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CHAPTER I 
THE EVE OF WAR 
In the years 1939 to 1941, Illinois stood poised to 
undergo significant changes in its economic, political and 
social landscape. In 1939, the state was coming out of a 
long depression. Many of its citizens were out of work. 
Many others, especially blacks, were employed in work relief 
projects of the Works Progress Administration (WPA). How-
ever, the state's mills and factories were increasing pro-
duction as the threat and then the onset of war in Europe led 
foreign governments and later the United States itself to 
purchase military supplies. Though many Illinoisans pro-
fited from the arms buildup, few wanted the nation to join 
the conflict in 1939. The Midwest was a citadel of isola-
tionism and the chief mouthpiece for non-intervention was 
the Chicago Tribune. Politically, the state was in the mid-
dle of a transition from vigorous competition by both par-
ties for all offices to a bipartisan division of power be-
tween Democratic Chicago and the Republican downstate as the 
Chicago Democratic machine and the Republicans in the city 
and state reached an accommodation with each other. One 
source of the machine's strength was its alliance with the 
Administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, an 
1 
2 
arrangement which provided jobs and money when both Chicago 
and the city Democratic organization badly needed them. 
In 1939, Illinois was a complex state with a hetero-
genous population. Chicago itself was ethnic, black, urban, 
catholic, Jewish and increasingly Democratic. In 1930, first 
and second generation white immigrants comprised 64.3 percent 
of the population. Blacks made up another 6.9 percent. Only 
27.9 percent were native-born whites with native-born white 
parents. Most of these ethnics came increasingly to vote 
Democratic. Downstate Illinois, however, was largely white, 
rural, small-town, Protestant, conservative and Republican. 
Downstaters viewed the big city of Chicago as a place of 
crime, corruption and sin, a place to visit but not to live. 
For their part, Chicagoans looked upon downstaters as hicks. 
Downstaters looked to the Republican party to uphold tradi-
tional small-town American values. Ethnic and black Chica-
goans looked to the Democratic party to help them realize 
their aspirations. While downstate Republicans relied on 
charity and private initiative to solve problems, Chicago 
Democrats looked to government for assistance. 1 
During the thirties, the Democratic machine gained 
control of city government in Chicago. During the twenties, 
the Irish controlled the organization, but in 1928, Anton J. 
Cermak organized a coalition of Bohemians, Poles, Jews and 
other non-Irish along with a few dissident Irish, including 
Edward J. Kelly, Thomas J. Courtney and Patrick Nash, and 
3 
ousted Michael Igoe and his Irish allies from control of the 
local machine. Cermak installed Nash as Cook County Demo-
cratic chairman. The Depression and the prohibition issue 
helped bring Democratic victories in the early thirties. In 
1931, Cermak defeated Republican Mayor William Hale Thompson, 
who was running for reelection and in 1932, Judge Henry 
Horner was elected governor. At this point, Horner was a 
loyal ally of the machine. 2 
Ed Kelly started in Democratic politics while working 
for the Chicago Sanitary District and in 1905 ran for trus-
tee of the District, but lost in a Republican landslide. 
The new Republican officials did not appreciate his campaig-
ning at worksites. While working on the North Shore Chan-
nel, he ended a dispute with the son of a local Republican 
official by flattening him with a single punch. When called 
before Sanitary District President Robert Rutherford McCor-
mick, a staunch Republican, Kelly expected to be fired. 
McCormick, however, admired his bravado and raised his sala-
ry. Thus started a lifelong friendship between Kelly and 
the aristocratic scion of the Chicago Tribune family. Kelly 
rose through the ranks at the District, eventually becoming 
chief engineer in 1920. His lack of formal training promp-
ted charges that he had gained his position due to his poli-
tical connections and McCormick's friendship. He also was 
indicted with several others on various charges of political 
corruption, but a friendly Democratic judge quashed the in-
4 
dictments. When the State's Attorney reassembled a case be-
fore a new grand jury, it reindicted everyone but Kelly, who 
3 
alone escaped unscathed. 
Irish Democrats, including Ed Kelly, despised Mayor 
cerrnak's leadership, but while others threatened rebellion, 
Kelly remained silent. Mayor Cermak supported Al Smith for 
the presidency in 1932, and failed to jump on the Roosevelt 
bandwagon at the Democratic convention until the tide swung 
to Roosevelt on the fourth ballot. In February, 1933, Cer-
mak went to Miami to make peace with the President-elect, 
but was fatally wounded by an assassin. 4 
Even before Cermak died on March 6, the struggle for 
succession began. On February 24, Democratic leaders dis-
cussed candidates, including Alderman Jacob Arvey. However, 
Nash thought a Jewish mayor and a Jewish governor, Henry 
Horner, would be rubbing it in for the Irish who were trying 
to regain their traditional leadership in the party. Arvey 
and other Jews agreed and party leaders considered other 
candidates, including Nash himself. Nash did not want the 
job, however, and on March 8, Democratic leaders voted to 
keep him as party leader, and later chose him to succeed 
Cermak as national committeeman. On March 10, the City 
Council, after rejecting rival candidates, chose Alderman 
Francis J. Corr as acting mayor. 5 
Meanwhile, in Springfield, the General Assembly passed 
legislation allowing the City Council to choose a mayor from 
5 
outside its own ranks. On April 10, Nash suggested Ed Kelly. 
other party leaders concurred and on April 14, the Council 
elected Kelly. There was much bitterness among rival 
candidates and their friends, some of whom suspected that 
colonel McCormick had assisted in Kelly's election, hoping 
to secure a friendly Democrat in City Hall. Certainly, 
McCormick did not resist. 6 
The Depression hit Chicago at a time when it was al-
ready suffering financial difficulties. Mayor Cermak, unab-
le to get more than limited relief from the state, turned to 
the federal government. By March, 1933, Illinois had re-
ceived its statutory limit of $45 million in loans from the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation. When Mayor Kelly took 
over, he used a variety of expedients to solve the more 
pressing financial difficulties, but he too turned to Wash-
ington for assistance and got it. New Deal agencies, espe-
cially the Works Progress Administration, provided financial 
assistance and work relief projects to Chicago and other ci-
ties. Chicago gained many civic improvements, including a 
modernized airport, the State Street subway, additional 
parkland, expressways and various street and sewerage im-
provements. 7 
In addition to taking credit for such projects, Mayor 
Kelly and other Chicago politicians took advantage of the 
infusion of money and jobs to reward themselves and their 
followers much as they later did during the war with the home 
front war agencies. 
6 
From time to time, the local press 
uncovered instances of extortion and other corrupt practices. 
Though federal agencies made some changes to prevent such 
abuses, they had to maintain constant vigilance to keep the 
graft within reasonable bounds. Even then, despite the 
efforts of federal administrators to hire without regard to 
political affiliation, many Kelly-Nash politicians told job-
seekers that they could get jobs if they had the support of 
the machine. So, it was not unusual for Chicago Congressman 
Arthur W. Mitchell to advise a constituent seeking a federal 
job to first get a letter from his ward committeeman. 8 
In practice, the machine did not have the influence 
it claimed to have in securing jobs for supporters, but the 
belief that it did brought additional votes for machine can-
didates, especially if machine supporters did get jobs. It 
also brought criticism from Republicans and independents, 
who claimed that the success of the machine rested on the 
captive votes of those on relief. This, too, helped the ma-
chine since Republican criticism of relief participants as 
parasites and WPA projects as costly boondoggles allowed the 
Democrats to portray themselves as the friends of the common 
people. This won votes at the expense of the apparently 
callous Republicans. Mayor Kelly's support of the New Deal 
was not solely based on political benefits. He believed in 
Roosevelt and the New Deal and was committed to helping the 
underprivileged. Though he never repudiated the tactics of 
7 
bossism, they gradually became less conspicuous under Roose-
velt's influence. The alliance between the Democratic ma-
chine and the Roosevelt Administration was not one-sided, 
for the Administration relied on the machine to deliver De-
mocratic votes in a region where it had many enemies. 9 
one powerful opponent of the Administration was Mayor 
Kelly's friend, Colonel Robert Rutherford McCormick, owner 
and publisher of the Chicago Tribune and leader of the Re-
publican party in Illinois. At first, he was friendly to-
ward his old schoolmate, President Roosevelt, but soon broke 
with him as the New Deal introduced extensive government re-
gulation into the economy. McCormick regarded this as fas-
cist or socialistic, and Tribune editorials often portrayed 
New Dealers as communists. McCormick blamed the Depression 
on government spending and felt that budget cuts would bring 
recovery. Hence, the Tribune ferreted out and attacked waste 
in New Deal agencies, while suppressing news favorable to the 
Administration. State and local Democratic officials also 
came under attack, with the exception of Mayor Kelly. 10 
Colonel McCormick also opposed the Administration's 
increasingly interventionist foreign policy. McCormick was 
an isolationist, opposing American intervention outside the 
Western Hemisphere. He had no use for the Nazis, but felt 
that Europe should settle its own problems without American 
intervention. Then too, he considered Russian communism to 
be a far greater threat than German or Italian fascism, and 
8 
hence favored a pol icy of appeasement of the Germans and 
Italians to ward off the Soviet Union. After war broke out, 
he did support England and France against Germany and Italy, 
but still opposed American involvement. McCormick also op-
posed American and European efforts to block Japanese expan-
sion in the Far East. He urged a buildup of American defen-
ses in the Pacific, but favored abandoning the Philippines 
to the Japanese as not worth saving. McCormick distrusted 
the Europeans, especially since they did not pay their war 
debts, and he disliked the English class system and English 
. 1. 11 socia ism. 
The Chicago Tribune was popular throughout much of 
the Midwest. During the thirties, about a third of its Sun-
day circulation went to cities outside the Chicago area. In 
1931, 83 percent of families in Champaign read the Sunday 
Chicago Tribune. The paper appealed to individualistic va-
lues of small-town free enterprise Americans in downstate 
Illinois, who looked with disfavor at Chicago's cosmopoli-
tanism, its heterogenous population and its wickedness. In 
Chicago, the Tribune was most popular in the wealthy neigh-
borhoods, while others either read a different newspaper, or 
as in the case of many ethnic neighborhoods, the foreign-
language press. While downstaters and many of the wealthier 
Chicagoans tended to vote Republican, most other Chicagoans 
became increasingly Democratic, especially after 1931. Even 
though the Tribune continued to be popular, its editorial 
9 
stand earned it many enemies, especially in Chicago after 
1939. 12 
one of the biggest accomplishments of the Kelly-Nash 
machine was convincing Chicago's black community to shift 
its political allegiance from the Republican to the Democra-
tic party. Mayor Cermak tried police raids on policy games 
in black neighborhoods to force blacks to support Democrats. 
Mayor Kelly dropped such tactics and allowed vice to flou-
rish unchecked. He also offered more patronage jobs to 
blacks than had the Republicans, and appointed blacks to high 
positions in city government. The New Deal helped a good 
deal with its work projects. In June, 1937, 53 percent of 
the city's blacks were involved with New Deal work relief 
projects. Kelly had to contend with segregationist policies 
in the school board and national public housing agencies as 
well as his white supporters. Though this limited the suc-
cess of his policies, his support of integration in housing, 
education and public accomodations generated support for the 
machine in the black community. 13 
During the thirties, the Kelly-Nash machine streng-
thened its hold on Chicago. Machine candidates won large 
victories, often with a huge Cook County vote offsetting a 
heavy Republican vote downstate. Many Democratic voters were 
relief recipients bearing cards identifying themselves as 
illiterates who wished to vote a straight Democratic ticket. 
Ward politicians distributed them, warning recipients to vote 
10 
Democratic or lose relief funds. Such tactics angered some 
officials in the Roosevelt Administration, but in 1935, the 
president reluctantly endorsed the Mayor for reelection after 
Jim Farley advised him that the Mayor had the nomination 
locked up and that it would be foolish to oppose him. In 
that election, the Republicans made a deal with the machine 
and put up a weak candidate, Emil Wetten, who waged a 
lackluster campaign. Mayor Kelly won easily, carrying all 
fifty wards. Massive vote fraud merely embellished the 
result. Soon afterward, when the Roosevelt Administration 
wanted the Illinois General Assembly to pass a tax increase 
to pay for relief funds, Mayor Kelly helped to push a bill 
through after Governor Horner was unable to do so. This 
increased the Mayor's prestige with the Roosevelt Administra-
tion at the expense of the Governor. 14 
Mayor Kelly and Governor Horner did not get along 
well. Kelly felt that Horner should take orders from the 
machine on matters of patronage, while the Governor insisted 
on maintaining his independence. In 1935, the Mayor broke 
with the Governor after Horner refused to appoint a friend 
of the mayor to a state commission and vetoed a controver-
sial bill sponsored by the machine to license and tax gamb-
ling in Chicago. Kelly slated Dr. Herman Bundesen, the ci-
ty• s health commissioner, for governor, and John Stelle, of 
McLeansboro, for lieutenant-governor. The President tried 
to persuade Horner to drop out of the race, but he refused. 
11 
Instead, he struck back, firing Kelly-Nash supporters from 
state jobs. Campaigning against Kelly and bossism, he 
soundly defeated Bundesen and went on to win easily in the 
Democratic landslide of 1936. Following the election, Hor-
ner gathered a team of politicians allied with him against 
Kelly, including Cook County State's Attorney Thomas J. 
Courtney. In 1938, their candidate for the Senate, Con-
gressman Scott Lucas, defeated Mayor Kelly's choice and went 
on to win in November despite growing hostility toward Pre-
sident Roosevelt in isolationist Illinois as international 
tensions worsened. During the campaign, Mayor Kelly, at the 
insistence of his allies, finally made peace with Governor 
Horner to preserve party harmony. However, the Mayor ulti-
mately decided that he wanted no more Democratic governors, 
and after Horner's death in the fall of 1940, Kelly worked 
to defeat the Democratic gubernatorial candidate. Eventual-
ly, he formed a working relationship with the Republicans in 
Springfield. 15 
During the thirties, the Army and Navy Munitions Board 
revised its industrial mobilization plan several times. In 
August, 1939, the War Department established the War Resour-
ces Board, headed by steel company executive Edward J. 
Stettinius, Jr. The Board only lasted a short time, but did 
make recommendations. In May, 1940, the President appointed 
an advisory commission to the Council of National Defense. 
Actually, the Council, an old World War I agency, remained 
12 
dormant while the Advisory Council advised the President and 
gradually began to coordinate the defense effort. Each 
advisor on the Commission represented a different aspect of 
the defense program and each built up a small staff, which 
eventually formed the basis for war agencies established 
later. Its Industrial Production Division eventually became 
the Office of Production Management, which itself was 
replaced in 1942 by the War Production Board. These produc-
tion agencies steadily assumed a more active role in super-
vising and coordinating the conversion of the nation's 
industrial resources from the manufacture of civilian 
products such as railway equipment and farm implements to 
production of tanks, artillery and other military supplies. 
Eventually, war brought government involvement in every 
aspect of the economy on an unprecedented scale. 16 
Defense production began as early as 1938 when some 
Illinois firms received educational orders from military 
procurement agencies. These orders were designed to test the 
ability of private companies to adapt themselves overnight 
to production of war supplies. In 1939, the outbreak of war 
in Europe brought an influx of orders for military supplies 
from the Allies, especially Britain, and in 1940, the 
American armed forces increased their purchases. During the 
years 1939 to 1941, much of Illinois industry converted from 
civilian to defense production with some assistance from the 
nation defense production agencies and from Governor Dwight 
13 
Green and Mayor Kelly, who sought defense contracts for state 
• 17 industries. 
conversion to defense production brought some shorta-
ges of civilian goods at a time when consumers were eager to 
buy. Prices rose rapidly, spurring demands by labor for in-
creased wages, which in turn led to further price hikes. To 
stem the resultant inflation, the National Defense Advisory 
commission adopted informal voluntary price controls. In 
April, 1941, its price stabilization section became the Of-
fice of Price Stabilization and Civilian Supply, later 
changed to the Office of Price Administration when civilian 
supply was shifted to the Office of Production Management. 
Controls remained voluntary at first, and were restricted to 
industrial prices. In 1942, however, the agency adopted 
mandatory controls and extended them to the retail level as 
it sought to keep prices at a reasonable level. Rationing 
was utilized to allocate food and scarce consumer goods on 
an equitable basis. Even so, demand outstripped supply and 
black markets developed. Ultimately, despite protests from 
farmers and labor, farm prices and wages were also restric-
ted in effort to hold down inflation. 18 
A major reason for the difficulty in holding down in-
flation was farm prices. Illinois agriculture was in a de-
pression throughout the twenties and thirties and prices de-
clined. Farmers responded by seeking parity prices for crops 
to give them the same purchasing power that they had between 
14 
1910 and 1914. The Roosevelt Administration championed their 
cause and tried various means of getting farm prices up to 
parity during the depression of the thirties. New Deal 
agencies such as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
(AAA) and the Soil Conservation Service worked to restrict 
farm production through payments to farmers for not planting 
all of their cropland. In 1939, price adjustment payments 
were made to offset low market prices. Gradually, farm 
prices, which had bottomed out at 63 percent of parity in 
1932, rose to 79 percent of parity by 1939. Because of their 
experience with low prices and heavy crop carryover during 
the twenties and thirties, farmers and New Deal agricultural 
agencies were slow to adjust to the increased demand for food 
following the outbreak of war in Europe, fearing that 
overproduction would bring large surpluses and low prices. 
In 1941, the Department of Agriculture established special 
price supports on hogs and other commodities to stimulate 
production. Later, the Department also established agricul-
tural war boards at the local level to promote increased 
planting. However, there was no agricultural defense agency 
until the War Food Administration was established in 1943. 
Instead, existing agencies simply handled new tasks. Even 
then, farmers, farm organizations and agricultural agencies 
resisted efforts to subject farm commodities to price 
controls and indeed forced the Off ice of Price Administration 
to accept a ceiling on farm prices of 110 percent of parity 
t . e 19 for a im • 
15 
Though agriculture in Illinois was highly diversified, 
corn was the chief crop. Corn was fed to hogs and other 
livestock, or sold to refineries for use in a variety of 
products. Wheat was another major crop, but surpluses in 
the early forties led to a substantial reduction in wheat 
planting in 1942. Soybeans were becoming an important crop. 
By the eve of war, soybean planting was one-fourth that of 
corn. Soybeans were sent to processors like A. E. Staley 
Company in Decatur, the soybean processing capital of the 
region, to be crushed and converted to vegetable oils and 
animal feed. Many farmers raised livestock, usually hogs, 
though cattle were a significant crop. Mechanization of 
farms was checked somewhat in the early thirties, but re-
vived in the late thirties as farmers reequipped their farms. 
In 1920, Illinois farmers owned 23,102 tractors. By 1940, 
they had 126, 067, and in 1940 and 1941, they made record 
purchases of additional implements. Illinois also led other 
states in the use of limestone to sweeten the soil. 20 
Many Illinois farms lacked the amenities of urban life 
on the eve of the war. Running water was often a luxury. 
Outhouses served sanitary needs. Most farms in the northern 
counties had electricity due to pioneering efforts by public 
utilities in that area in extending electricity to farms and 
rural homes. In the central and southern counties, it was a 
different story. Public utility companies were reluctant to 
16 
extend electric lines into rural areas for fear that they 
would be unprofitable. In 1935, the Rural Electrification 
Administration was established to offer low-interest loans to 
cooperatives for extension of power lines to rural areas. 
still, during the war, only about half of Illinois farms had 
any electricity and even fewer were fully electrified. The 
situation was worst in the southern counties where only about 
10 percent of farms had electricity. Indeed, many farms in 
the southern counties were small subsistence farms, whose 
owners barely eked out a living. Still, many Illinois farms 
did have radios and telephones and farmers drove automobiles 
to town on new hard roads. 21 
Many farmers were owners or part-owners, but others, 
including some large-scale commercial farmers, were tenants. 
By 1940, ownership was gaining over tenancy. In 1935, there 
were 86,862 full owners, 39,698 part owners (who owned part 
of their land and rented the rest) and 102,856 tenants. By 
1940, there were 87,004 full owners, 32,826 part-owners and 
91,982 tenants. This trend continued during the war. The 
number of farms was also declining. In 1920, there were 
237,181 farms. In 1940, there were only 213,439. Of these, 
105,857 were medium-sized farms of 50 to 180 acres. Land 
values fell during the twenties, but bottomed out in the 
early thirties and rose somewhat by 1940. During the war, 
they were to rise sharply. Many farmers were members of the 
Illinois Agricultural Association, the state affiliate of 
17 
the American Farm Bureau and the largest and wealthiest state 
farm organization in the country. In 1941, 33.8 percent of 
Illinois farmers belonged to the organization. 
included large and small farmers and tenants 
Membership 
as well. 
However, by and large, the organization served the interests 
of the successful commercial farmer and was apathetic toward 
disadvantaged farmers. The Illinois Agricultural Association 
was a staunch supporter of New Deal programs. In 1934, when 
only 36 percent of Illinois farms of under 100 acres were 
under the AAA program, 71 percent of those ranging from 260 
to 500 acres were under it. 22 
Many farmers sent their children to one-room schools 
staffed by poorly-paid and poorly-trained teachers, who had 
only a few students to teach. The schools themselves often 
lacked water or even outhouses and the educational quality 
was inferior to that of city schools. Though the number of 
one-room schools was slowly declining in the early forties, 
there were still over 12,000 school districts in Illinois in 
1942, of which about 10,000 were one-room schools. Illinois 
had more one-room schools than any other state in the coun-
try. 23 
Farm workers were plentiful on the eve of war. Many 
were young men from nearby farms, who could not be employed 
profitably at home. They worked on other farms, gained ex-
perience, saved up a little money and bought their own farms 
or went into non-farm work. Other hired hands were permanent 
18 
farm laborers. Wages were low. In April, 1939, the average 
monthly wage for an Illinois farm laborer was $32.25 with 
room and board and $43.25 without it. Living quarters for 
hired hands and tenants were often undesirable. As late as 
April, 1942, hired hands in Jo Daviess County often lived in 
houses lacking running water and electricity. There also 
were migrant workers following seasonal crops. In 1941, 
seasonal workers in Southern Illinois lived in tents or slept 
in sheds on the farms while harvesting fruits and vegetables. 
Pay ranged from $1.20 to $1.60 for a 10-hour day. This was 
soon to change as the draft and defense plants drained off 
farm laborers. By the summer of 1941, many farmers around 
the state had a difficult time securing hired hands and 
migrant workers.~ 
Illinois has long been a major crossroads for the 
transportation arteries of the nation. Within the state, 
several cities, especially Chicago, were long-standing points 
for transhipment and interchange of people and cargoes and 
junctions between carriers serving different parts of the 
country. On the eve of the Second World War, the railroads 
dominated common-carrier transportation, handling over 60 
percent of all freight and carrying over 64 percent of all 
passengers traveling on public carriers. Illinois had 11,949 
miles of line, more than any state in the Union except Texas. 
Chicago, which was served by twenty-two trunk-line railroads 
and several terminal roads, was the hub of the national 
19 
railway system. East St. Louis, Peoria and several other 
Illinois cities were also important railway terminals with 
. b t . 25 connections e ween numerous carriers. 
The railroads greeted the outbreak of war in Europe 
with some trepidation. During the First World War, a series 
of blunders by both the companies and the government led to 
government takeover and operation of the railways. It was a 
costly experience which neither party wished to repeat. One 
of its legacies was an agreement between the government and 
the railroad brotherhoods on work-rules. The carriers soon 
embarked on a lengthy battle with the unions to change these 
work-rules, which were out-dated, inefficient and costly. 
During the twenties, the railroads invested heavily in new 
equipment only to find themselves saddled with excess capa-
city when the Depression hit in the thirties. Traffic fell 
off and many railroads entered receivership. Although the 
outbreak of war in 1939 brought increased traffic, the car-
riers were reluctant to purchase new rolling stock except to 
replace existing equipment lest they be stuck with excess 
capacity after the war. This reluctance led to serious 
equipment shortages during the war. 26 
By the end of the thirties, railroads faced serious 
competition from other means of transportation, especially 
the automobile. In 1922, automobile passenger-miles were 
one-fourth that of passenger trains. By 1927, the figure 
was reversed, and by 1940, only 8.71 intercity passengers 
20 
went by rail, though trains did carry most of those who did 
not go by car. The automobile emptied locals and made seri-
ous inroads on long-distance travel. Bus competition also 
increased so that by 1940, almost 30 percent of travelers 
using common carriers went by bus. Auto and bus travelers 
benefitted from steadily increasing government investment in 
highways. In 1916, in response to demands by motorists for 
good roads, Congress established the first federal highway 
program. By the twenties, every state was building new roads 
with federal matching funds. By 1940, Illinois had 14,000 
miles of paved hard roads, which were soon crowded with 
automobiles, buses and trucks. 27 
Airlines also captured a small but growing portion of 
intercity passenger traffic, especially long-distance tra-
vel. In 1940, airlines carried 2.7 percent of all passengers 
traveling on common-carriers. Illinois had 54 airports in 
1941. The first ones were mainly private ventures, but in 
the thirties, the Civil Works Administration, the Works 
Progress Administration and the Illinois Emergency Relief 
Commission financed municipal airport projects in Chicago, 
Bloomington, Danville, Springfield, Peoria and other cities. 
Chicago built its Municipal Airport, now Midway Airport, on 
the city's Southwest Side. In 1941, the airport was im-
proved and enlarged after a railroad line running through it 
was relocated. At the same time, with air traffic outgrow-
ing the airport, Chicagoans sought a site for another air-
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field. Many, including Merrill C. Meigs, a newspaper publ 
sher and aviation advocate, urged a lakefront airport since 
it would give Chicago air facilities close to the city's 
business district. There also was some discussion of a site 
on the city's Southeast Side in the Lake Calumet District. 
ultimately, the city had to wait until after the war to ful-
fill its dreams. Meanwhile, eight major airlines served the 
city, including United Air Lines, which maintained its cen-
tral offices in a new building at the airport. 28 
Railroads responded to the loss of passenger traffic 
to the auto, the bus and the airplane by introducing new 
streamlined passenger trains in the mid-thirties. Streamli-
ners recaptured much lost passenger traffic with their speed 
and modernity. Railroads added more every year until after 
Pearl Harbor. Most were pulled by diesel-electric locomo-
tives. Some railroads experimented with diesels in the 
twenties for switching, but it was in the thirties that 
railroads started ordering diesels in ever-larger numbers 
for passenger service, switching and finally in the early 
forties, for line-haul freight service. Though they conti-
nued to buy steam locomotives, by 1939, railroads bought more 
diesels than steamers.~ 
As with passenger service, railroads faced increasing 
competition in freight traffic. In the late twenties, rail-
roads handled 75 percent of all freight. In 1940, they still 
carried almost 62 percent, but trucks handled over 8 percent, 
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waterways almost 20 percent and pipelines over 10 percent. 
The number of trucks on the road grew rapidly in the twenties 
and by the end of the decade carried almost 4 percent of 
total intercity freight ton-mileage, most of it light loads 
moving short distances. During the thirties, truck transport 
expanded rapidly as unemployed truck drivers bought their own 
trucks on credit in order to establish their own small 
intercity trucking businesses. Though many soon folded, 
others arose to take their place. Trucking was unregulated 
until 1935 and like the automobile and the bus, benefitted 
from new highways reaching all parts of every state. 30 
Shortly before the turn of the century, the City of 
Chicago built the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal, mainly to 
improve drainage and sanitation. However, the canal also 
was useful for transportation. In 1908, Illinois initiated 
improvements to the Illinois and Des Plaines Rivers and the 
Chicago waterways. When completed in 1933, the resulting 
Illinois Waterway connected Lake Michigan with the Missis-
sippi River. Chicago also straightened a portion of the 
Chicago River during the twenties. In 1918, in order to 
relieve pressure on the railroads, the federal government 
created a division of Inland Waterways in the United states 
Railway Administration, which oversaw the government opera-
tion of the railways. The Division continued operation of 
its barges after the railroads were returned to private 
hands in 1920, and in 1924, Congress created the Inland Wa-
23 
terways corporation to operate the Federal Barge Lines. By 
the late thirties, about 500 private operators were on the 
waterways. During the twenties and thirties, the government 
also built a series of locks and darns on the Mississippi and 
Ohio Rivers to improve navigation on those waterways. Water 
traffic rose rapidly due to cheap rates. Tonnage on the Il-
linois waterway went from half a million in 1934 to 7 mil-
lion in 1940. Barges carried coal, grain, sulphur, sugar, 
oil, scrap iron, sand and gravel, and other bulk products. 
Great Lakes traffic also increased in the late thirties and 
early forties as a recovering economy and the defense boom 
brought big gains in lake movements of coal, iron ore, grain 
1 . t 31 and irnes one. 
All carriers, rail, highway, air and water, were corn-
petitors in 1940. Wartime conditions were to force them in-
to a temporary cooperation and retard the shift in traffic 
from some carriers to others. However, the general direction 
of these trends was already set and they would resume in the 
postwar years. 
The labor movement in Illinois was also changing on 
the eve of the Second World War. In 1930, most of Illinois 
labor was unorganized and many companies were militantly an-
ti-union. The Fox River Valley Manufacturers Association 
maintained a blacklist for many years. Some companies, such 
as International Harvester, established company unions, which 
they dominated in an effort to stave off outside organizers. 
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company unions did provide some benefits for their members, 
but generally failed to engage in real collective bargaining. 
They were outlawed by the Wagner Act of 1935 and after the 
supreme court upheld the law's constitutionality in 1937, 
most company unions were gradually dismantled, though this 
did not end efforts to avoid unionization. The American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) and its state affiliate, the 
Illinois State Federation of Labor (ISFL), dominated or-
ganized labor in Illinois. The latter was hard hit by the 
Depression as its membership dropped from 189,000 in 1927 to 
about 76,000 in 1933, though it rebounded to 237,000 by 1941. 
Most AFL unions were based on specific crafts. In 1933 and 
1934, the Federation tried to organize new locals in various 
industries, but with little success, partly because of its 
insistence that workers join craft unions. Many workers 
wanted industrial unions. Although some member organiza-
tions, led by John L. Lewis and his United Mine Workers, 
urged that the AFL organize new unions on an industrial 
basis, the more conservative craft unions objected to this. 
The United Mine Workers and others soon bolted the Federation 
and set up the Congress of Industrial Organizations and set 
out to organize the unorganized industries on an industrial 
basis. 32 
One of the first targets was the steel industry. The 
United Mine Workers helped establish the Steel Workers Orga-
nizing Committee, which set out in 1936 to conquer the mills. 
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The new union had limited success that year, but early in 
1937 , the united states Steel corporation gave in without a 
fight. other victories soon followed. However, several 
smaller "Little steel" producers, led by Republic Steel, 
organized to fight the Steel Workers union. On Memorial Day, 
1937, Chicago police fired on a crowd of strikers and their 
families, killing ten and wounding others. "Little Steel" 
beat the union temporarily. However, within a few years, the 
union resumed its organizing activity under more favorable 
circumstances during the defense boom of 1940-1941. With the 
heavy defense business, the companies were in less of a 
position to resist unionization. 33 
In the late thirties, the Farm Equipment Workers Or-
ganizing committee, an offshoot of the Steel Workers Organi-
zing Committee, set out to organize the farm equipment in-
dustry. It faced a formidable obstacle in International 
Harvester, which set up a company union in 1919 in a suc-
cessful effort to avert unionization by the American Federa-
tion of Labor. The company union, the Harvester Industrial 
Council, had a Works council in each plant. Management do-
minated each local, though they did have employee represen-
tatives. The company managed to fight organization by AFL 
unions for some time. In 1937, the Farm Equipment Workers 
union gained control of the Works council at the Tractor 
Works in Chicago. A year later, the union won recognition 
at the plant. One of the Works Council employee representa-
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tives who joined the new union was Gerald Fielde, later to 
become one of the most talented leaders of the union. Mean-
while, following a Supreme Court decision outlawing company 
unions, International Harvester replaced its Works Councils 
with independent unions in each plant, each with the old 
works council leadership, many of whom were soon promoted to 
managerial positions. There were no elections. The company 
simply signed contracts with the locals after they were or-
ganized. The Farm Equipment Workers union protested to the 
National Labor Relations Board that the independents were 
company unions. After investigation, the Board agreed and 
in February, 1941, ordered their disestablishment. This 
paved the way for a drive to unionize International Harves-
ter. During the late thirties, the Farm Equipment Workers 
union and others also complained to the National Labor Re-
lations Board about John Deere and Company's reliance on an 
individual contract with each worker. The contract con-
tained a clause forbidding the employee to join in a concer-
ted action to change wages, hours or other conditions of the 
contract. Though the Board forbade the company to enforce 
the clause, unions generally had only limited success in or-
ganizing John Deere in the late thirties. Though a Pattern-
makers union affiliated with the AFL won contracts at some 
Moline plants in 1939, unions scored no major gains at John 
Deere until 1942 and 1943.~ 
The Congress of Industrial Organizations grew rapidly 
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in the thirties as it organized industrial unions in meat 
· electrical equipment and other industries. At that packing, 
time, it allowed competition between member unions in orga-
nizing companies. This eventually led to a bitter feud be-
tween the Farm Equipment Workers union and the United Auto 
workers, which wished to organize the farm equipment indus-
try itself. Ultimately, the latter union triumphed in the 
postwar world and the Farm Equipment Workers union folded. 35 
During the thirties, Illinois was also the scene of a 
battle within the United Mine Workers union, which led to 
secession of many Illinois members and formation of a rival 
union. John L. Lewis ruled his union with an iron hand. 
His dictatorial policies and interference in union politics 
and wage disputes in Illinois led dissidents to form a 
schismatic group, the Reorganized United Mine Workers of Il-
linois, in March, 1930, claiming that they were rescuing the 
union from Lewis. The movement faltered as its leaders fell 
out among themselves. The original leadership included 
selfless and incorruptable union officials, but they soon 
deserted the movement when the membership demanded accep-
tance of several locally popular but notoriously corrupt 
leaders. Some of these leaders accepted Communist support, 
thus allowing Lewis to engage in red-baiting, though he him-
self had no scruples about hiring leftists if it suited his 
purpose. Lewis took the opportunity to strengthen his hold 
on his union's District 12, which controlled the Illinois 
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coalfields. Violence broke out as Lewis supporters engaged 
in gun battles with dissidents. In March, 1931, the move-
ment collapsed after a local court ruled that the Lewis fac-
tion was the legal union and that the rival faction had to 
disband. Although it soon did, Lewis provoked a second and 
more successful revolt when he forced Illinois miners to 
accept a wage cut in August, 1932. They responded by for-
ming the Progressive Mine Workers of America. Lewis ended 
up with the shell of a union in Illinois as most miners de-
serted to the Progressives. The new union encountered dif-
ficulties in securing recognition. Bitter civil war broke 
out as the two unions dueled over jurisdiction of the mi-
ners. Scores lost their lives in bombings of homes and other 
violence. In 1938, after the United Mine Workers left the 
American Federation of Labor, the Progressives obtained a 
Federation charter, only to withdraw in 1946 when the Uni-
ted Mine Workers rejoined for a short time. They would not 
remain in the same organization with John L. Lewis, though 
they sometimes participated in strikes called by the United 
Mine Workers. 36 
The increase in business for Illinois firms following 
the outbreak of war in Europe created new job opportunities 
for many on relief. Unemployment, which hit 1,215,000 in 
1932, over 42 percent of the state's work force, declined to 
511,000 by 1937, then rose to 892,000 in 1938, then dropped 
to 251,000 by the end of 1941. By December, 1940, the Works 
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progress Administration was employing mostly older men, who 
had difficulty finding jobs in the new defense industries. 
Most were untrained and unskilled, while industry sought 
skilled, younger men. Within a few years, however, most 
companies would be glad to hire even the unskilled. In some 
cases, new defense industries led to the rise of boomtowns 
such as Wilmington, a Northern Illinois community, which was 
crowded with workers employed at the nearby ordnance plants. 
Elwood, another nearby town doubled its population by May, 
1941. 37 
Due to pervasive discrimination, blacks were slower 
to benefit from the reviving economy. Many employers refused 
to hire blacks at all or restricted them to service posi-
tions. Some unions, all of them either independent or 
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, discrimi-
nated against blacks, either by banning them outright or by 
segregating them in auxiliary locals, which limited their 
job opportunities. A commission appointed by Governor Horner 
in 1939 to investigate the condition of urban blacks in 
Illinois found extensive discrimination by defense industries 
and unions. In 1941, the commission sent a questionnaire on 
black employment to 473 firms holding defense contracts. Of 
the 146 who replied, 95 employed no blacks, while the 
remainder employed very few. Some companies simply refused 
to hire blacks, while others cited union or community 
opposition. There were exceptions. International Harvester 
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employed hundreds of blacks, many in skilled positions. So 
did Chicago meat packers. However, a Chicago military truck 
plant employed only a single black janitor, while a Peoria 
tractor plant employed no blacks among its 12,000 workers. 
Even blacks trained in defense work had difficulty getting 
jobs. Many were rejected in favor of whites with lower 
grades. Often, blacks were instructors in training classes 
for jobs which they could not get simply because of racial 
barriers. Some employers also restricted hiring to Gentiles. 
All of this was soon to change as the draft and resultant 
labor shortages forced employers to hire blacks and other 
. 't' 38 minor1 1es. 
In 1940, there were 854,276 women in the state's labor 
force. Most were in poorly-paid off ice work, service 
industries and industrial jobs. Many other women did not 
work outside the home. Some employers refused to hire mar-
ried women. The school board in Rockford required woman 
teachers to retire at the end of the semester in which they 
married. Other employers were reluctant to hire women for 
traditionally male jobs. The defense boom brought women in-
to defense industries luring them away from jobs as domes-
tics, though even then comparatively few women were hired 
because employers had large pools of unemployed men to draw 
upon. Not until 1942 was there a big increase in employment 
of women in defense industries. 39 
On the eve of the Second World War, Illinois was al-
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ready undergoing some changes in its political and economic 
fabric. 
timately 
A resurgent Republican party was engaged in its ul-
successful campaign to recapture the statehouse 
while the Chicago Democratic machine was strengthening its 
hold on the city. Much of the machine's support came from 
working-class ethnics and blacks who were seeking a larger 
share of the city's resources. Many workers were organizing 
themselves into unions to secure better wages and working 
conditions in the state's industries which were emerging from 
a severe Depression. Other workers, however, were un-
employed or underemployed. Farm workers were plentiful and 
farmers themselves restricted production in the hope of se-
curing higher farm prices. At the same time, they were 
mechanizing their farms to improve their efficiency and in-
crease profits. 
Many of these trends continued during the war and some 
were actually strengthened by it. The division of political 
power between Democratic Chicago and Republican downstate 
eventually led to a measure of bipartisan cooperation in the 
General Assembly. Throughout the defense buildup and the war 
emergency, all levels of government cooperated in civilian 
defense and in efforts to secure war contracts for the 
state's manufacturers. Expansion of industry relieved 
unemployment and strengthened the hands of union organizers 
since the heavy defense business made companies reluctant to 
fire skilled workers for union activity. Eventually, many 
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firms had to accept unionization. 
other changes were somewhat retarded by the war, only 
to resume soon after the war, often at an accelerated pace. 
Farmers could not obtain new agricultural implements during 
the war and railroads were forced to curtail dieselization. 
More significantly, the war delayed but did not stop the 
shift of most common carrier passenger travel and much in-
tercity freight traffic from railroads to other forms of 
transportation. 
The war also stimulated new currents which ultimately 
resulted in profound social changes. In 1939, most married 
women stayed home and tended to household duties. Those who 
did work were usually employed at low-paying jobs in cleri-
cal and service industries. Blacks were largely confined to 
low-paid menial and unpleasant occupations. Many were on 
work relief projects. Trade unions often barred them or 
segregated them into auxiliary locals controlled by white 
locals. The war, however, created new employment opportuni-
ties for women, blacks and other minorities and ultimately 
raised their status in society. 
Illinois on the eve of war was strongly isolationist, 
somewhat provincial and divided in its political allegiance 
and its reaction to New Deal farm, labor and relief policies. 
The war that broke out in Europe ultimately led to signifi-
cant changes in the state's political and economic life and 
left a different world in the postwar era. 
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CHAPTER II 
ILLINOIS POLITICS IN WARTIME 
Illinois politics during the late thirties and for-
ties blended concerns over national domestic and foreign 
policy issues with those of state and local interest. The 
Chicago Democratic machine established close ties with the 
Administration of President Frankl in Delano Roosevelt and 
supported its domestic and foreign policies, while Illinois 
Republicans fought these same policies and the Democratic 
machine as well. In addition, a long-standing rivalry be-
tween the city of Chicago and downstate Illinois led to 
friction within the Democratic party as Governor Henry Hor-
ner arose as a political rival to Chicago Mayor Edward Jo-
seph Kelly. This split within the Democratic party eventu-
ally benefitted Illinois Republicans, who capitalized on 
voter discontent with the New Deal, scandals in the Horner 
Administration, machine politics in Chicago and the Roosevelt 
Administration's foreign policy to regain control of state 
government. This brought a new division of political power 
between Democratic Chicago and Republican downstate with some 
assistance from Colonel Robert Rutherford McCormick, archcon-
servati ve owner of the powerful Chicago Tribune and a good 
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friend of Mayor Kelly. Illinois Republican politics began to 
shift during the forties from the isolationism of Colonel 
McCormick to the internationalism of Colonel Frank Knox, 
owner of the Chicago Daily News. Though Governor Dwight 
Green steered a middle course, some of his allies associated 
themselves with the movement. The Old Guard continued to 
dominate the party, but with decreasing electoral success. 
This led to bipartisan cooperation between Governor Green and 
Mayor Kelly in 1945. 
In 1939, Illinois politics was dominated by the Demo-
crats who controlled the statehouse as well as the City of 
Chicago. In Chicago, the Democratic organization maintained 
an alliance with the Roosevelt Administration, helping to get 
out the vote on election day. The Administration, in turn 
allocated funds and work relief projects for the city. These 
projects resulted in many civic improvements for the city and 
provided jobs for machine supporters and its constiuents at 
a time when jobs were scarce. However, during the thirties, 
Governor Horner, once a loyal supporter of the machine, 
became a political rival to Mayor Kelly when he refused to 
obey the dictates of the machine on patronage and vetoed 
legislation supported by the machine to allow gambling in 
Chicago. After Kelly failed in an attempt to unseat Horner 
in 1936, the Governor gathered a team of politicians allied 
with him against Kelly, including Cook County State's 
Attorney Thomas J. Courtney. During the 1938 campaign, Mayor 
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Kelly, at the insistence of his allies, finally made his 
peace with Governor Horner to preserve party harmony. 
aowever, some of Horner's allies continued to oppose Kelly 
and backed State's Attorney Courtney for mayor in 1939. 
courtney, who portrayed himself as a crime-fighting reform-
er, campaigned against machine politics and boss rule and 
accused the machine of protecting criminals. Horner was in 
seclusion in Florida recovering from a serious illness and 
took no part in the campaign. His aides and allies were 
divided, with some supporting Courtney and others, including 
Lieutenant Governor John Stelle, backing Kelly. 
end, Kelly beat Courtney by a substantial margin. 1 
In the 
Mayor Kelly faced a formidable Republican opponent in 
Dwight H. Green, a successful attorney who had assisted in 
the prosecution of Alphonse Capone and Samuel Insull. In 
1938, local Republican leaders approached Green and persua-
ded him to run for mayor. Illinois Republicans believed that 
to elect a Republican president, the party would have to 
carry Illinois, and to do this, they would have to destroy 
the Democratic machine. If they could elect a Republican 
mayor, they stood a good chance of electing a Republican 
president. Green campaigned against the Kelly-Nash machine, 
accusing it of political domination of municipal services. 
He also charged that it was allied with the Capone gang and 
promised, if elected, to destroy the political influence of 
criminal elements in city Hall. There was a good deal of 
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truth to his charges. Gambling flourished in Chicago as 
police looked the other way and the underworld made payoffs 
to the machine. Each ward committeeman was in charge of 
supervising gambling revenue in his ward. Green also raised 
the issue of foreign policy, promising, if elected, to aid 
the Republican party in its policy of keeping the country out 
of foreign entanglements. In the end, Green lost to Mayor 
Kelly by about 183, 000 votes, but this was still a much 
better showing than in 1935, and the party saw prospects for 
further victories in 1940. 2 
Illinois Democrats soon made things easier by provi-
ding them with an issue. In the spring of 1939, committees 
in the Illinois General Assembly found considerable evidence 
of graft and minor corruption in the Horner Administration. 
Though Democrats managed to stop the investigations, the 
issue would not die. A new crisis arose over a Democratic 
campaign slush fund to which state employees and contractors 
doing business with the state had to contribute. Director of 
Public Works F. Lyndon Smith was in charge of the fund, but 
in the fall of 1939, State Finance Director Sam Nudelman 
demanded more control over the fund. Both contended for 
Horner's favor. When Smith lost out, he became emotionally 
unbalanced and in February, 1940, went on a long vacation in 
Florida, allowing Nudelman to take control of the slush fund 
and state jobs. Later that month, a state policeman filed 
suit in a Sangamon County circuit court demanding an account-
. 9 of the fund. in 
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The court ordered Smith to appear and 
deliver such an accounting. Smith returned to Springfield, 
burned his papers, and after an unsuccessful suicide attempt, 
was admitted to a hospital for observation and treatment. On 
March 9, the day he was to appear in court, he committed 
suicide. His death intensified demands for an investigation 
of the fund, and on April 30, when the General Assembly met 
in a special session, it appointed a committee to investigate 
the fund and other abuses by officials of the Horner Ad-
ministration. Although many records of the slush fund were 
missing, the committee did uncover evidence of other corrupt 
practices, all of which provided ammunition in the political 
campaign which was underway. 3 
At first, Governor Horner wanted to run for reelec-
tion, but his poor health forced him to withdraw from the 
race. In February, 1940, Mayor Kelly and some of his allies 
met with some of the Governor's aides to determine possible 
candidates. Kelly wanted Stelle for governor, but Horner did 
not even want him for lieutenant-governor, fearing that 
Stelle would plunder the state if he ever became governor. 
The conferees finally chose State Democratic Chairman Harry 
Hershey for governor and slated Lieutenant-Governor Stelle 
and Senator James Slattery for reelection. Stelle, however, 
broke with the harmony slate and ran for governor himself 
with his own slate of candidates. He also charged that Hor-
ner was too sick to run the state and was letting his aides 
44 
perform his duties. At one point, Stelle stormed into the 
Governor's office and declared himself governor in a vain 
attempt to seize power. He was ignored by secretaries and 
ridiculed by Horner. Soon afterward, he and his allies were 
swamped by the Kelly-Nash-Horner forces in the primary. 4 
Illinois Republicans looked forward to the 1940 cam-
paign with great expectations. Dwight Green's strong show-
ing in the 1939 Chicago mayoral election suggested that Il-
linois was swinging back to the Republican party. During 
the primary campaign, the candidates mixed concerns over 
machine politics and scandals in the Horner Administration 
with hostility to the New Deal, the Roosevelt Administra-
tion' s interventionist foreign policy and the President's 
own quest for an unprecedented third term. Green himself 
won the nomination for governor, while C. Wayland Brooks, a 
protege of Colonel McCormick and a perennial candidate for 
office during the thirties, won the nomination for senator. 5 
Illinois Republicans fought vigorously to influence 
the party platform on defense and foreign policy. Meeting in 
Springfield in mid-June, they drafted a platform urging a 
strong defense effort, but opposing intervention in foreign 
wars. There were some interventionists led by Colonel Frank 
Knox, owner of the Chicago Daily News and former vice-presi-
dential candidate in 1936. They opposed the foreign policy 
plank, arguing that Illinois was not isolationist. Some 
county leaders noted that rigid isolationism was not so 
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popular and there was growing support for aid to the allies. 
soon afterward, President Roosevelt appointed Colonel Knox 
secretary of the navy, a post he held until his death in 
April, 1944. Illinois Republicans carried their anti-inter-
vention campaign to the national convention later in June. 
colonel McCormick appeared before the platform committee 
urging a plank opposing a peacetime draft, while his friend, 
c. Wayland Brooks, Illinois member of the committee, fought 
unsuccessfully, first to have the Illinois convention's an-
ti-war plank adopted, and then to include the Illinois stand 
against sending American troops into foreign wars as part of 
the final platform. However, former Vice-President Charles 
Gates Dawes, a Chicago banker, negotiated a watered-down 
compromise plank opposing American intervention in foreign 
wars. The Illinois delegation generally supported Thomas E. 
Dewey, the winner of the Illinois primary, but he was over-
whelmed by Wendell L. Willkie. 6 
Meanwhile, Mayor Kelly orchestrated efforts to per-
suade President Roosevelt to run for a third term. On Feb-
ruary 3, 1940, despite the President's refusal to commit 
himself, Cook County Democratic leaders put Roosevelt's name 
on the primary ballot. Technically, this was illegal since 
the President had not filed a certificate of candidacy as 
required by Illinois law. Secretary of State Edward J. 
Hughes chose to overlook this infraction. Mayor Kelly and 
Pat Nash also convinced the Democratic National committee to 
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have the convention in Chicago. Roosevelt easily overwhelmed 
bis rivals in the primary. At the state convention in June, 
Illinois Democrats endorsed the President for a third term 
and adopted resolutions pledging war only to defend the 
nation, but evading the issue of intervention. 7 
on the first day of the national convention in June, 
Mayor Kelly packed the galleries of the Chicago stadium with 
machine supporters, who shouted down a speech by Virginia 
senator Carter Glass on the pitfalls of a third term. On 
the following day, Kelly stationed Thomas Garry, Chicago 
superintendent of sewers, in the basement with a microphone 
hooked up to the hall's public address system. When Kentucky 
senator Alben Barkley read a letter from President Roosevelt 
denying his desire for a third term, Garry's voice boomed 
from loudspeakers urging Roosevelt's renomination. A parade 
started which lasted almost an hour until the voice subsided. 
Finally, Jim Farley, who presided over the proceedings, 
regained control of the floor and defeated efforts to 
nominate Roosevelt by acclamation. However, on the next day, 
the President won on the first ballot, easily overwhelming 
his rivals. Though Illinois Democrats backed Senator Scott 
W. Lucas for vice-president, he withdrew from the race early 
and Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace was nominated, 
though Lucas later ran the campaign in Illinois. Many 
Democrats were unhappy at the President's apparent duplicity 
in accepting a synthetic draft and the machinations of the 
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Chicago machine, but Roosevelt wrote to Kelly expressing his 
· f r the machine's efforts. 8 appreciation o 
During the campaign, Illinois Republicans focused on 
corruption in Chicago city government and the Horner Ad-
ministration, the third term issue, the New Deal, farm poli-
cies and neutrality. Farmers generally returned to the Re-
publican party now that farm conditions were better. This 
brought a sharp drop in the Democratic vote. Neutrality was 
a sticky issue. Willkie favored aid to the Allies, which 
many Illinois Republicans feared would lead to war. Dwight 
Green and c. Wayland Brooks voiced support for neutrality 
and opposition to American involvement in the European war, 
though denying any differences with Willkie. The Chicago 
Tribune tried to convert Willkie to isolationism but with 
little success. Democrats, however, accused Republicans of 
seeking to appease the Axis Powers and criticized Brooks and 
Colonel McCormick for their role in shaping the Illinois 
Republican party platform. 9 
Late in the campaign, there were rumors that the 
Kelly-Nash forces were committed to Roosevelt, but less opti-
mistic about the state races, while the reverse was true of 
the Republicans. There were rumors of a deal which would 
spare Secretary of State Hughes as a reward for putting 
Roosevelt on the primary ballot despite a technical viola-
tion of state law. Though both parties denied it, the re-
sults suggest that a deal was made. President Roosevelt won 
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the state, though his vote was down sharply from previous 
years. 
Hughes. 
The Republicans swept the state offices except for 
Harry Hershey lost to Dwight Green after winning 
Chicago by only a slight margin. Mayor Kelly ordered his 
precinct captains to trim Hershey's votes partly because 
Hershey had promised, if elected, to suppress gambling, an 
important source of revenue for the machine. Kelly also 
wanted no more Democratic governors who could seriously 
challenge his leadership within the party. Senator Slattery 
was leading until a sudden upsurge of votes from Cook County 
precincts gave Brooks a narrow victory. Slattery was suspi-
cious and called for an investigation, but Brooks was seated 
in the Senate. Bipartisan deals were not unusual in Illi-
nois politics, especially in Chicago where many Republican 
committeemen cooperated with the machine. Mayor Kelly 
benefitted from this by getting weak Republican opposition 
and gradually eliminating rivals within his own party, while 
the Republicans elected candidates on the state level after 
1938. Not until 1948 did the Democrats recapture the state-
house and defeat Brooks. 10 
After Governor Horner died on October 6, 1940, Lieu-
tenant-Governor Stelle confirmed all of Horner's worst fears 
about his extravagance. Shortly after taking office, Gover-
nor Stelle fired his political enemies, replacing them with 
his supporters and rewarding them with extra pay. He also 
rewarded allies with contracts for heavy purchases of coal, 
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building repairs, road construction and repairs and services 
used by the state. Stelle redecorated the governor's man-
sion, threw lavish parties and pardoned hundreds of inmates 
in state prisons. His spending spree, coming at a time when 
the state was facing a budget crunch, forced incoming Gover-
nor Green to embark on a program of economy. One of his 
first acts was to fire over a thousand state employees, in-
cluding Stelle' s cronies. 11 
Illinois politics between 1939 and 1941 was highly 
influenced by the debate over American involvement in the 
war in Europe. The big battle over isolationism was in the 
Midwest and Chicago was the capital of the Midwest. Al-
though opinions on the issue cut across party lines, most 
isolationists were conservative anti-New Deal Republicans 
like Colonel McCormick. They generally distrusted England, 
though they preferred to see her defeat the Nazis. Some were 
also anti-Semitic. Interventionists were usually liberal 
Democrats like Mayor Kelly, Paul Douglas and Adlai Steven-
son. There were internationalist Republicans like Colonel 
Knox and isolationist liberals like R. Douglas Stuart, Jr., 
a founder of the America First movement, who foresaw that war 
would curtail New Deal programs he wanted expanded. 12 
The debate over intervention spawned organizations on 
both sides of the issue. Several small groups were active 
in the fight over Cash and Carry in the fall of 1939. Sena-
tor Lucas alone received over 60,000 letters, telegrams and 
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postcards on the issue. In 1940, the battle over neutrality 
was carried on in the campaign and election, which the Tri-
bune declared was a victory for isolationism and suggested 
~
that Willkie would have won if he had accepted neutrality. 
Later, it read him out of the party for endorsing Lend-Lease. 
The most significant non-interventionist organization, 
America First, was founded in 1940, but was not very active 
until the battle over Lend-Lease early in 1941. Its chief 
mouthpiece, the Chicago Tribune, gave extensive publicity to 
the fight and to the organization, which was based in 
Chicago. Though the group had chapters in most areas of the 
country, most of its membership was concentrated within a 
300-mile radius of Chicago, an area in which the Tribune 
enjoyed a sizable circulation. The paper did its best to 
downplay the activities of interventionist groups, often 
sending photographers to take pictures of any empty seats at 
their rallies. The Committee to Defend America by Aiding 
the Allies was not based in the Midwest, but did have chap-
ters in several Illinois cities and a newspaper voice in the 
Chicago Daily News. Many interventionists fought as hard in 
favor of Lend-Lease as isolationists against it. Adlai Ste-
venson, head of the Chicago chapter, often represented the 
group in debates with his friend, Clay Judson, of the Ameri-
ca First movement. 13 
Isolationism steadily lost ground, especially after 
the passage of Lend-Lease. By the summer of 1941, attendance 
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at rallies sponsored by the Committee to Defend America far 
surpassed that at America First events. America First and 
other groups continued the fight. The Tribune conducted 
anti-war polls. America First tried to keep out Bundists, 
anti-Semites and other extremists, but some managed to 
participate in its activities. Colonel Charles A. Lind-
bergh's anti-Semitic speech in September in Des Moines, Iowa, 
in which he claimed that Jews and others were pushing the 
nation into war, embarrassed the organization and cost it 
some support. During 1941, some isolationists grew increa-
singly discouraged and by the fall, some, including Con-
gressman Everett Dirksen of Pekin, felt that the country was 
already at war and either ceased their opposition to inter-
vention or actually supported Administration policies. Even 
those who continued to oppose intervention were divided on 
some defense measures. Still, in November, America First 
prepared to participate in the 1942 elections and endorsed 
Senator Brooks for reelection. Pearl Harbor, however, ended 
this brief venture into electoral politics, and led to the 
movement's disbandment. Though its officers preferred to 
continue, they felt that the organization's opposition to 
the war would render it suspect. The Committee to Defend 
America also disbanded after Pearl Harbor. 14 
Other local groups, however, did not disband. The 
Chicago-based Citizens Keep out of War Committee, headed by 
Avery Brundage and William J. Grace, a Reublican attorney 
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and unsuccessful office-seeker, reorganized as the Citizens 
USA committee, a defeatist organization. It backed Cong-
gressman-at-large Stephen A. Day, a McCormick protege, for 
reelection in 1942 and promoted the Colonel himself for the 
presidency in 1943 and 1944 until McCormick killed the boom-
let. Grace himself represented dissident unionists in legal 
action against allegedly Communist union officials. Mrs. 
Elizabeth Dilling's isolationist organization, We, the 
Mothers Mobilize for America, gained new leadership and 
joined Grace's organization in promoting a peace conference 
~arly in 1942 and also backed conservative Republicans in 
1942 and 1944. Mrs. Dilling herself was tried with several 
others on charges of sedition, but the case was dropped in 
March, 1945 after the judge died in the course of a lengthy 
trial. All of these organizations, as well as several 
others, later came under fire from Mayor Kelly's Committee 
on Race Relations for their racist, anti-semitic and anti-
catholic propaganda. 15 
The Chicago Tribune's editorial bias resulted in 
attacks by interventionists at rallies during the summer of 
1941, and in December brought the birth of a rival newspaper, 
the Chicago Sun. Marshall Field III and other liberals 
wanted a pro-New Deal morning newspaper to off set the biased 
reporting of the Tribune. The Administration encouraged the 
project and the sun appeared on December 4, 1941. The Sun 
never did well financially, though the Tribune's circulation 
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dropped by 100, 000 during the forties. In 1948, Field 
bought the Chicago Times, an afternoon tabloid daily, and 
merged it with the Sun. The Tribune fought the Sun's ef-
forts to join the Associated Press until a government law-
d . . f th . 16 suit forced a mission o e Sun in 1945. 
After Pearl Harbor, the Tribune loudly proclaimed its 
patriotism, but continued its attacks on the Roosevelt Admi-
nistration's foreign and domestic policies and the conduct 
of the war. The paper was quick to publicize blunders by 
war agencies, though it sometimes distorted an incident so 
much that it drew protests from both sides. Colonel McCor-
mick offered his own commentaries on military tactics. The 
Daily News responded with a series of cartoons caricaturing 
the Colonel as "Colonel McCosmic." When a friend wrote to 
McCormick in February, 1942, suggesting that he temper his 
views on Administration foreign policy, the Colonel replied 
with a letter in which he claimed credit for introducing the 
machine gun, mechanization and other reforms in the armed 
forces. The Daily News published it under the caption, 
"Whatta Man!" and the Colonel became the subject of ridicule. 
Later that year, the Justice Department sought to indict the 
Tribune for printing a story suggesting that the Navy knew 
the Japanese plan of attack at Midway. The Navy did know, 
but was anxious to keep the Japanese from learning that the 
United States had broken their naval code. The proceedings 
were dropped after the reporter explained that he had written 
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the story based on his knowledge of naval affairs and assumed 
that the Navy had guessed the Japanese plans. 17 
While Colonel McCormick and his allies fought to keep 
the nation out of war, Mayor Kelly, Governor Green and 
others worked to prepare the state for its role in the up-
coming conflict. While Green paid lip service to isolation-
ism, he also called for unity in defense. Mayor Kelly ac-
cepted the nation's involvement in the war as inevitable. on 
December 20, 1940, the Chicago City Council established a new 
city agency, the Chicago Commission on National Defense with 
Kelly as its chairman. In the spring of 1941, it set up a 
city defense council. Governor Stelle appointed an 
Illinois Emergency Defense Council, which was replaced in 
April, 1941 by the Illinois State Council of Defense, later 
renamed the Illinois War Council. Each member of the Coun-
cil headed a particular division such as agriculture, indus-
trial production and the like. Members were business and 
civic leaders from around the state. Governor Green also 
appointed political leaders from both parties as ex-officio 
members. In May, President Roosevelt created the Office of 
Civilian Defense, which established a regional headquarters 
in Chicago and later designated the Chicago area as a sepa-
rate defense district from the rest of Illinois, with Mayor 
Kelly as its director. At first, the Chicago District in-
eluded Lake county, Indiana, but the county was consolidated 
with the rest of Indiana in August, 1942. Though the Illi-
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nois war council was unhappy with Chicago's status as a 
separate district, its relations with the Chicago organiza-
tion were friendly. There also were 640 local defense coun-
cils, mostly at the county, municipal and township level. 
county and township councils served rural areas. Cities, 
especially Chicago, set up block organizations. Many com-
munities adopted ordinances enforcing directives of munici-
pal defense councils. Other local defense councils and the 
state council had to rely on voluntary cooperation. 18 
In 1941, the state and local civilian defense organi-
zations were mostly concerned with attracting defense busi-
ness to the state, though they also sponsored scrap drives 
and other defense projects. During the war years, they held 
scrap drives, promoted victory gardens and car pools, set up 
day care centers, recruited war workers and trained air raid 
wardens, first aid workers, demolition teams and auxiliary 
police and fire units. In Chicago and other cities, a cen-
tral control station alerted local uni ts in case of air 
attack. There were blackouts and "bombings" to test the ef-
fectiveness of the system throughout the state. Though the 
Midwest was never bombed, civilian defense units proved in-
valuable in handling floods, fires, train wrecks and other 
disasters. State police and militia units played a role in 
such disasters and also in guarding important bridges, air-
ports and other possible targets of sabotage. Many communi-
ties also established serviceman's centers. Chicago had the 
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biggest with every amenity desired by a soldier on leave. 19 
Inevitably, politics crept into civilian defense as 
it had with the New Deal. Mayor Kelly used the program, and 
to some extent other war agencies as a source of patronage. 
oemocratic politicians secured jobs with various war agen-
cies. Ex-Congressman Raymond s. McKeough, who lost a Senate 
race in 1942, headed the regional price control office in 
1943. There also were reports of favoritism in gas ration-
ing toward people with political connections. In 1942, the 
Auburn Park community civilian defense commander tried un-
successfully to bar a local Republican congressional candi-
date from appearing at patriotic gatherings, and also tried 
to fire block captains who were Republican precinct captains. 
In the spring of 1945, when President Harry s. Truman closed 
down the civilian defense program, Mayor Kelly insisted that 
it was still needed and did not close the Chicago office 
until the war ended in August. 20 
During the thirties, the Kelly-Nash machine converted 
the black community in Chicago to the Democratic party. Ma-
yor Kelly offered patronage jobs and appointed blacks to high 
positions in city government and to prestigious commissions. 
The machine also claimed credit for helping blacks secure 
jobs on New Deal work relief projects, an important source of 
employment for blacks. The machine also established a 
Democratic organization in the black South Side wards, which 
eventually led to construction of a submachine run by William 
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L. Dawson, a black politician who joined the shift of his 
constituents from the Republican to the Democratic party. 
While alderman from the Second Ward, Dawson started backing 
the machine in the City Council. He lost his bid for 
reelection in the 1939 primary, but then backed Earl B. 
Dickerson, a Democrat, against a Republican. He soon 
switched parties and became Second Ward Cammi tteeman. Dawson 
was soon at odds with Dickerson, who also irritated the Mayor 
with his militance on civil rights and outspoken criticism of 
the machine in the Council. He also angered the machine by 
refusing to support some of its candidates, including 
congressman Mitchell, and supporting Fifth Ward Alderman Paul 
Douglas, an anti-machine Democrat, against the machine 
candidate for Senator. When Mitchell retired from Congress 
in 1942, Dickerson tried to take his place, but was beaten in 
the primary by Dawson, who went on to win in November. In 
1943, Dickerson lost his council seat to a Dawson ally. 
Dawson went on to extend his control over other wards as they 
changed from white to black. By 1950, his submachine 
controlled over a quarter of a million votes. 21 
The war raised racial tensions as Southern blacks 
moved into already overcrowded housing and schools in the 
ghetto. Shortages forced many industries to start hiring 
blacks in 1942 and 1943. This led to friction with whites 
who resented the economic gains of blacks which threatened 
their status. In 1943, race riots broke out in Detroit and 
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other cities, but not Chicago. Mayor Kelly responded to the 
oetroit riot by appointing the biracial Mayor's Committee on 
Race Relations, later renamed the Mayor's Committee on Human 
Relations, to identify and alleviate sources of racial fric-
tion, especially housing. The Committee worked with the po-
lice department to keep racial incidents from getting any 
bigger. This led to better police and community relations 
and a drop in juvenile delinquency in some cases. The Com-
mittee also persuaded the school board to add classrooms in 
black areas and cease its practice of transferring white 
students in the district to white school districts. Most of 
the Committee's achievements were limited, but it did pro-
vide a forum for discussion of the problems of blacks and 
other minorities. The Mayor's firmness in suppressing ra-
cial disturbances and his commitment to solving the problems 
of the ghetto helped Chicago escape the riots that hit other 
cities during the war years. Other cities, including 
Springfield, appointed similar committees and Governor Green 
established a state-wide commission to study the problem. 
They too achieved some 1 imi ted success, though the basic 
problems continued. Mayor Kelly also backed Elizabeth Wood, 
head of the Chicago Housing Authority, in her efforts to in-
tegrate public housing, and refused to support white stu-
dents who struck against integration of public high schools 
in Morgan Park in 1934 and Calumet Park, Englewood and Mor-
gan Park in 1945. In supporting integration, Kelly ran up 
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against segregationist policies in the school board and na-
tional public housing authorities as well as his own white 
followers. Ultimately, this was to prove a factor in for-
cing his retirement from office in 1947. 22 
ouring the forties, Governor Green built an efficient 
Republican machine, which dominated downstate Illinois poli-
tics, especially in the statehouse. There were dissidents, 
however. Some Green supporters, who objected to Colonel 
McCormick's control of the party, complained that the Gover-
nor was too generous in giving patronage to leaders in that 
faction, while neglecting his own supporters. They also 
worried that renomination of Senator Brooks and Congressman-
at-large Stephen A. Day, both isolationists and allies of 
Colonel McCormick, would wreck the party and return the 
Senate to the Democrats. They also criticized the extreme 
isolationist platform of the Illinois Republican party. Hill 
Blackett, former national committeeman from Illinois, was 
leader of these dissidents who sought a Senate candidate who 
was committed to an interventionist foreign policy before 
Pearl Harbor. They found him in State Treasurer Warren 
Wright, who announced his support for the President's foreign 
policy shortly before Pearl Harbor. Though the Tribune 
promptly read him out of the party, Wright announced in 
January, 1942, that he would run against Brooks. 23 
Green stayed out of the battle over neutrality, Though 
he often spoke out in favor of preparedness and unity in 
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national defense, he also praised Senator Brooks at the 
Governor's Day conclave at the 1941 State Fair in Spring-
field. Green eventually endorsed Brooks and his slate in a 
meeting with the Senator in February. Brooks was embarrassed 
and angry when copies of an anti-war speech he made on 
October 31 and mailed to constituents before Pearl Harbor, 
arrived in Illinois after the attack. His running mate, 
congressman Day, was even more embarrassed when it was 
disclosed that an anti-war book he wrote in 1941 had been 
published by a Nazi-subsidized company in New Jersey. Day 
denied any knowledge of the Nazi affiliation. Later in the 
campaign, he was accused of having sent a telegram to Adolf 
Hitler in 1933 congratulating him on his rise to power. 
Wright and Denison Hull, who ran against Day, played up their 
opponents' isolationism. They and their allies also criti-
cized Tribune domination of the party and depicted Brooks as 
a puppet of the Colonel. Brooks himself campaigned on his 
record and the conduct of the war, while Day attacked the New 
Deal. 24 
A battle also developed in the Democratic primary when 
Mayor Kelly slated Congressman Raymond s. McKeough to run 
against Senator Brooks. Kelly briefly considered running 
himself, but opposition within the party, lack of support 
from Roosevelt and the problems of tackling a resurgent 
Republican party in an off-year election led him to forego 
any senatorial ambitions. McKeough was a little-known ma-
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chine supporter, who expressed pride in his connection with 
the organization. Dissident Democrats and Republicans ac-
cused Kelly of making a deal with Colonel McCormick to slate 
a weak candidate to oppose Brooks in exchange for a weak Re-
publican opponent in the 1943 mayoral race. The machine made 
similar questionable nominations when it slated Dr. Herman 
aundesen to oppose Brooks for governor in 1936 and senator 
Slattery in 1940. Chicago Democrats were more concerned 
about control of municipal and county off ices than state and 
national races. During the fall of 1941, anti-machine 
Alderman Paul H. Douglas toured the state urging all-out 
support for the President's foreign policy. In January, 
Douglas entered the race to oppose Brooks. Douglas cam-
paigned vigorously against the Kelly-Nash machine and the 
isolationist record of Senator Brooks. McKeough also 
attacked Brooks and the Tribune, even accusing the Colonel 
of treason for a Tribune editorial describing Administration 
leaders as draft dodgers. Downstaters, especially allies of 
the late Governor Horner, wanted state's Attorney Courtney 
to join the race, but he withdrew when the machine slated 
another Hornerite, Benjamin Adamowski, to oppose Day and help 
McKeough downstate. The state party accepted the machine 
candidates, but the downstate eventually went for Douglas. 25 
A light vote in the primary brought victory for both 
machines. The Republicans selected Brooks and Day, who 
crushed their rivals while the Democrats chose McKeough and 
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Adamowski. Even so, the vote totals reflected an anti-ma-
chine sentiment for Adamowski did better than McKeough, who 
won because of a big lead in Chicago. Douglas soundly beat 
him downstate. Soon after the primary, the fifty-year old 
Alderman enlisted as a private in the Marine Corps where he 
served with distinction, eventually rising to lieutenant 
26 
colonel. 
The Tribune, meanwhile, labeled McKeough as "small 
potatoes." This backfired when the Democrats proclaimed 
their candidate as the representative of the common man, who 
was small potatoes to the wealthy. Rural Democrats brought 
baskets of spuds to the fall party convention in Springfield 
(they were later given to charity). The Tribune then began 
calling McKeough a rubber stamp New Dealer. Republicans al-
so continued their attacks on McKeough's ties to the Kelly-
Nash machine while the Democrats attacked Brooks and Day and 
Colonel McCormick for their isolationist record. Voting was 
light and the results reflected voter discontent with the 
conduct of the war and with the discomforts of rationing and 
shortages. Brooks and Day won reelection, but the latter's 
margin of victory was well below that of the Senator. Re-
publicans also did well in state contests. The Republican 
resurgence of 1940-1942 bred a Democratic fatalism and in-
difference which probably influenced the results. Reelection 
of Senator Brooks and Congressman Day was distasteful, but 
Palatable since Kelly himself was not running. 27 
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In December, Colonel McCormick selected Roger M. 
Faherty, a wealthy lawyer and political unknown, to run 
against Mayor Kelly in 1943. After he boasted of his close 
ties to Kelly and disclaimed any knowledge of issues on which 
to campaign, Republicans protested and refused to back his 
candidacy. Faherty withdrew and the party chose George W. 
McKibbon, the state director of finance, to oppose Kelly. 
McKibbon was little better-known and his father-in-law head-
ed one of the street-car companies, thus making it easy for 
the Democrats to label him a tool of the unpopular transit 
companies. The Republican choice of a mayoral candidate 
made it a good deal easier for Kelly at a time when problems 
with the city's schools and police corruption might have 
threatened his re-election. Indeed, dissidents in both par-
ties charged that Faherty and McKibbon were chosen to guar-
antee Kelly's reelection in exchange for election of Senator 
Brooks and Governor Green. Both Kelly and McKibbin faced 
rivals in the primary, but the anti-machine Democrats were 
divided and ineffective as were the opponents of McKibbon, 
who was backed by Governor Green. The Mayor's opponents 
criticized the city's schools and blasted the machine for its 
ties to the underworld. Several gangland slayings and a 
gangster's suicide helped remind voters of the connection. 
McKibbon also played on popular discontent with rationing by 
claiming that the rationing system was controlled by the 
machine, which was using it as a source of patronage. Mayor 
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KellY campaigned very little, choosing to run on his record 
of civic improvements, including the newly-finished State 
street subway. Shortly before the election, the Democrats 
also accused McKibbon and his wife of signing a restrictive 
covenant barring blacks from their Hyde Park neighborhood. 
McKibbon denied it, but then the Republicans sent some Re-
publican workers, including a white real estate agent known 
for his advocacy of segregated housing, to deliver leaflets 
accusing Kelly of signing such a covenant. When they tried 
to deliver them to the home of a black Republican Alderman, 
Oscar DePriest, they were jumped by several black Democrats 
and arrested on charges of inciting to riot. The whole in-
cident backfired for the Republicans. Soon afterward, Kelly 
beat McKibbon, though with a smaller margin than in 1939. 
McKibbon returned to his state post soon afterward. 28 
Meanwhile, a fight was brewing within the Republican 
party over isolationism. During the 1942 campaign, Con-
gressman McKeough proposed a world organization for peace. 
Some Illinois Republicans echoed these sentiments and tried 
unsuccessfully to influence their party platform along those 
lines. When the isolationists managed to defeat their ef-
forts, some of the internationalists switched their support 
to McKeough and Adamowski. In February, 1943, the interna-
tionalists, led by Deneen Watson, chairman of the Governor's 
advisory committee on taxation (and for a time, representa-
tive of the Illinois War Council in Washington seeking de-
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fense contracts for the state), started a doorbell campaign 
financed by Denison Hull, Congressman Day's opponent in the 
1942 primary, to convert the rank and file of the party to 
international cooperation. They organized the Republican 
postwar Policy Association, headed by Watson, to carry on 
the campaign, which soon spread from Illinois to the rest of 
the country. In May, the group held a convention in Chicago 
attended by 100 delegates, including congressman Everett 
Dirksen. Governor Green did not attend, but did give a 
speech to downstate papers urging postwar planning. The 
Tribune denounced the organization as a group of Willkieites 
bent on betraying the country's best interests. 29 
However, in December, 1942, the more moderate Harri-
son E. Spangler replaced Werner w. Schroeder, an Illinois 
committeeman backed by Colonel McCormick, as Republican Na-
tional Chairman. In May, 1943, with the Republican Postwar 
Planning Association at the height of its influence, Spang-
ler appointed a Republican Postwar Advisory council of 49 
members to consider domestic and foreign policies for the 
1944 campaign. Though Wendell Willkie was not invited, 
neither was Senator Brooks, while Governor Green and con-
gressman Dirksen were included. Watson challenged Spangler 
to put his group's proposals before the Advisory council, 
which met on Mackinac Island. Though there were several 
isolationists on the Council, it also included a number of 
internationalists. Governor Green played a major role in 
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drafting the convention's declaration of support for reason-
able participation of the United States in a postwar coope-
rative organization among the sovereign states. The propo-
sal was sufficiently vague as to satisfy both the Tribune 
and the Daily News, but it also was a significant step away 
from the isolationism of Colonel McCormick. Governor Green 
emerged with enhanced regional prestige. During the confe-
rence, the Tribune read New York Governor Thomas Dewey out 
of the party for advocating a postwar Anglo-American alli-
ance, though the Colonel himself proposed a world union of 
sorts--by annexing England, Scotland, Wales, Canada, New 
Zealand and Australia to the United States as individual 
states, but excluding the British Empire. The other nations 
declined the offer, preferring to remain independent. 30 
The battle between isolationists and internationalists 
continued. William J. Grace organized the Illinois National-
ist Revival Committee to draft Colonel McCormick for presi-
dent. During 1943, the group held meetings in Chicago 
attended by old America Firsters and various extremists. 
Despite the Colonel's protests, the group entered his name 
in the Illinois primary. Wendell Willkie eagerly challenged 
the Colonel, but withdrew when the Colonel refused to run. 
Instead, Willkie entered the Wisconsin primary and dropped 
out of the presidential race after his defeat. Illinois Re-
publicans chose General Douglas MacArthur, the only major 
candidate entered in the primary, but he also withdrew from 
31 
the race. 
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Meanwhile, a battle developed over the state party 
slate, dominated by the McCormick-Brooks faction, which 
called for reelection of Governor Green and Congressman-at-
large Day and chose Richard J. Lyons, a diehard isolationist, 
to oppose the incumbent Democrat, Senator Lucas. Opponents 
objected to Lyons on geographical as well as ideological 
grounds since both Lyons and Senator Brooks were Chi-
cagoans. Several candidates threatened to run against Lyons, 
including Congressman Dirksen, who also flirted with a run 
for the presidency. However, most withdrew, leaving Deneen 
Watson to challenge Lyons and Colonel Edward Davis to run 
against Day. There also was opposition for other posts, but 
the slated candidates easily crushed their rivals in the 
April primary. The national convention, held in Chicago, 
nominated New York Governor Thomas Dewey for president and 
Ohio Governor John W. Bricker for vice-president. 32 
Illinois Democrats were united in their support of 
the President's quest for a fourth term and the slating of 
candidates for other off ices. After the death of party 
leader Patrick Nash in October, 1943, Mayor Kelly took con-
trol of the party. He also made a truce with state's Attor-
ney Courtney and slated him for governor. Senator Lucas ran 
for reelection while Emily Taft Douglas, wife of former Al-
derman Paul Douglas, challenged Congressman Day. Other can-
didates were slated for state races, including Edward J. 
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Barrett, a sargeant in the marines, who was running for sec-
retary of state. At the national convention in Chicago, the 
Mayor helped line up support for Harry s. Truman, the Presi-
dent's choice for vice-president. Some Illinois delegates 
wanted to retain Vice-President Henry A. Wallace, but Kelly 
argued that the President should have a running mate he 
wanted, and persuaded the delegates to support Senator Lucas 
until switching to Truman. Some labor supporters of Wallace 
tried to stampede the convention into renominating him, but 
Kelly had the convention adjourned for the day, claiming 
violation of city fire regulations. On the next day, Kelly 
closed the galleries to the public and Truman was nominated 
on the second ballot. 33 
During the campaign, Illinois Democrats supported the 
Administration's foreign and domestic policies. They backed 
its plans for a world organization to settle disputes while 
Republicans Lyons, Day and Brooks were wary of American ties 
to such an organization. Republicans also demanded that the 
nation retain captured islands for bases and blasted the 
Kelly-Nash machine for its ties to the underworld, problems 
with Chicago schools and machine efforts to win the votes of 
soldiers overseas. Mayor Kelly even wanted to count the 
votes of soldiers who had died after voting but before the 
election. Republicans attacked the New Deal and home front 
programs, especially rationing, and charged that the fourth 
term would lead to a dictatorship. Democrats replied with 
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attacks on Governor Green for his spending and patronage 
policies. Though some labor leaders, mainly from the Ameri-
Federation of Labor (AFL) and its member unions, backed can 
the Republicans, most supported the Democrats. The AFL' s 
state affiliate, the Illinois State Federation of Labor, 
unanimously endorsed Roosevelt. The Congress of Industrial 
organizations (CIO) set up a Political Action Committee, 
headed in Illinois by ex-Congressman McKeough, to assist the 
Democrats. Since some member unions included significant 
numbers of Communists in their membership and even in lea-
dership posts, the Republicans blasted the Democrats for 
Communist support. In November, the voters spoke. The 
President won reelection, carrying Illinois by a larger 
plurality than in 1940. Senator Lucas and Mrs. Douglas also 
won. Republicans won most state offices (except for secre-
tary of state, won by Edward J. Barrett), but by very small 
margins. Even Governor Green, who was much stronger than 
the rest of the ticket, won by only 72,000 votes, compared 
to 256,000 in 1940.~ 
The results showed the efficiency of the Kelly-Nash 
machine and organized labor in getting out the vote, but also 
reflected continued voter support for Democratic policies 
and growing opposition to isolationism. Both Lyons and Day 
went down to defeat. Some Republican newspapers around the 
state saw the vote as a personal triumph for the Governor, 
but a repudiation of his running mates, and urged him to 
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surround himself with forward-looking Republicans. The 
Governor reached the same conclusions and sought to broaden 
his base beyond Colonel McCormick and the Tribune. He also 
wanted to leave office with a record of progressivism. To 
help achieve this goal, he met with Mayor Kelly, with whom 
he had been feuding, and the two antagonists agreed on a 
program of mutual cooperation in the General Assembly. Chi-
cago gained some limited aid to public housing and legisla-
tion permitting unification of the city's transit lines under 
the Chicago Transit Authority. Chicago Democrats supported 
Governor Green's ill-fated efforts to reform the state 
constitution as well as his more successful reapportionment 
of the state's congressional districts. Green also secured 
some benefits for veterans, including new hospital facilities 
and rehabilitation centers. Overall, the unprecedented bi-
partisan coalition benefitted both, though it disturbed 
members of both parties, who found it more difficult to 
resist legislation they disliked. 35 
During the late thirties and forties, political par-
ties in Illinois developed a new division of power, which 
carried on into the postwar era. once Republican, but Demo-
cratic in the thirties, Illinois became a swing state whose 
allegiance could not be taken for granted by either party. 
The powerful Democratic organization in Chicago, which gained 
control of Chicago in 1931, helped President Roosevelt and 
his successor, President Truman, carry the state in every 
ti. on during the two decades • eiec 
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The Democratic Admi-
nistration, in turn, financed civic improvements during the 
oepression and homefront programs during the war, which pro-
vided jobs for machine supporters. Mayor Kelly enhanced his 
organization's effectiveness by converting blacks to the 
oemocratic party. His black allies then built a submachine 
in their wards. During the thirties and forties, the Mayor 
and his allies had to contend with rivals within the party. 
They resolved this difficulty by cooperating with a resurgent 
Republican party led by Colonel McCormick in eliminating the 
more dangerous rivals. It was an odd alliance between a 
liberal New Dealer and the arch-conservative anti-New Deal 
publisher, but it benefitted both. The Mayor eliminated his 
more serious rivals and secured relatively weak Republican 
mayoral opponents, while the Colonel gained the election of 
his candidates on the state level. During the early and mid-
forties, Republicans dominated the state offices while the 
Democrats won the national and the Chicago and Cook County 
races. The war brought further changes, strengthening the 
power and prestige of Mayor Kelly and gradually eroding the 
influence of Colonel McCormick in his own party, especially 
after 1944 when Democratic victories eliminated some of his 
proteges. This in turn led Governor Green to a bipartisan 
arrangement with Mayor Kelly in an effort to escape the 
domination of the Colonel. The new division of power 
continued with little interruption into the postwar era. 
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CHAPTER III 
PLOWSHARES INTO SWORDS: 
ILLINOIS WARTIME INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
During the Second World War, Illinois industrial pro-
duction converted from freight cars, farm implements, stoves 
and other civilian goods to artillery, tanks, airplane parts 
and other military supplies, while the state's mines and 
utilities directed their resources toward supplying the war 
industries. Production was coordinated by a variety of na-
tional defense agencies to satisfy the changing requirements 
of the armed forces. These agencies allocated raw materials 
based on the relative importance of each company's product to 
the war effort. State and local defense planners supple-
mented the work of national agencies, while local business-
men set up pools to bid on contracts and coordinated efforts 
for protection of industrial plants. 
Although initially, many companies secured defense 
contracts with minimal government supervision, the national 
defense planning establishment gradually assumed a more ac-
tive role. In May, 1940, President Franklin Delano Roose-
velt appointed the National Defense Advisory Commission, whose 
Industrial Production Division cleared contracts for military 
supplies and construction of bases and defense plants. In 
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1941 the Division became the Office of Production January, ' 
Management, which handled military production and later 
civilian production as well. In addition to clearing 
contracts, the new agency established a priority system to 
allocate materials to defense industries, and eventually re-
strict the output of civilian goods through such alloca-
• 1 t1ons. 
In November, 1940, the Advisory Commission designated 
Federal Reserve Banks as regional off ices where manuf actur-
ers could secure information about government requirements 
and credit to finance defense production. Illinois was di-
vided between the Chicago and St. Louis Federal Reserve Banks. 
Branch banks served as district offices and certain bank 
officials operated the service. This arrangement proved 
inadequate and in the spring of 1941, the Office of Production 
Management set up its own field service utilizing the Federal 
Reserve Banks as headquarters and their personnel as part of 
its field organization. The Washington off ice ran the field 
service, including special groups such as a delegation of 
machine tool expediters in Rockford. In June, the agency's 
Priorities Division set up its own field organization. The 
War Production Board, which replaced the Office of Production 
Management in January, 1942, reorganized the field service 
and set up a regional organization, with Region VI, which 
included most of Illinois, headquartered in Chicago. The East 
St. Louis-Alton area later became part of the st. Louis 
r~gion. 
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The Chicago regional office included sections on 
production, priori ties and appeals, technical services, labor, 
salvage, materials redistribution, compliance and finance. 
District offices located in various Illinois cities, assigned 
priority ratings in minor amounts of materials, but their main 
functions were technical and advisory. They located idle 
plants, tools, materials and labor, brought prime contractors 
together with potential subcontractors, interpreted 
regulations to businessmen, secured technical and financial 
aid for companies, recommended relief from restrictions and 
monitored violations of priority orders. All military 
services had procurement offices in Chicago. The Chicago 
Ordinance District, one of the biggest buyers, increased its 
staff from 1400 before Pearl Harbor to over 5000 at its peak. 
Headed by prominent businessmen, it could let contracts up to 
$1 million in value. Larger ones were handled by Washington. 
The Division also had advisory committees of Illinois indus-
trialists. 2 
Conversion to defense production began as early as 1938 
when some Illinois firms received educational orders from 
military procurement agencies, especially in subcontracts from 
the Rock Island arsenal. The purpose of these orders was to 
test the ability of private industrial firms to adapt 
themselves overnight to production of war supplies. Hence, the 
Chicago plant of the American Forge Division of American Brake 
Shoe and Foundry Company received an educational order for 
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25 ,ooo shell forgings in June, 1939. By April, 1941, its 
daily production was half that number. The outbreak of war 
in Europe brought contracts for Illinois industries from the 
British and French governments. Steel companies sold steel 
to Britain. Two railroad car manufacturers, Pullman-Standard 
car company and Pressed Steel Car Company, built tanks for the 
British at Chicago-area plants. Smaller firms also secured 
contracts with the Allies, especially after the introduction 
of Lend-Lease in the spring of 1941. Williams Oil-0-Matic, 
a Bloomington manufacturer of oil heaters, produced gears for 
anti-aircraft guns used in the Battle of Britain in 1940-1941. 
Whiting Corporation, a builder of cranes and railroad and 
industrial equipment, produced cranes for Russia. Other firms 
made war supplies for England under contract with the United 
States government. As the nation's own rearmament program 
got underway, Illinois companies concentrated more and more 
on defense production. 3 
Illinois industries produced a variety of products for 
the armed forces. In some cases, they simply adapted existing 
product lines to military uses. caterpillar, Austin-Western, 
Barber-Greene and others built construction equipment for use 
in constructing roads and airfields. Pullman-Standard built 
railroad equipment for the armed forces overseas. Ingersoll 
Milling Machine Company won the coveted Army-Navy "E" award 
in the fall of 1941 for building a machine to mill battleship 
armor. Many Illinois plants made the same things for the 
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armed forces as they did for civilian use: tractors, diesel 
engines, gloves, wire, nuts, bolts, screws and the like. 
others made some adjustments to adapt peacetime products for 
military use. Zenith Radio had to retool since military 
specifications required closer tolerances than civilian radio 
equipment. Whiting Corporation, the crane manufacturer in 
Harvey, made hoists for loading bombs into airplanes. Elgin 
watch Company produced fuses and navigational instruments. 
western Electric made gun directors, field telephones, 
switchboards, cable and radiotelephone sets for tanks, planes 
and ships. 
military. 
By 1944, 83 percent of its output went to the 
Diamond T. Motor Company, a Chicago truck 
manufacturer, produced military trucks and also built a half-
track troop carrier, a new type of hybrid vehicle with wheels 
in front and tracks in the rear. Springfield-based Sangamo 
Electric, a manufacturer of meters, made signal equipment for 
the Signal Corps, fire control equipment and aircraft 
instruments. 4 
Many companies, however, made items for the military, 
which were far different than what they produced in peace-
time. Pullman-Standard plants built tanks, howitzers, 
trench mortars, aircraft assemblies and shells. In 1942, the 
Company erected a shipyard on Lake Calumet which constructed 
small escort ships and landing ships, medium (LSM's) for the 
United States and British navies. International Harvester 
Produced tanks, military trucks and tractors, and also made 
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torpedoes and shells, though it also continued to make farm 
equipment. Pettibone-Mulliken, a Chicago-area manufacturer 
of railway track equipment, turned out carriages for heavy 155 
millimeter cannon. In its Springfield plant, Allis-Chalmers 
built the M-18 tractor for towing heavy artillery. Western 
cartridge, of East Alton, made small-arms ammunition as did 
a large number of small firms. Stove manufacturers in 
Belleville made shells, bombs, ammunition boxes and tank 
parts. A group of thirty-three plants in six states 
cooperated in a program to produce armor plate for tanks and 
other combat vehicles. Kroehler Manufacturing Company, a 
Naperville furnituremaker, converted to production of plywood 
airplane parts. A Chicago firm, Victor Adding Machine 
Company, became a major producer of bombsights. An electrical 
products plant in Bloomington made proximity fuses for anti-
aircraft shells. A Decatur steel fabricator built prefabri-
cated bridges for use overseas. Another Decatur plant, the 
Garfield Division of the Houdaille-Hershey Corporation, worked 
on a top secret project involving production of parts for the 
first atomic bombs. Wallpaper firms made munitions. 5 
Production soared. The Chicago area almost tripled 
its industrial output between 1939 and 1944. Many firms were 
rewarded for their productivity by being awarded the Army-Navy 
"E" award. Such awards depended on high production and 
quality, but also low absenteeism, avoidance of work stop-
pages, fair labor standards, labor-management cooperation in 
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t . n conservation of critical materials, progress in produc 10 , 
overcoming obstacles and a good health and safety record. 
one Illinois firm even lost its award due to labor diff icul-
ties, while an award to another firm was delayed until a labor 
6 dispute was settled. 
Although many firms secured defense contracts in 1940 
and 1941, Illinois did not gain nearly as much at first as 
other states. Much of this was due to geography and war 
conditions. Early in the war, the armed forces of the Uni-
ted states and the Allied nations demanded ships and planes, 
which were usually built on the East and West Coasts. Still, 
some Illinois political leaders felt that the state was being 
slighted in the granting of contracts. They raised the issue 
in the 1940 election and renewed the charges after the 
• 7 
election. 
Some efforts were made to alleviate the situation. On 
May 1, 1941, Governor Dwight Green directed the Illinois 
State Council of Defense to consider means of getting arma-
ment work for Illinois firms with unused plant capacity and 
machinery. Although Illinois industry was recovering from 
the Depression, there still were many idled factories and 
unemployed workers. Illinois Director of Labor Martin P. 
Durkin, who surveyed 1423 plants in the state, each employing 
less than 500 workers, reported that 166 firms capable of 
turning out armaments were operating less than one shift when 
they could run two or three. Meanwhile, the Illinois 
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Manufacturer's Association turned over to the Office of 
production Management a list of 720 Illinois manufacturers 
with unused plant capacity and machinery adaptable to defense 
production. The Office of Production Management also worked 
with the National Association of Manufacturers in seeking out 
usable plants and machinery, and in May, 1941, held a clinic 
in Chicago to promote defense business. At the clinic, the 
agency discovered that many companies did not know how to get 
orders. It quickly set out to remedy the situation and match 
contractors with potential subcontractors with unused 
capacity. The agency's Defense Contract Service had the firms 
fill out exhaustive questionnaires describing their plant 
facilities and specifying the type and model of machines in 
the plant. When a contractor needed a subcontractor to assist 
in filling an order, the agency could check its files of 
manufacturers with the plant capacity and machinery needed for 
the job and suggest potential subcontractors, especially those 
with idle facilities and low priorities for their normal 
production. 8 
During the spring and summer of 1941, a new situation 
developed which made it imperative for the state's mills and 
factories to convert to defense production. The rising tem-
po of rearmament created shortages of materials and led the 
Office of Production Management to develop a system of pri-
orities to shift materials from civilian to defense produc-
tion. Under the system, producers of raw materials had to 
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give preference to defense orders. The system was gradually 
refined and strengthened so that all manufactured goods, ci-
vilian and defense-related, had a priority weighted in ac-
cordance with its usefulness to the defense effort and its 
relative scarcity at any given time. Priorities were re-
vised from time to time to reflect changing military and 
homefront requirements. For a time, the Office of Produc-
tion Management concentrated on defense-related production, 
while the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply 
handled civilian goods. However, while the latter had no 
authority to direct producers of raw materials to distribute 
them in accordance with its demands, it did have the power to 
tell the Off ice of Production Management to carry out its 
recommendations after defense needs had been met. The Of-
fice of Production Management resented having to follow pro-
grams formulated by the Off ice of Price Administration and 
Civilian Supply. This was resolved by transferring civilian 
supply functions to the former agency. The President also 
created the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board to for-
mulate policies on priorities which the Off ice of Production 
Management put into effect. The new agency was abolished when 
the War Production Board replaced the Off ice of Production 
Management in 1942. 9 
Meanwhile, the priority situation and shortages of 
raw materials created problems for the state's manufactur-
ers. Many responded by stepping up purchases of supplies. 
91 
BY April, 1941, 57 percent of Chicago-area firms were order-
ing materials for six months ahead or longer. on January 1, 
onlY 30 percent were buying that far in advance, while 50 
percent were ordering for periods of three months ahead or 
less. Even with the increased purchases, deliveries were 
uncertain. some companies hoarded materials, leading the 
office of Production Management to threaten punitive action. 
BY June, many firms, especially the smaller ones, were ha-
ving difficulty getting supplies and were losing business. 
Many cut production and employment, while others shutdown 
entirely. Many communities in the state were faced with 
"priority unemployment" as firms without priority rights 
were idled for lack of materials. In July, two-thirds of the 
state's small industries reported in a survey by the Illinois 
Small Business Men's Association that they would have to go 
out of business unless they received war contracts or got 
materials for normal production of civilian goods. The 
situation worsened throughout the summer as controls on the 
various metals intensified. 10 
The climax occurred in September when the Off ice of 
Production Management subjected all steel to priority con-
trols. on September 12, mayors, small businessmen, labor 
executives, trade association officials and civic leaders 
from several midwestern states met in Chicago to discuss the 
situation. There was special concern over the plight of 
smaller industries, which faced the greatest difficulties 
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~ith shortages and getting defense business since procure-
ment agencies generally sought out the largest and best-
equipped producers to fill their producers to fill their re-
quirements. The conference decided to seek a division of 
defense work among hard-hit industries, especially in one-
industry towns, increased subcontracts, allocation of mate-
rials on a plant-by-plant basis rather than by companies, 
increased use of substitute materials and pooling of a com-
rnunity' s resources so that it could bid as a unit for con-
tracts. Many of the state's political and business leaders 
journeyed to Washington to press their case. Delegations of 
trade and industrial associations, company representatives 
and members of the Illinois State Council of Defense descen-
ded on the capital and met with the state's congressional 
delegation. Governor Green and Chicago Mayor Kelly also 
traveled to Washington several times to lobby the Off ice of 
Production Management for more defense business for the 
state. Their efforts did win promises by the agency of more 
contracts for Illinois firms. The Illinois State Council of 
Defense also established an off ice in Washington to lobby 
for more defense business. 11 
In addition to lobbying for more defense business 
for the state firms, business and political leaders developed 
systems for helping industries secure contracts. In Septem-
ber, Chicago Mayor Kelly appointed the Chicago Commission on 
National Defense, an industrial commission, to stimulate 
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ation of pools for obtaining defense contracts, to gather form 
information on available plant facilities and manpower and to 
use its influence in obtaining a proper distribution of 
surplus materials. The commission acted as a clearinghouse 
for manufacturers' problems, recommended solutions and served 
as a 1iason between Chicago manufacturers and the federal 
government. The city was divided into seven areas, each with 
a divisional headquarters supervised by a representative of 
the industrial commission and aided by engineers. Advisory 
committees of 15 manufacturers and 15 labor leaders were also 
chosen. The Chicago Plan Commission supplied canvassers to 
gather information for the commission. Governor Green and the 
state defense council also developed plans for pooling of 
federal contracts. The Illinois Division of the National 
Small Business Men's Association sponsored a conference in 
Chicago of businessmen and officials of the Chicago Ordnance 
District. The officers and representatives of large companies 
such as Stewart-Warner and General Electric conferred with 
smaller manufacturers to arrange subcontracts. 12 
The Off ice of Production Management established a Di-
vision of Contract Distribution to assist small companies in 
gaining defense contracts. The agency held defense clinics 
in various cities to facilitate subcontracting and in Octo-
ber, 1941, held a big regional clinic in Chicago in which 
purchasing agents and production engineers from 150 corpo-
rations holding major contracts conferred with representa-
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tives of over 3500 small firms to determine if any had 
facilities available for subcontracts. Some did. Pullman-
standard found six plants with heavy machinery to make parts 
for tanks which the company was building at its Hammond, In-
diana plant. Within a month, the company completed arrange-
ments for the smaller firms to produce the needed parts. The 
off ice of Production Management also sent out defense trains 
to tour cities across the nation with exhibits showing samples 
of rearmament items which could be produced by smaller 
companies. In some cases, the agency allocated contracts to 
small companies to relieve local unemployment resulting from 
lack of materials. In April, 1942, the War Production Board 
tested the Stanley Plan of letting subcontracts to Chicago-
area plants. Under the plan, contractors and potential 
subcontractors used a mutual clearinghouse which matched 
contractors with potential subcontractors having the machinery 
to do the job. Subcontractors attended a special class to 
learn how to list their machines in a directory using a 
special code. Those who participated were put on a mailing 
list for a special weekly listing of contract opportunities. 
The plan proved sufficiently successful that in June, 1942, 
it was extended throughout the Chicago region of the War 
Production Board. 13 
Small companies used a variety of means to gain con-
tracts. Some advertized their availability in major newspa-
pers. Early in 1941, Lyon Metal Products, an Aurora-based 
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manufacturer of metal shelving and business furniture, sent 
its salesmen out to visit other companies and field off ices 
for procurement agencies in search of contracts and subcon-
tracts. The company neglected its own successful business to 
concentrate on defense business. Its aggressiveness paid off. 
By the spring of 1942, it was farming out orders when it had 
more than it could handle. Many companies formed pools in 
which they bid as a group on defense contracts. Pooling was 
most popular late in 1941 and early in 1942. In August, 1941, 
Peoria's Association of Commerce Industrial committee 
organized the Mother Hen Pool of Group Resources. Fifty-four 
local firms pooled facilities and equipment, with two serving 
as Mother Hens and assuming responsibility for any contracts 
secured. The pool printed catalogues of facilities. Late in 
the summer of 1941, Decatur formed a pool of fifteen metal-
working firms following a conference between Governor Green 
and a local businessman. The presidents of the companies 
gathered information on their facilities, which was placed on 
file with defense production offices. One of the company 
presidents headed the group and another made all contacts with 
government offices. The Decatur pool arose in response to 
shortages of materials. Metalworking of one sort or another 
accounted for 50 percent of the city's industry and payroll. 
The Off ice of Production Management and state and local 
political and business leaders encouraged pooling as a means 
by which smaller firms could get defense business. There were 
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over twenty in Chicago alone. Most involved metal fabrica-
tors, though there were some composed of furnituremakers. 
surgess-Norton developed a pool to make tank parts, which 
ultimately supplied tank bodies for 85 percent of all 
American-built tanks. Pools were granted immunity from anti-
trust laws provided that they could demonstrate a link between 
increased efficiency and war needs. Although some pools were 
successful, others failed to gain any business and eventually 
fell apart. Many were mismanaged and others were poorly 
organized. By February, 1942, twenty-two pools had been 
organized in the Chicago Ordnance District but none had 
obtained a contract. With such mixed results, pooling declined 
generally in the spring of 1942. 14 
Pearl Harbor brought more problems for smaller indus-
tries. The armed forces stepped up their purchasing, but 
continued their traditional reliance on larger companies. 
Small industries could only get business when larger ones 
could not handle any more. Even then, many of the jobs were 
ones that other companies simply did not want. In March, 
1942, the War Production Board issued a directive granting 
contracts to small companies through negotiation without re-
quiring them to bid against big manufacturers. One of its 
first fruits in the Chicago area developed in April, 1942 when 
one hundred firms secured contracts to make bomb parts. In 
June, 1942, the Smaller War Plants Division, later the Smaller 
War Plants Corporation, was established to help small business 
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participate in the war effort. Al though the new agency 
enjoyed some success, small business continued to have 
difficulty in getting war contracts throughout the war 
and they often suffered the most from contract cancellations 
. th 15 later in e war. 
Meanwhile, controls on materials tightened as the 
united states entered the war. This intensified shortages 
of supplies and also equipment. Some companies traded or 
sold materials to others in exchange for supplies they nee-
ded. In the summer of 1943, the War Production Board and 
several Chicago area war plants launched a drive to share 
steel, which resulted in cancellation of orders for 700,000 
tons of steel. Some companies resorted to illegal means of 
getting the supplies they needed. In the fall of 1941, the 
Office of Production Management barred a Chicago firm from 
using aluminum for six months after the company violated 
priority regulations by diverting aluminum from rearmament 
projects to companies making jukeboxes, slot machines and 
other nonessentials. In February, 1942, the War Production 
Board amended the order to allow the firm to fill war or-
ders, but continued to penalize other violators, who hoarded 
scarce metals or diverted them to nonessential uses. In Ap-
ril, the agency penalized Mills Novelty Company, a Chicago 
manufacturer of jukeboxes and gambling equipment, for diver-
sion of materials to such machines. The company, which la-
ter turned to war production, sold its products to local 
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gangsters as well as country clubs evading anti-gambling laws, 
though the latter had to divide their profits with the Capone 
gang. The company appears to have had some connection with 
• • • 16 local pol1t1c1ans. 
one source of raw materials was scrap and refuse of 
various kinds. Throughout the war, various war agencies, 
state and local defense councils and local organizations 
sponsored scrap drives to collect metals, wastepaper, rub-
ber and even kitchen grease, which was used to make glyce-
rine, an ingredient in munitions. Scrap drives started in 
the summer of 1941, when the general public contributed 
cooking utensils and other items to help relieve a shortage 
of aluminum. Scrap drives soon encompassed other metals, 
particularly iron and steel. Manufacturers turned in obso-
lete unusable machinery for scrap. Farmers provided a rich 
harvest of wornout machinery for scrap drives. Railroads 
were an especially rich source of scrap from unused spur 
lines. Railroads abandoned many miles of branch lines du-
ring the war, though in some cases, the need for scrap con-
flicted with the need of local communities for transporta-
tion. Many proposed abandonments aroused strong protests. 
One of the most controversial involved a segment of the Il-
linois Terminal system running from Peoria through Blooming-
ton and Decatur to Champaign-Urbana and Danville. The War 
Production Board supported the abandonment in order to get 
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the rails, but backed down amid vigorous protests from the 
communities and the line continued in operation. No such 
protests greeted the disappearance of Civil War cannon and 
other community war memorials into the nation's scrap pile. 
Much of the sacrifice was probably needless, but there were 
shortages. Scrap dealers took advantage of the situation and 
a black market developed in steel scrap. Many scrap dealers 
resorted to a practice known as "top dressing," under which 
they loaded railroad cars with inferior grade material, then 
put a load of higher quality scrap metal on top and billed the 
steel companies at the higher rate. One Chicago dealer even 
put in a load of dirt. Such practices were a headache for 
steel producers and undoubtedly hurt production. 17 
There also were shortages of machine tools and some 
resorted to the black market to fill their needs. Some com-
panies were able to reuse old obsolete equipment. However, 
while some machines were readily adaptable to defense pro-
duction, others were not. Many companies were forced to re-
tool when they switched from civilian to military produc-
tion. Machines also wore out, especially with wartime work 
schedules. Machines were used round the clock and broke down 
from overwork. Sometimes, even if machines were available, 
they were unused due to a lack of workers with skills to use 
them. The War Production Board and the Chicago Ordnance 
District also purchased or leased idle machines and made them 
available to manufacturers in need of machinery. In February, 
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1944 , the Anny Air Force established a warehouse in Chicago 
to dispose of machines rendered surplus when contracts were 
cancelled. Many companies already made their own tools, but 
still found it necessary to increase their production of tools 
and add to their tool-making staff. Plant protection was also 
a problem. In Chicago, Mayor Kelly appointed Patrick H. 
Joyce to the post of Industrial Coordinator in March, 1942. 
Joyce, who was president of the Chicago Great Western 
Railroad, met with local business leaders and developed a code 
for plant protection which was eventually picked up by other 
communities. Joyce and his associates also helped plants 
organize for protection against enemy attack, organized an 
inspection of plants by the Fire Department, and worked on 
plans for transportation of war workers. Later, in 1943, the 
War Department and other agencies took over security and plant 
protection and inspection, and in March, 1944, the Anny 
discontinued its Advance Warning System as there no longer 
was any danger of air attack. There were some efforts at 
sabotage and war plants did establish guards to prevent this. 18 
The conversion from civilian to war production crea-
ted many shortages of civilian goods. Even what was avail-
able was often of poorer quality. Manufacturers, who stayed 
in civilian production, had to make do with substitute mate-
rials and even these were often hard to get. Retailers 
stocked their shelves with ersatz merchandise and were glad 
to get even that. sears, Roebuck and Company, which de-
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signed much of its own merchandise, scavenged in stock rooms 
and dumps of various manufacturers in search of materials that 
could be used in hard goods. Even so, durable goods became 
scarcer during the war and retailers and mail order firms had 
to devote more space to soft goods such as clothing. They 
also had to restrict their sales to maintain their inventory. 
consumer attitudes varied during the war. In December, 1942, 
holiday sales were brisk, but returns were few. People kept 
what they had due to shortages. In 1943, several "Victory" 
models of clothing items of spartan design were introduced. 
However, as news from the battlefront became more optimistic, 
people anticipated the easing of shortages and became more 
reluctant to accept substitute goods. Victory models 
disappeared in 1944 and shoppers turned to luxury goods and 
higher-priced items. Scarce items, however, such as 
appliances and furniture, remained popular regardless of 
quality. Sears sold iceboxes, which could be converted to 
electric refrigerators after the war. Secondhand merchandise 
sold well. Finally, to aid war workers and reduce absen-
teeism, utilities such as Commonwealth Edison promoted a 
program for repair and resale of old appliances. People could 
bring in appliances to electric appliance stores for repair 
and resale to war workers. overall, despite shortages of 
goods, retailers had record sales in the war years. Monthly 
retail sales in Illinois, which totaled $14, 435, 854. 00 in 
June, 1941, reached $17,363,949.00 in June, 1944. Chicago 
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retail sales rose from $1,650 million in 1940 to an estimated 
. . . 1945 19 $2180 0 million in • 
Many war industries had to expand their facilities to 
fulfill their contracts. Idled plants were reopened. In 
March, 1942, American Locomotive Company reopened its Chica-
go Heights steel-making plant, most of which had been closed 
for ten years. Smaller firms made use of whatever space was 
available as they expanded to meet war orders. In Rockford, 
an old high school girls gymnasium housed a local war indus-
try. Though some acquired idle plants of other manufactur-
ers, others had to make do with stores, garages, old livery 
stables and other makeshift facilities. Many companies grew 
rapidly as a result of the war. A Freeport producer of 
electric switches with only 138 employees in 1940, had over 
1000 by 1944. To help finance this expansion, private banks 
and some government agencies, especially the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, extended loans to companies in need of 
them. In the Chicago region, 31.7 percent of the loans went 
to businesses with assets totalling over $5 million or more, 
33.2 percent to those with assets of $500,000 to $5 million, 
28.2 percent to firms with assets between $50,000 and 
$500,000, and 6.9 percent to those with less than $50,000 in 
assets. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation also estab-
lished a subsidiary, the Defense Plant Corporation, to fi-
nance construction of war plants for specific purposes. 
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usuallY, the agency owned the plants, but leased them to 
·vate companies for operation. pri In the Chicago area, it 
financed aircraft engine plants, an aluminum rolling mill and 
a plant to produce brass and other metal parts for air-
craft and munitions. Not all such ventures were successful. 
In 1943, the Defense Plant corporation financed construction 
of hemp mills in Illinois and several other states to process 
hemp for use in making rope. Axis victories in 1942 cut off 
or reduced foreign supplies of Manila hemp, sisal and jute and 
threatened a shortage of rope. Al though some hemp was planted 
in 1943, production was reduced in 1944 and none was planted 
after that year. Allied victories in 1943 and 1944 reduced 
the need for the hemp mills as foreign supplies again became 
available. 20 
A more successful Defense Plant Corporation venture 
was the construction of airplane engine plants in the Chica-
go area. In the spring of 1941, the Studebaker Corporation 
started construction of a factory on the city's southwest side 
to manufacture components for engines to be assembled at a 
plant in South Bend, Indiana. Early in 1942, the factory 
started production of components for engines for B-17 
bombers. The Buick Division of General Motors Corporation 
built a plant in Melrose Park, which ultimately supplied 
most of the engines for B-24 bombers. Later, Chrysler Cor-
poration's Dodge Division built a huge engine plant on Chi-
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cago, s southwest side, which at that time was the world's 
iargest airplane engine plant. It produced a total of 18,413 
engines for B-29 and B-32 bombers, including the planes which 
dropped the first atomic bombs. Douglas Aircraft Company 
constructed an Army-owned plant in Park Ridge to build C-54 
transports, many of which were powered by engines from the 
nearby Buick plant in Melrose Park. The Douglas plant was 
especially noteworthy for its use of wood as a substitute for 
steel in its construction. On Chicago's near west side, 
Bendix Aviation, built the nation's largest factory for 
airplane carburetors. Other firms around the state produced 
airplane parts and subassernblies and even light planes and 
gliders. All of this led some Chicago and state business 
leaders to anticipate that the city and state would become the 
center of an aviation industry after the war. This did not 
materialize as the aircraft and engine plants shut down after 
the war. 21 
Ordnance plants were constructed by the Army and usu-
ally operated by private operators. There were several built 
in Illinois, including the large Wilmington-Elwood complex, 
which started production in 1941, the crab Orchard Lake plant 
near Herrin, the Green River plant near Dixon, and the 
Illiopolis plant between Decatur and Springfield. All except 
the Wilmington-Elwood plants started production in 1942. Some 
of the sites aroused some controversy since the land was good 
farmland and the farmers did not wish to sell. Farmers in the 
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Wilmington area were especially angry since hundreds of acres 
of wasteland created by strip coal mines were available 
nearby. Eventually, however, the Army won out and the farmers 
were relocated to other areas of the state. Contractors then 
built the Kankakee Ordnance Works to manufacture TNT, tetryl 
and lead azide, and its twin, the Elwood Ordnance Works, which 
loaded these explosives into shells and bombs. The other own 
ordnance plants were shell and bomb-loading plants. The 
Army's own ordnance plants at Rock Island and Savanna also 
increased production. Construction of the new plants 
stimulated boomtown conditions in nearby communities. Housing 
was scarce and trailer camps sprang up to meet the demand. 
Though the plants went to great lengths to ensure safety and 
security, there were accidents. The most serious took place 
at the Elwood Ordnance Works in June, 1942, when an explosion 
destroyed a building, killing 51 and injuring 41 others. 22 
Boomtown conditions prevailed in Seneca where the 
Chicago Bridge and Iron Company built and operated a ship-
yard under a contract with the Navy to build landing ships 
tank (LST's). Since all coastal yards were working full-time 
on other types of ships, new yards were necessary and the 
Navy decided to build some on inland waterways with suf-
ficient depth to float the vessels down to the sea. The Il-
linois River was part of the Great Lakes-Gulf Waterway with 
a nine-foot channel down the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers. 
From June, 1942 to June, 1945, the Seneca shipyard built 157 
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of the large landing ships and launched them sideways into 
the Illinois River. 
oecember 14, 1942. 
The first ship took to the water on 
Others followed at ever-increasing 
intervals as the work force gained experience and efficiency. 
since housing was scarce, Federal housing agencies erected 
temporary housing for the workers, many of which were from 
other parts of the country. Seneca went from a population of 
1235 in 1942 to 6600 by 1944. The community had to expand its 
schools and other services to accomodate the newcomers. Many 
residents resented this and made the migrants feel unwelcome. 
some shipyard workers joined local schools, but even then, 
many were made to feel unwelcome. The community itself 
benefitted from the influx of shipyard workers. New churches 
were built, while older ones gained new members and income. 
Empty store buildings were remodeled and opened to new 
business establishments. Food stores doubled or tripled their 
business. Other retailers enjoyed a similar expansion. Some 
locals even claimed that the boom rescued several businessmen 
from bankruptcy. The community itself gained a new school 
building, a new drainage and sewage system and additional fire 
fighting equipment. 23 
Several other Illinois shipyards also built naval 
Vessels of various kinds. Pullman-Standard constructed and 
operated a shipyard on Lake Calumet, which erected small es-
cort vessels and landing ships medium (LSM's) for the United 
states and British navies. 
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Other Chicago-area yards built 
small minesweepers, minelayers, tugboats, small cargo ves-
sels, small oil tankers and invasion barges. An East Peoria 
firm turned out assault boats. Quincy Barge Builders con-
structed landing craft tanks (LCT's). The construction of 
naval vessels in Illinois and other Great Lakes states pre-
sented some major difficulties. In the first place, the Rush-
Bagot Treaty of 1817 prohibited such activity until March, 
1941 when the United States and Canada made a new agreement 
lifting the ban provided the vessels were not used on the 
Great Lakes. A much greater difficulty lay in getting the 
vessels out of the Lakes and other waterways to seaports. 
Most naval vessels that came out of yards on the Lakes and 
various rivers had a sufficiently shallow draft to go down the 
Illinois and Mississippi Rivers, the Erie Canal, the Welland 
Canal and other waterways. However, when a yard at Manitowoc, 
Wisconsin built submarines, they were floated down the 
Illinois and Mississippi Rivers in special cradles constructed 
for the purpose, which lifted them free of shoals. Chicago 
yards on the north branch of the Chicago River had their own 
problems with shallow water. Low bridges were another 
obstacle and eventually some communities had to raise them or 
make them movable. 24 
The demand for steel from such industries as ship-
building forced the steel industry to increase capacity in 
order to increase production. As early as June, 1940, the 
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industry in Chicago was operating at 93.3 percent of capa-
city and soon United States Steel Company's Carnegie-Illi-
. oi'vision added two electric furnaces at the South Works 
no1s 
in Chicago. Early in 1941, another United States steel sub-
sidiary expanded its facilities in Joliet. Most additions 
to capacity resulted from improvements to exisiting facili-
ties to make them efficient. The industry was reluctant to 
build new facilities to meet the demands of defense, and la-
ter, war production as this would add to steel-making capa-
city, thus leaving them with excess capacity in peacetime and 
driving up costs. They wanted federal financing of the new 
facilities and got it from the Defense Plant Corporation. 
Late in 1941, Inland Steel Company started construction 
of three blast furnaces, two of them financed by the 
government. Early in January, 1942, Republic Steel Corpora-
tion started construction of six electric furnaces at its 
Chicago plant, all financed by the government. The furnaces 
were part of the first all-electric steel mill in the na-
tion. It went into partial operation in 1943 producing 
electric alloy steel. In January, 1944, the War Production 
Board recommended that work be stopped on construction of a 
bar mill at the plant. This was soon reversed and the mill 
was completed. Ultimately, the plant consisted of nine 
electric furnaces, four batteries of coke ovens, a blast 
furnace, four open hearths, a blooming mill, a bar mill, a 
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breakdown mill and three ore unloading bridges. It went in-
to production late in 1944. Some companies did construct 
additional facilities at their own expense, but the most 
significant facilities were financed by the Defense Plant 
corporation. The improvements raised total steel production 
capacity in the Chicago area from 15,429,600 tons on Decem-
ber 31, 1939 to 18,600,300 tons as of January 1, 1945. The 
Defense Plant Corporation also financed expansion of other 
Illinois steel-making facilities such as Granite City steel 
company's plant in Granite City. All of these improvements 
helped to increase steel production to record levels. Chi-
cago area steel ingot production rose from 17,665,000 tons 
in 1942 to peak at 18,090,000 tons in 1944 before dropping 
to 16,494,000 tons in 1945. Pig iron production at Chicago-
area mills went from 6,536,098 tons in 1939 to 13,115,268 
tons in 1944 and 11,510,810 tons in 1945. 25 
Feeding the state's mills, factories and utilities were 
its highly mechanized coal mines. Illinois coal pro-
duction went from 51,033,319 tons in 1941 to 77,400,031 tons 
in 1944. Production dropped somewhat in 1945 due to labor 
shortages. since coal was more plentiful than fuel oil, 
users of the latter were encouraged to convert back to coal. 
Even then, however, consumers were urged to buy early. Dea-
lers secured loans to help them build up stocks during the 
summer. Late in the fall of 1943, the Solid Fuels Adminis-
tration restricted consumer purchases of coal due to shor-
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es caused in part by labor difficulties and labor shorta-tag 
ges and mounting demands from industry. Early in 1945, a 
slump in coal supplies led to a brownout, which curtailed 
some usage of electricity. During 1943 and 1944, strikes 
led the Solid Fuels Administration to take over the mines and 
operate them for a time. Sales of Illinois coal met another 
obstacle in st. Louis, whose smoke abatement ordnance barred 
southern Illinois coal from the city due to its excessive 
smoke, and required coal to be shipped in from other states. 
This led to protests from Southern Illinois coal interests and 
local communities and also from the Midwest Shipper's Asso-
ciation, which charged that the shipping of coal from other 
states to St. Louis was a wasteful use of railroad cars in 
wartime. Illinois mines also contributed lead, zinc, 
fluorspar and other minerals to the war effort. Galena's 
long-dormant lead and zinc mines revived. Southern 
Illinois mines produced almost half the nation's supply of 
fluorspar, which was used in making steel, hydrofluoric acid 
and cryolite, a mineral used in making aluminum. Illinois 
fluorspar production increased from 117,465 tons in 1939 to 
161,949 tons in 1942.u 
One industry which was highly dependent on the output 
of Illinois coal mines was the electric power system. The 
growth of war industries led to a heavy demand for electric 
power and also natural gas. Indeed, the Seneca shipyard and 
several major war industries in the Chicago area were loca-
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ted in Northern Illinois partly because of the abundant sup-
ply of electricity. Still, some utilities had to add gene-
rating units at power plants and even built new power plants 
to meet the need for power. Power production increased 
sharply. The Commonwealth Edison system, which generated 
7 ,550,378,224 kilowatthours in 1939, peaked at 11,583,894, 
760 kilowatthours in 1944 before dropping to 11,349,117,347 
kilowatthours in 1945. Utilities also added interconnecting 
lines to allow for pooling of power to serve specific war 
plants or as an emergency reserve. The Commonwealth Edison 
system and the Wisconsin Electric Power built an emergency 
power line between Waukegan and Kenosha to connect the two 
systems and serve as an emergency reserve source of power 
for either system. New extensions were limited due to sher-
tages of materials. Rural electrification projects were 
curtailed, though some restrictions were eased in 1943 to 
permit some extensions to improve farm production. To con-
serve the use of electricity, the nation went on Daylight 
Saving Time or Wartime year-round. One result was to change 
the time of peakload from the late afternoon to the morning. 
It changed back when Central Standard Time returned after 
the war. Early in 1945, a coal shortage led to a brownout, 
which curtailed outside lighting and forced night clubs, 
taverns, and other places of entertainment to close at 
midnight, thus depriving them of much of their business. 
Natural gas usage met with similar restrictions. Extensions 
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to new homes were limited by shortages of aterials. Some 
companies resorted to plastic pipe. Gas deliveries were qas 
cut to businesses, which could use other fuels. There was a 
heavy emphasis on conservation, though some new pipelines 
were built and old gas manufacturing plants reopened. 27 
Unlike most commodities, production of oil from Illi-
nois wells declined during the war. After peaking at 147, 
64 7, ooo barrels in 1940, production dropped to 82, 2 60, 000 
barrels by 1943. There were several reasons for this, in-
eluding the loss of experienced labor to the armed forces, 
shortages of equipment and price restrictions for crude oil. 
one of the biggest causes for the decline was restrictions on 
drilling by the War Production Board and the Office of 
Petroleum Coordinator, later renamed the Petroleum Adminis-
tration for War, headed by Secretary of the Interior, Harold 
L. Ickes. The War Production Board wanted to limit steel, 
while the other agencies wanted to conserve oil, so they 
limited drilling to one well for every forty acres. Under 
pressure from Illinois operators and their congressional al-
lies, Ickes eased the restriction somewhat, but never re-
moved all restraints until after the war. The General As-
sembly passed a mild oil conservation measure in 1941, but 
failed to enact stronger legislation despite pressure from 
Ickes. The oil industry also expanded refineries and other 
facilities during the war.~ 
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Most companies prospered during the war, but profits 
were often lower than before Pearl Harbor due to rising taxes, 
especially the excess profits tax, and renegotiation of war 
contracts. Renegotiation grew out of a congressional fear of 
war profiteering. Under the law passed April 28, 1942, the 
war contracts Price Adjustment Board could renegotiate 
contracts if a firm's profits seemed excessive. The company 
would then refund any excess to the government. Even then, 
while many firms had higher profits in 1941 than during the 
rest of the war years, they still did much better than during 
the Depression years of the thirties. Many firms, especially 
smaller ones, grew to an unusual size under the impetus of 
war contracts. While some small manufacturers suffered, 
others did quite well. During the war years, the nature of 
manufacturing in Illinois also shifted somewhat. Heavy 
industry grew in proportion to food and clothing. In 1939, 
iron and steel industries comprised 21. 2 percent of total 
employment in the Chicago area, while food industries employed 
14 percent of the workforce, printing and publishing, 10.2 
percent, textiles, 9 percent and machinery, 16.5 percent. In 
1948, iron and steel was down to 20.5 percent of total 
employment in the Chicago area, but machinery was up to 24.1 
percent, food processing was down to 11.2 percent, printing 
and publishing, 8.3 percent and textiles only 6.4 percent. 
Also, even though iron and steel had decreased its share of 
the workforce, the industry grew in capacity during the war. 
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Illinois emerged from the war as the center of diesel engine 
ntanufacture. New industries sprang up in light metals, 
plastics and the like, while existing firms introduced new 
product lines based on their wartime experiences. Though 
Chicago failed to become an aircraft manufacturing center as 
she bad hoped, she increased in stature as a financial center 
29 during the war. 
Illinois industries produced a variety of products 
during the war ranging from small parts to warships. Since 
111aterials were insufficient to allow manufacture of all ci-
vilian product and military supplies, the national defense 
agencies charged with coordination of industrial production 
found it necessary to devise a system of priorities for al-
location of scarce commodities. Production of some civilian 
products had to utilize substitute materials. Even war plants 
themselves sometimes made extensive use of wood as a 
substitute for steel in their construction. Since companies 
without a priority could not get raw materials, it was impe-
rative for them to convert to manufacture needed military 
supplies instead of civilian goods. To assist them in con-
version to defense and then war production, the Office of 
Production Management and later the War Production Board 
sponsored clinics and other programs. State and local poli-
tical and business leaders also held clinics and lobbied 
procurement agencies for contracts for firms located in the 
state. Industries also formed pools to solicit defense 
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business or checked out contracts themselves to see if there 
were products they could make. In some cases, the Defense 
plant corporation financed new industrial facilities in or-
der to get military equipment or materials for which there 
was a critical need such as aircraft engines. Through their 
own efforts as well as those of political and business lea-
ders and federal agencies, most of the state's mills, mines 
and factories managed to play some sort of role on the pro-
duction front. The experience involved a good deal of coo-
peration between different levels of government and between 
businessmen themselves in dealing with problems of priori-
ties, solicitation of business, acquisition of tools and plant 
protection. It also required some versatility since most 
industries produced military items that were at least somewhat 
different and often a good deal different from what they made 
in peacetime. By and large, Illinois industry profitted from 
the war. Though many companies did not do as well financially 
as they would in peacetime, the tremendous growth in the size 
of their establishments and the volume of business and 
experience they had acquired during the war left them well 
positioned to participate in the postwar world. 
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CHAPTER IV 
LABOR RELATIONS AND MANPOWER MANAGEMENT IN WARTIME ILLINOIS 
The Second World War brought a change in labor-
management and inter-union relations from confrontation to 
peration. During the thirties and early forties, labor 
unions fought industrial concerns of all sizes seeking re-
cognition and better wages and benefits for their members. 
some labor disputes involved rival unions affiliated with the 
American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO) as well as independents, some 
of them company-dominated, all competing for the allegiance 
of the workforce. The struggle disrupted defense production 
as strikes hit steel, farm equipment and other vital indus-
tries. Pearl Harbor changed all this. Unions strove to co-
operate with management and with each other in pushing pro-
duction. Rival unions laid aside their jurisdictional dis-
putes and for the most part ceased their competitive ef-
forts. Most companies and unions settled their disputes 
through collective bargaining or if this proved unsuccess-
ful, submitted them to the War Labor Board and agreed to 
abide by its decisions. Some strikes did occur, but most 
were the result of intransigence on the part of one or both 
parties in a dispute. In a few instances, strikes were se-
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rious enough to bring government takeover of the affected 
industries. For the most part, however, labor leaders tried 
to prevent strikes and squelch those that did occur. The 
war brought a measure of labor peace and productivity. In 
some cases, defense and wartime conditions helped induce a 
reluctant management to accept unions. The war also brought 
an unprecedented degree of government control over the work-
force as the War Manpower Commission sought to manage the 
labor supply so as to place workers where they were most 
needed while the War Labor Board settled disputes to main-
tain production and restricted wages in an effort to hold 
down inf lat ion. Wartime labor shortages also created em-
ployment opportunities for women and blacks and other mino-
rities. 
Union membership grew rapidly in the thirties and 
forties as the American Federation of Labor organized new 
craft union locals while its offshoot and rival, the Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations, established new industri-
al unions in mass production industries. The first conven-
tion of the State Industrial Union Council in Springfield in 
September, 1941 had representatives from 29 international 
unions and 272 local industrial unions. In 1943, the state 
organization had a membership of 270,995 though it lost the 
United Mine Workers in 1942 and expelled several unions in 
the late forties on grounds of Communist domination. Alarmed 
by the rapid growth of its rival, the American Federation of 
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Labor eventually reversed its traditional opposition to 
industrial unions and organized federal locals in mass 
production industries. Membership in the Federation's state 
affiliate, the Illinois State Federation of Labor rose from 
?6,000 in 1933 to 273,000 in 1941 and over 800,000 by 1950. 
outside labor unions of any kind had to contend with the 
hostility of employers, many of whom went to great lengths to 
avoid dealing with outside unions, sometimes forming company 
unions disguised as independent unions. However, if a 
company found that it had to deal with an outside union, it 
sometimes favored those affiliated with the American Federa-
tion of Labor as they were generally more conservative and 
less militant, though an anti-union management could provoke 
as much militance in an AFL local as in a CIO union. 1 
boom. 
Organized labor benefitted greatly from the defense 
Not only were its members employed in high-paying 
jobs, but companies were less reluctant to accept unioniza-
tion. The Steel Workers Organizing committee rebounded from 
its defeat by "Little Steel" in a 1937 strike and resumed 
organizing activity. Short walkouts occurred whenever local 
grievances developed. The strikes aggravated the "Little 
Steel" companies, but they could do little to stop them. 
Defense production gave them plenty of business and they were 
anxious to keep experienced workers rather than fire them for 
union activity. The union also picketed the mills and forced 
incoming workers to sign up with the union and pay union dues 
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or oe barred from the plant. The National Labor Relations 
Board helped matters by ordering the companies to dises-
taolish company unions. The companies finally gave in and 
signed contracts with the Steel Workers Organizing Committee 
in 1941. The heavy defense business and disestablishment of 
its company unions finally forced the companies to accept 
unionization. The union also conducted dues-picketing at 
u. s. steel's Gary Works in the spring and fall of that year 
in order to force a union shop. In the summer of 1942, the 
union, now renamed the United Steelworkers of America, won 
exclusive bargaining rights for all workers at U. s. Steel. 2 
In 1936, the Farm Equipment Workers Organizing Com-
mittee, an offshoot of the steelworkers union, set out to 
conquer the farm equipment industry, only to run into deter-
mined opposition from International Harvester. After 
company unions were outlawed, the company simply converted 
them to independent unions which it still dominated. The 
Farm Equipment Workers union complained to the National Labor 
Relations Board, which found that the independents were 
really company unions and in February, 1941, ordered them 
disbanded. In January of that year, the Farm Equipment 
Workers started organizing International Harvester. It faced 
competition from the United Auto Workers. At that time, the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations allowed competition 
between member unions in organizing industries. This 
resulted in a bitter feud between the Farm Equipment Workers 
d the united Auto Workers. an 
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The Congress of Industrial 
organizations tried to persuade them to merge, but the Farm 
Equipment workers resisted. The United Auto Workers resorted 
to raiding its rival, especially in the postwar era, and 
ultimately, with the assistance of International Harvester, 
destroyed the Farm Equipment Workers in the mid-fifties. 3 
In 1941, both unions faced another competitor in the 
American Federation of Labor. When the independents were 
disestablished at International Harvester, the Federation 
started converting them into federal locals with the support 
of management, which was anxious to keep out the CIO, espe-
cially the Farm Equipment Workers, which they considered 
communist-led. The latter, which struck two plants in Janu-
ary, 1941 as part of its drive for union recognition, res-
ponded to the threat from the AFL by extending the strike to 
other plants in March. The federal locals then led a back 
to work movement which broke the strike. The company also 
granted wage hikes to reduce the attractiveness of the CIO. 
However, when the National Labor Relations Board held elec-
tions, the CIO won most of the plants. The Farm Equipment 
Workers took four, including the main plants in Chicago, 
while the United Auto Workers captured plants in other 
states. Only two plants chose federal locals, and one of 
them switched to the Farm Equipment Workers in 1944. Inde-
pendents hung on at a few plants, but by the end of the war, 
most had been voted out by the workers in favor of outside 
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unions. By 1945, the Farm Equipment workers held eleven 
and the United Auto Workers six, while the American plants, 
Federation of Labor had the Milwaukee plant and craft unions 
in other plants. The National Defense Mediation Board and 
its successor, the War Labor Board, eventually settled the 
contract between the company and the Farm Equipment Workers 
in 1942. The union also organized Caterpillar in Peoria, 
defeating an independent union and an AFL federal local. 
John Deere was able to fend off unionization of most of its 
plants until 1943 when the United Auto Workers won four 
plants, while the Farm Equipment Workers took one. 4 
While International Harvester was opposed to outside 
unions in principle, it especially objected to the militant 
Farm Equipment Workers union, which reputedly was communist-
led. At that time, the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
willingly hired Communists and their sympathizers as organi-
zers. Some reputed reds rose through the ranks to dominate 
locals and even entire unions such as the Farm Equipment 
Workers and the United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers 
of America, with which it merged in the late forties after 
both were expelled from the Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions for their communist leanings. The CIO was concerned 
about the communist issue, but was quite happy to use Mar-
xists to organize and build its affiliated unions until after 
the war when the reds were expelled. The Communist issue did 
hurt the organization's public image, and the American 
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federation of Labor as well as many industry leaders were 
quick to take advantage of this. A congressional committee 
investigating domestic subversives came to Chicago in the 
fall of 1939 and accused several local CIO officials of being 
communists. The committee, headed by Texas Congressman 
Martin Dies, made further accusations throughout the war 
years as did the Chicago Tribune and local business and labor 
leaders. Frequently, the paper played up dissident union 
members' charges of Communists in union leadership positions. 5 
The American Federation of Labor, however, suffered 
from bad publicity due to the influence of racketeers in some 
of its affiliated unions. In Chicago, local gangsters gained 
control of several locals in service industries. Later, 
alleged labor leaders sold jobs and union cards at inflated 
prices. In 1941 and 1942, George Ziller, a reputed Democrat-
ic leader, forced potential laborers and truckers to pay 
exorbitant fees to get work at several ordnance plants. 
Truckers had to join the Teamsters union and laborers the 
hod carriers union. Ziller collected the dues. After many 
delays, including changes of venue, he pleaded guilty in 
April, 1945 and was fined. other AFL unions drew criticism 
for charging exorbitant initiation fees to join the union 
and get jobs at ordnance plants, though several cut their 
fees following the exposure of the Ziller scandal. 6 
Besides facing opposition from company management, 
many unions had to deal with worker apathy and sometimes 
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outright hostility. Some workers felt they should not have 
to join a union to get a job. Others questioned what the 
union could do for them. The security of a good job seemed 
more important than any possible gains from unionization. 
Even union members were apathetic. They had no comprehension 
of the expense of running a union and could see no need to 
keep up with their dues. Unions resorted to dues picketing 
simply to collect enough funds to keep going. Ultimately, 
they issued reports on audits of their funds to their members 
and collected dues through deduction from paychecks. 7 
As the nation started to rearm, President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt and his advisors saw a need for settling 
industrial disputes that threatened defense production. In 
March, 1941, the President appointed the National Defense 
Mediation Board to negotiate settlements for strikes in de-
fense industries. The Board was composed of representatives 
of industry, labor and the public, and it handled only dis-
putes which could not be settled by the parties themselves 
or by the United States conciliation Service. Individual 
cases were handled by tripartite panels selected by the Board 
from its members while the entire group worked out policy. 
It relied on public opinion to enforce its recommendations. 
Disputants who refused to accept them might find public 
opinion going against them. The Board also required strikers 
to go back to work while mediation was in progress. It 
usually was more successful in ending strikes than in 
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resolving the issues and many of its cases, including that of 
International Harvester, were passed on to the War Labor 
8 
soard. 
one of the Mediation Board's successes was settlement 
of a dispute at western Cartridge Company in East Al ton. 
The company, which had defense contracts with the United 
states and Great Britain, utilized individual contracts with 
its employees and an inside union to stave off outside 
unions. In January, 1941, however, the Chemical Workers 
union, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, 
began organizing the smokeless powder workers, who comprised 
about 550 employees out of a total workforce of 6500. The 
union asked for recognition, but the company refused to bar-
gain on the grounds that the smokeless powder division was 
not a proper bargaining unit and that recognition would in-
terfere with individual contracts. The union appealed to 
the National Labor Relations Board, which certified the unit 
as a bargaining unit and held an election, which the union 
won. The company refused to negotiate and the union threa-
tened to strike. The company also set up a subsidiary plant, 
the East Alton Manufacturing Company, and announced plans to 
transfer the smokeless powder workers to that plant. The 
union feared that the change might be detrimental to the 
workers, and when the dispute went to the National Defense 
Mediation Board, sought protection for its members as well as 
union recognition and a union shop. The company, meanwhile, 
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nted a wage increase to all employees except those in the gra 
smokeless powder division. After discussions with the 
Mediation Board, the company finally agreed to bargain with 
the union. Negotiations soon broke down, however, and the 
Board got the case. The two sides continued negotiations 
before the Board and separately with little progress. 9 
on July 24, the Mediation Board recommended a wage 
increase, abolition of individual contracts and recognition 
of the union. Although it refused to endorse a closed shop, 
it did recommend maintenance of membership, a provision un-
der which an employee belonging to a union would have to 
remain in it for the duration of a contract in order to keep 
his job. The Board saw a need for some form of union secu-
rity in view of company efforts to eliminate union members. 
Nevertheless, maintenance of membership was a controversial 
issue which finally came to a head with the War Labor Board. 
Western Cartridge and the union accepted the Mediation 
Board's findings and signed a contract on August 2, though 
some issues were left for later bargaining or arbitration. 
This did not end disputes at Western Cartridge. The com-
pany's anti-labor policies eventually led to two strikes in 
the fall of 1942. 10 
Al though the National Defense Mediation Board was 
successful in ending several strikes, it foundered and broke 
up over a series of coal strikes in 1941. John L. Lewis, a 
Republican who supported Roosevelt in 1936, broke with him 
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n h e refused to assist the Steel Workers Organizing Com-whe 
t11ittee in its strike against "Little Steel" in 1937. As an 
isolationist, Lewis also objected to the President's foreign 
policies, fearing that war would bring restrictions on union 
rights and collective bargaining. Lewis opposed any res-
trictions even in wartime. In 1940, he backed Republican 
Wendell Willkie and advised union members to do likewise. 
When most CIO unions refused to go along with him, he stepped 
down as head of the organization after the election, and in 
1942, took his United Mine Workers out of the cro. 11 
In the spring of 1941, the United Mine Workers nego-
tiated with the Appalachian Conference of bituminous coal 
operators on a series of proposals including elimination of 
a difference in wage rates between northern and southern 
mines. Southern mines paid lower wages on grounds of lower 
living costs. The union and northern operators feared that 
if this continued, competitive advantages would shift coal 
production to southern fields. The South refused to yield 
and the miners struck after the contract expired on March 
31. In Illinois, the Progressive Mine Workers, who had left 
the United Mine Workers in 1932, joined the walkout. Roose-
velt urged both sides to end the strike and resume negotia-
tions. The northern operators soon reached a tentative 
agreement with the United Mine Workers, but the southerners, 
who withdrew from the Appalachian Conference on April 11, 
continued to resist. The union and the northern operators 
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t inued the strike in an effort to force the South to con 
yield· on April 24, as coal shortages threatened, the Na-
tional Defense Mediation Board took up the dispute and on 
April 30, the strike ended, though most Illinois miners re-
mained out until May 3 in a dispute over local issues. In 
June, the Mediation Board recommended elimination of the wage 
differential for daytime shifts. After the southerners 
finally agreed to this, Lewis pressured them into signing a 
contract identical to the one which he negotiated with the 
northern operators. The new contract, signed July 6, raised 
wages and abolished the wage differential. 12 
Soon afterward, Lewis sought to extend the terms of 
the agreement to the captive coal mines owned by steel com-
panies. The operators generally agreed except for a demand 
for a union shop. The union already had 95 percent of the 
miners in the captive mines and thought it only logical that 
it should have the rest. The companies, however, feared that 
if they accepted a union shop in the mines, they would have 
to accept it in the steel mills, where the Steelworkers union 
demanded the same terms. If the government imposed a union 
shop, they could argue in negotiations with the Steelworkers 
that it did not constitute a precedent. On September 15, the 
miners walked out. The National Defense Mediation Board 
promptly took up the case and within a few days, Lewis 
ordered the miners back to work for a month while the Board 
considered the dispute. A Board panel tried to avoid the 
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union shop issue because of its repercussions in the steel 
and shipbuilding industries and tried to turn the matter over 
to the full board while the mines continued working. Lewis 
declined and called the miners out on October 26. After a 
personal plea by the President, Lewis agreed to a temporary 
reopening of the mines while the Mediation Board took up the 
dispute. However, on November 10, the Board voted nine-to-
two against a union shop in the mines. The two cro members 
resigned in protest, thereby leading to the Board's collapse. 
Roosevelt summoned both sides to the White House on November 
14 and requested them to continue coal production and 
negotiations, but warned that he would not impose a closed 
shop. On November 17, the miners struck again. On November 
22, Lewis accepted a proposal by President Roosevelt for 
arbitration and ordered the miners back to work. The panel, 
which included Lewis, Benjamin Fairless of U. S. Steel and 
John Steelman of the Conciliation Service, voted two to one 
for a union shop. Though Lewis won his victory. his tactics 
angered the public and led to numerous anti-strike bills in 
Congress though none passed. 13 
Soon after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt convened 
business and labor leaders in Washington to establish some 
basis for wartime cooperation. The conferees agreed on a 
program banning strikes and lockouts for the duration, 
peaceful settlement of disputes and creation of a War Labor 
Board to handle disputes which could not be solved through 
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_..al procedures. In effect, labor agreed not to strike, 
no.1-•u 
t o trust its fortunes to the Board. In January, 1942, bUt 
Roosevelt appointed the National War Labor Board with repre-
sentatives of business, labor and the public. The Board, 
which replaced the National Defense Mediation Board, handled 
disputes which threatened the war effort. Later, its duties 
were expanded to include wage stabilization. Sometimes, it 
also handled cases of union recognition and other issues 
normally dealt with by the National Labor Relations Board. 
When employees struck, the War Labor Board had to get them 
back to work. Both sides were expected to abide by its de-
cisions, though they were advisory and not enforceable in 
the courts. Late in 1942, ten regional boards, including 
one in Chicago, were established to handle local wage stabi-
lization and local disputes subject to review by the Natio-
nal Board. The War Labor Board succeeded partly because the 
country was unified and partly because both management and 
labor were represented on the Board and took an active role 
in pol icy-making. 14 
One of the first issues the War Labor Board had to 
deal with was union security, the same issue which tore apart 
the National Defense Mediation Board. Unions generally 
wanted a union shop or closed shop while management wanted 
an open shop . Union maintenance of membership was a corn-
promise. No one was forced to join a union, but those who 
belonged to a union when a contract was signed had to remain 
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. i't while the contract was in force or lose their jobs. in 
unions wanted some form of security as protection against 
hostile employers, especially in the absence of a strike 
threat. Public members of the War Labor Board supported 
union security for this reason and also because they felt 
that a stable union would insure better plant discipline and 
observance of the no-strike pledge and discourage inter-union 
rivalry and raiding, which sometimes disrupted industrial 
before the war. 15 peace 
Union security was a major issue in the dispute be-
tween International Harvester and the Farm Equipment Workers 
union dating back to the spring of 1941, which the Mediation 
Board passed on to the War Labor Board. In the spring of 
1942, the Farm Equipment Workers and the American Federation 
of Labor joined in submitting the dispute to the Board. In 
April, the Board voted eight to four to recommend mainte-
nance of membership in the contract subject to a referendum 
of the membership of the unions involved. Though industry 
members dissented, they indicated a willingness to accept 
maintenance of membership with an escape period during which 
an employee could resign from a union without losing his job. 
The Board soon adopted this provision and made it a standard 
feature of maintenance of membership agreements. Interna-
tional Harvester, though still opposing union security, 
especially with the Farm Equipment Workers union, finally 
accepted it in order to avoid any disruption of war produc-
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tion. A referendum of union members approved maintenance of 
membership by a wide margin and the company had little labor 
16 trouble for the rest of the war. 
Although the War Labor Board saw maintenance of mem-
bership as desirable to obtain union security, it sometimes 
refused to grant it or even withdrew it if a union violated 
the no-strike pledge. The Chemical Workers Union struck 
western cartridge in September, 1942 for refusing to rein-
state its president. He was fired in June for entering a 
restricted area without permission, but the union attributed 
the firing to his union activities. Even though the company 
had a contract with the union, it continued trying to get 
rid of the union and keep out other unions. American Fede-
ration of Labor President William Green ordered the strikers 
back to work, but blamed the strike on the company's anti-
labor policies. In November, the War Labor Board ruled that 
the company's policies provoked the strike and ordered it to 
reinstate some workers and deal with the union; but it also 
criticized the union for calling a strike over minor issues 
and refused to continue maintenance of membership in a new 
contract. Meanwhile, a second AFL union struck the casting 
and brass mill shops in October, accusing the company of 
refusing to deal with it to settle grievances. Again, Green 
ordered the men back to work. The National Labor Relations 
Board, meanwhile, ruled that the company had interfered with 
union organization, discriminated against workers and domi-
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nated an independent union. The Board ordered the indepen-
dent union disestablished and directed the company to cease 
its anti-union policies. The company appealed to the United 
states circuit Court of Appeals, but the court ruled against 
it in May, 1943 and ordered enforcement of the Board's ru-
• 17 ling. 
At first, the War Labor Board had no set policies and 
proceeded on a case by case basis settling disputes on their 
merits as they arose. Over time, the Board developed some 
policies based on similar cases. Some settlements provided 
for automatic deduction of union dues from paychecks when 
the physical difficulty of collecting dues interfered with 
war production. The Board also dealt with wages, vacation 
plans and other issues. In June, 1944, following a strike 
by a United Auto Workers local at a John Deere plant in Mo-
line, the Board penalized the strikers and ordered withdra-
wal of the company's vacation plan, replacing it with one 
less liberal. 18 
One of the War Labor Board's most troublesome issues 
was wages. On April 27, 1942, President Roosevelt announced 
a program for holding down inflation, including controls on 
wages as well as prices. The Board had to stabilize wages 
by restricting wage hikes. At the time, the Steelworkers 
union was negotiating a contract with the Little Steel corn-
panies. The chief issues in dispute were union security and 
wages. The companies objected mostly to union security, 
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though some felt that wages should be frozen in wartime. In 
July, the War Labor Board concluded that since the cost of 
living had gone up 15 percent since January 1, 1941, wages 
should be adjusted accordingly. The Board awarded a pay hike 
of 44 cents a day, far less than the $1 a day increase the 
steelworkers wanted, but more than the companies wished to 
pay. The union accepted it glumly, while the industry 
accepted it under protest. The Board also raised wages for 
u. s. steel and generally used the Little Steel formula as a 
yardstick for future wage settlements. Hence if a company's 
wages were already high enough, they could go no higher. 19 
The Little Steel formula did not solve the problem 
since the War Labor Board could only handle disputes. It 
could do nothing about wage agreements arrived at through 
collective bargaining. Many companies raised wages to keep 
their workers and attract others. This naturally forced 
other to raise wages. On October 2, 1942, Congress passed 
the Economic stabilization Act and on the following day, the 
President ordered new wage and price controls. Now the War 
Labor Board had to develop and administer a wage-stabiliza-
tion program. Employers could not raise wages without ap-
proval of the War Labor Board. The President forbade wage 
hikes except to eliminate inequalities and substandard wa-
ges. Even then the Board had to maintain wages at the level 
of September 15, 1942. In April, 1943, the President issued 
a "hold the line" order further restricting wages and pri-
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ceS· one immediate result was denial of thousands of wage 
hike petitions in the Chicago Regional War Labor Board of-
fice. pay restrictions caused problems for employers wish-
ing to satisfy their workforce. Early in 1943, the Studeba-
ker Aircraft Engine plant in Chicago agreed to a request by 
a united Auto Workers local to raise wages to the level of 
General Motors plants, only to suffer some embarrassment when 
the Regional War Labor Board denied its request to raise 
wages. Another Chicago firm was fined for raising wages. 
Employers continued to think up ways of raising wages without 
violating the stabilization program, usually through fringe 
adjustments such as job reclassifications, paid holidays and 
the like. Meanwhile, prices continued to rise, though at a 
slower rate due to price control, and by 1943, labor unions 
were demanding relaxation of the Little Steel formula. 
Though some cracks did occur, the formula held for the most 
part. Between January, 1941 and October, 1942, basic wage 
rates in manufacturing rose 15 percent. Between October, 
1942 and July, 1945, however, the increase was only 9 
percent. Meanwhile, the cost of living rose about 33. 3 
percent between January, 1941 and July, 1945, hence the la-
bor unrest. Sometimes, the War Labor Board approved a wage 
hike if it were necessary to attract workers into a criti-
cally important industry. In 1944, the radio manufacturing 
industry in Chicago found it difficult to attract workers 
due to low wages. Representatives of the armed forces, union 
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ieaders and company officials persuaded the War Labor Board 
to approve a wage hike for the industry. 20 
Though most business and labor leaders went along with 
wartime restrictions, there were some who dissented and 
defied the government. Usually, the government responded by 
seizing the strikebound industry. At one point, from Decem-
ber 28, 1943 to January 18, 1944, the entire railroad indus-
try was taken over to end a strike, but the takeover was 
short-lived and the companies continued to operate the 
roads. 21 
The situation was different with the Toledo, Peoria 
and Western Railroad, an Illinois carrier whose owner, George 
P. McNear, refused to deal with unions and who considered 
standard railroad work rules obsolete and inefficient. When 
he issued new ones, the unions struck on December 28, 1941. 
McNear refused to accept arbitration, and after all efforts 
to end the strike failed, the government took over the line 
in March, 1942 and operated it fo~ the rest of the war. 22 
Sewell Avery also disliked unions, but his main pur-
pose in resisting the War Labor Board was to dramatize his 
opposition to the growth of presidential powers under the 
New Deal and War Powers legislation. Conservatives felt he 
was fighting their fight. As president of Montgomery Ward, 
Avery fought unionization in the thirties and early forties. 
Even after a cro union won and election at the Chicago store 
and warehouse in January, 1942, Avery refused to deal with 
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the union. In October, the War Labor Board ordered the com-
pany to sign a contract providing for maintenance of member-
ship, voluntary dues checkoff, arbitration of grievances and 
seniority rights. Avery refused until finally in December, 
after several orders by the President, he agreed to sign a 
contract, but under protest. However, the company continued 
to fight the union and in November, 1943, notified the union 
that it would not negotiate a renewal of the contract be-
cause it doubted that the union still had a majority of the 
workforce. When the War Labor Board ordered a temporary ex-
tension of the contract, the company refused. On April 12, 
after another refusal, the union struck. Other unions sup-
ported the strike by refusing to cross picket lines. Truc-
kers refused to pick up or deliver packages at Ward proper-
ties. On April 23, Roosevelt ordered the strikers back to 
work and the company to comply with the War Labor Board's 
decision. The union called off the strike, but the company 
denied the authority of the War Labor Board and challenged 
the President's right to seize a civilian business. The 
government responded by taking over the company's Chicago 
offices. With photographers clicking away, Sewell Avery was 
carried from his office by Army troops. The occupation was 
short-lived. On May 9, after the union won an election by a 
large margin, the company was returned to its management. 23 
During the summer, the union tried unsuccessfully to 
negotiate a contract, and the War Labor Board again ordered 
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renewal of the contract and some wage hikes. The company 
again refused to comply and on December 27, its employees 
struck. At the same time, disputes arose in Ward stores in 
some other cities due to the company's rejection of War La-
bor Board orders. The situation was especially serious in 
oetroit where other unions pledged support to Ward employees. 
on December 28, the government took over Ward properties in 
Chicago and six other cities. This time, the Army operated 
the business, using men experienced in retail trade. The 
government also filed a suit in district court for a judge-
ment on its right to seize the properties under executive 
order. On January 27, 1945, Federal District Judge Philip L. 
Sullivan ruled against the government on grounds that the War 
Labor Disputes Act authorized seizure of facilities used in 
production of items used in the war effort, but he did not 
feel this included distribution. However, the government won 
on appeal on June 8, when the Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that production included distribution and also cited the 
company's own applications for priorities, which claimed that 
its materials and services were essential to the war effort. 
The Supreme Court refused to consider an appeal because the 
properties had been returned by then. Though the Army ran 
the stores until October, 1945, the union finally lost its 
fight. 24 
Defiance of wartime restrictions was not confined to 
management. John L. Lewis led a series of strikes in the 
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coal fields in 1943. In March, negotiations began on a new 
contract. The United Mine Workers sought a wage hike of $2 
a day, which would break the Little Steel formula, and por-
tal-to-portal pay (travel time from mine entrance to work-
place and return). In late March, with the deadline approa-
ching, the President asked both sides to continue production 
while working on a new contract. The union agreed to conti-
nue to May 1. On April 22, the case went to the War Labor 
Board, which ordered work to continue until a new contract 
was signed. However, late in April, miners started walking 
out and the strike soon became general. The President or-
dered seizure of the mines by Secretary of the Interior Ha-
rold L. Ickes as head of the Solid Fuels Administration for 
War, and the miners returned to work. Lewis hoped to nego-
tiate through Ickes, but the War Labor Board insisted that 
Ickes was to administer the mines while it settled the dis-
pute. Lewis refused to negotiate with the Board, feeling 
that it had violated the no-strike agreement with the Little 
Steel formula which Lewis was out to break. To achieve his 
goals, he sought to divide and confuse his opponents among 
the operators and provoke inter-agency rivalry. Since Lewis 
refused to deal with the Board, it appointed a staff member 
to present the miners' case. On May 25, it denied the wage 
hike as contrary to the Little Steel rule and also denied 
portal-to-portal pay. The miners struck again soon after-
ward. Many members of the Progressive Mine Workers joined 
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the strikes, though officially, their union opposed them. 
Aqain, the President ordered the miners back to work and a 
truce was called until June 20. On June 18, the War Labor 
soard ordered amendments to the previous contract, but still 
turned down portal-to-portal pay. On June 21, the miners 
struck again. Lewis called it off on June 23 and extended 
the truce to October 31 on condition that the government run 
the mines. He preferred Ickes to the Board. Meanwhile, the 
strikes provoked public outrage sufficient to enable conser-
vative forces in Congress to push through the Smith-Connally 
Act requiring advance notice of strikes and a strike vote. 
rt also allowed the War Labor Board to subpeona witnesses. 
Lewis could no longer avoid appearing before the Board. 25 
Meanwhile, through the efforts of Governor Dwight 
Green, Illinois coal miners reached an agreement with the 
Illinois Coal Operators' Association providing for portal-
to-pay and other benefits. Lewis appeared before the War 
Labor Board and urged them to use it as the basis for a na-
tional settlement, but eastern operators objected to its cost 
and the Board rejected it. Later, the Illinois operators 
and the United Mine Workers submitted a revision, but the 
Board rejected it on October 26. The miners struck again and 
again the President ordered them back to work. Soon after-
ward, the War Labor Board modified the second Illinois 
agreement and ordered it into effect. It gave the miners a 
wage hike, including portal-to-portal pay, but a longer work 
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Lewis had beaten, but not crushed the War Labor Board, 
and he had not cracked the Little Steel formula. His efforts 
and those of his militant followers gained them the enmity of 
much of the public and even of American labor, who blamed him 
for the passage of anti-strike legislation. In 1945, there 
were some coal strikes, but they never became general, and on 
April 11, 1945, a contract was signed. 26 
Wartime strikes were not uncommon. Many companies 
continued anti-union policies throughout the war. In 1944, 
the War Labor Board noted a growing tendency among Chicago-
area employers to question the majority status of a union 
each time a contract came up for renewal. Mills Novelty 
Company, which normally made gambling equipment for sale to 
gangsters, helped organize and signed a contract with an AFL 
union after a CIO union won an election. Another firm re-
fused to bargain with the United Auto Workers for two years 
after the union won an election. Both firms were represen-
ted by a Chicago law firm with several clients, all of whom 
followed the same policies, often resulting in strikes. 
Other strikes were caused by young and militant unions, whose 
members and often the leaders as well were unused to the 
discipline associated with such organizations. The huge 
Dodge-Chicago plant, with eleven different unions represen-
ting its diverse workforce, had over two hundred strikes, 
most of them short-lived. The overwhelming majority of war-
time strikes were unauthorized work stoppages lasting a few 
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bours or at most a few days. In Illinois, strikes rose from 
279 in 1942 to 492 in 1944 with a total of 1114 for 1942 to 
1944. With 7. 5 percent of the nation's non-agricultural work 
force, Illinois had 9.5 percent of the nation's strikes in 
that period. Still, for the most part, the no-strike policy 
generally held. Though more Illinois workers were involved 
in strikes than in any year since 1927, the loss of time was 
only one-tenth that of 1927. Union leaders worked to avert 
strikes and to stop those that did occur. In 1944, the 
Amertorp torpedo plant in Forest Park had a great deal of 
labor unrest partly because of a request for a wage hike 
which the War Labor Board denied, though officials of the 
steelworkers union complained of a bad element that had come 
into the plant. Some of these officials had to spend much 
of their time at the plant trying to stamp out strikes. 27 
Unions generally cooperated with each other in cur-
bing disputes. The American Federation of Labor and the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations called a truce and for 
the most part ceased jurisdictional raiding, though some 
firms continued to invite AFL unions into their plants to 
keep out the CIO. However, in 1943, workers at the Interna-
tional Harvester Farmall plant in Rock Island grew dissatis-
fied with their AFL Federal local and urged the United Farm 
Equipment Workers to organize their plant. The union star-
ted doing so, but backed off at the insistence of the War 
Labor Board and the CIO, which feared that this would dis-
150 
t labor relations. In 1944, however, the union went ahead ruP 
despite protests from the War Labor Board and the American 
Federation Labor and in June, 1944, easily won an election at 
tbe plant. However, a year later, the union itself was 
subjected to raiding by the United Auto Workers. There also 
were some unsuccessful attempts to merge the American 
Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions. The chief dissident from labor unity was John L. 
Lewis, who had grown disenchanted with the CIO and taken the 
united Mine Workers out in 194 2. Lewis flirted with the 
American Federation of Labor from time to time, but always 
withdrew his union within a short time. Meanwhile, his 
union's District 50, created to organize Gas, Coke and 
Chemical Workers, set out to organize other fields and even 
raided existing AFL and CIO locals. 28 
Unions also worked with management in promoting pro-
duction. In 1942, at the suggestion of the War Production 
Board and some labor leaders, many companies set up labor-
management committees. The committee at u. s. Steel's South 
Works in Chicago had fourteen members evenly divided between 
management and labor. There were six subcommittees similar-
ly divided dealing with personnel and safety, publicity, em-
ployee transportation, materials and products, practices and 
methods, and machinery and equipment. The committee and 
subcommittees devised a suggestion system, found ways of im-
Proving quality and conserving materials, conducted scrap 
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'des developed ways of improving the operation of equip-dr1v 1 
~ent, preventing delays and generally improving efficiency. 
The committee also promoted car pools, fought absenteeism 
and improved plant food service. Committees in other compa-
nies often had similar organizations and functions. some-
times, friction developed over the composition of such com-
panies as some companies sought labor representatives who 
did not belong to the union with bargaining rights and thus 
were unrepresentative of the workforce. Many companies 
feared that labor would try to get into management. For the 
most part, though labor-management committees worked well. 
Besides the committees, many companies developed suggestion 
systems. Many workers also contributed in other ways by 
giving up holidays so the plants could continue production. 29 
One of the most serious problems in war production 
was the shortage of manpower. The draft took many of the 
younger men, thus forcing employers to look outside tradi-
tional labor pools to fill their needs. To assist them and 
utilize labor supplies more efficiently, President Roosevelt 
established the War Manpower Commission on April 18, 1942. 
It was organized into twelve regions corresponding to exis-
ting regions of the United States Employment Service. The 
Sixth Region, headquartered in Chicago, included Illinois, 
Indiana and Wisconsin. Regions were broken into labor mar-
ket areas, each with a director. Illinois's ten areas were 
headed by a state administrator. Also, in December, 1941, 
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all state employment services were brought under federal 
control in the United States Employment Service and the lat-
ter integrated with the War Manpower Commission. 30 
one source of labor was the black community. On June 
5 1941, under pressure from black leaders, President Roo-2 , 
sevelt issued an executive order banning discrimination in 
companies having defense contracts and also setting up a Fair 
Employment Practice Committee to investigate complaints of 
discrimination. The agency started as part of the Office of 
Production Management, then went to the War Manpower Com-
mission and finally became an independent agency in 1943. 
It worked closely with the War Manpower Commission and the 
United States Employment Service in seeking jobs for blacks. 
Some companies such as International Harvester and Pullman-
Standard already had significant numbers of black employees. 
Buick, Studebaker and others, however, discriminated against 
blacks and also Jews. A few firms also barred Catholics and 
aliens. The Fair Employment Practice Committee managed to 
end such discrimination in some cases. The United States 
Employment Service sought to recruit without discrimination 
and often got results. In January, 1942, one firm fired its 
employment manager and a superintendent for hiring two 
whites, but refusing to hire their black instructor in a 
defense training class. In August, 1942, a Chicago Union 
League survey found a 300 percent increase in the number of 
contractors employing blacks since January, 1941. The air-
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and engine plants and mass transit lines in Chicago 
craft 
hired blacks while the meat packers, farm and railroad 
equipment companies increased their employment of blacks. 31 
Many companies, however, refused to hire blacks, 
usually claiming they had no segregated facilities to accom-
date them. Some argued that other workers would not accept 
blacks. This was sometimes true since many AFL unions, es-
pecially railroad unions, barred blacks or segregated them 
into auxiliary locals dominated by all-white locals. CIO 
unions, however, welcomed blacks into their ranks and many 
were active in union affairs. Sometimes, local communities 
objected to employment of blacks at local industries, espe-
cially if they were imported to the community. A shortage 
of foundry workers in Rockford prompted the United States 
Employment Service to seek black laborers from other cities. 
Local residents objected, but still would not fill the posi-
tions themselves. The United States Employment Service tried 
for years to get Western Cartridge in East Al ton to hire 
blacks, but community opposition made this impossible. 
Sometimes, employment or promotion of blacks prompted walk-
outs, even in CIO unions. In December, 1942, white toolma-
kers struck when a black was promoted to toolmaker at the 
Studebaker engine plant. In December, 1944, several hundred 
workers at the Pullman shipyard struck in protest against 
promotion of a black employee, but returned after a week 
without securing his demotion. Whites struck because they 
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feared loss of status and job security when blacks were em-
ployed and promoted. Usually, however, such strikes were 
short-lived and blacks stayed in their newly-won positions. 32 
Women were another important source of labor. Many 
were already employed in poorly-paid office work, service 
industries and industrial jobs. Many companies were reluc-
tant to hire women for traditionally male jobs, but pressure 
from the United States Employment Service and the loss of 
men to the armed forces forced them to accept women. By the 
end of the war, there were few industries that did not em-
ploy women in production jobs. In Chicago, Republic Drill 
and Tool Company adapted its machinery and production pro-
cesses to women and soon over 80 percent of its workforce 
were women. At the Bendix Aviation carburetor plant in Chi-
cago, 80 percent of the workforce were women. Women drove 
taxis, directed traffic, worked at filling stations, drove 
buses in Rockford and highway trucks between Chicago and Iowa 
and operated interurban trains on the Chicago, North Shore 
and Milwaukee Railroad. Railroads employed women in shops 
and yards, stations, ticket off ices and commuter trains. 
Women worked in Chicago steel mills, aircraft engine plants 
and shipyards, oil refineries in Wood River and Whiting, 
Indiana, fluorspar mines in Rosiclare and ordnance plants 
around the state. As they acquired experience, some moved 
into the ranks of supervisors. One woman, who left a 
supervisory position at a bank after a nervous breakdown, 
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~orked at the Savanna ordnance plant supervising hundreds of 
employees loading TNT into shells. The attraction of high-
paying jobs in war plants lured women from lower-paid jobs in 
laundries, beauty shops and other service industries. Even 
there, however, opportunities for women increased. By the 
end of the war, women managed over 500 Woolworth stores. 33 
Employment of women raised other issues. Many women 
were paid at a lower rate than men for the same work. The 
war Labor Board and the United States Employment Service 
urged equal pay for equal work and sometimes got results. 
In March, 1943, machinists at Hummer Manufacturing Company 
in Springfield struck to protest wage differentials between 
men and women. The company raised wages for women to those 
of men. Illinois passed legislation in the spring of 1943 
requiring equal pay, but limited it to manufacturing. An 
attempt to strengthen it failed in 1945. In June, 1945, 
weekly earnings of women in Illinois industries averaged 
$32.86 as compared to $54.99 for men. In 1943, the General 
Assembly also passed a bill relaxing laws limiting women to 
eight hours a day amid increasing violations. There also 
was considerable debate about whether women would want to 
continue in wartime occupations. Conservatives, including 
some AFL unions, urged that women return home after the war. 
Even those who recognized that women would want to work ex-
pected them to choose more "feminine" employment. Actually, 
a United Auto Workers survey in 1944 revealed that almost 50 
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percent wanted to stay in factory work. Others wanted other 
but very few wanted to return home. 34 jobs, 
Employment of women with children created a need for 
day-care facilities. In Chicago, the Office of Civilian De-
fense set up nurseries to care for children of war workers. 
In other communities, private groups and individuals esta-
blished child care facilities for children of war workers. 
Many parents, however, were unable to secure day-care servi-
ces or simply chose not to place their children in the care 
of others. Unattended children often got into trouble. 
This was especially true of older children and teen-agers. 
Juvenile delinquency became a serious problem all over the 
state. Boys ran in gangs, stole cars and engaged in vanda-
lism, arson and petty theft. Young "Victory girls" or 
"patriotutes" seduced or were seduced by servicemen. In 
Springfield, arrests of young girls for prostitution in-
creased 64 percent in 1942 while arrests for other sex 
offenses soared 104 percent. Because of such activity, 
venereal disease increased dramatically, thus posing a threat 
to servicemen as well as their dates. Political and civic 
leaders blamed parents, especially working mothers for the 
situation. However, with the need for labor growing, society 
could not simply demand that mothers stay home. Many com-
munities responded with youth centers to serve the recrea-
tional needs of teenagers under adult supervision. civilian 
defense organizations also put children of various ages to 
at tasks suited to their age groups.
35 
work 
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Many teenagers went to work in war plants or worked 
on farms during the summer. The Illinois Central Railroad 
hired teenage boys as station agents and train crewmen. In 
November, 1942, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins lowered 
the age limit for employment of girls in war plants to six-
teen. Employment of teenagers sparked controversy. While 
industry needed workers and even some educators urged part-
time jobs for students, others felt that children should stay 
in school. Some compromised by urging students to work part-
time or in the summer instead of quitting school to work 
full-time. This relieved the shortage of labor while keeping 
students in high school. Still, many dropped out to work in 
war plants, often illegally. By 1943, Illinois led the 
nation in child labor violations. 36 
Illinois industries went to great lengths to secure 
an adequate labor force. Aside from hiring women, minori-
ties and children, many recalled retirees and when possible 
hired the handicapped. Some used prisoners of war, though 
labor unions sometimes objected to this. Jamaicans and Bar-
badians were imported into Illinois, mainly to work on farms, 
but some worked in factories. Full employment dramatically 
reduced relief rolls. Even drifters disappeared into jobs. 37 
Service industries had difficulty keeping people be-
cause of the attraction of higher wages in war plants and 
also because of the draft. Employees in industries consi-
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d essential were less likely to be drafted than those in dere 
nonessential industries. At first, service industries such 
as laundries were considered nonessential, but eventually 
the war Manpower Commission decided to classify them as 
locally essential when this was the case. 38 
workers also migrated to other cities because of 
higher wages. Freeport lost workers to Rockford where wages 
were low enough, but still 25 to 30 percent higher than 
Freeport. Labor shortages were aggravated by hoarding of 
labor and labor piracy. The problem appeared in Chicago in 
1941 when companies hiked wages and engaged in extensive 
recruiting activities in an effort to attract workers. out 
of town firms set up recruiting offices to hire workers with 
promises of exorbitant wages. In 1943, a farm equipment 
company pirated workers from LaSalle to work at its Rockford 
plant. A Litchfield shoe company engaged in labor piracy 
until it lost some of its own workers. The War Manpower 
Commission worked out labor stabilization agreements with 
war plants to curb the problem in specific communities. 39 
As labor shortages intensified in the course of the 
war, the War Manpower Commission classified several communi-
ties as areas with critical labor shortages. By February, 
1944, over 80 percent of the labor force in Illinois was in 
areas with a critical shortage of labor. For the last two 
years of the war, the state had the worst labor shortage in 
the nation. Most cities protested their classification as 
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areas with critical labor shortages since their industries 
had difficulty gaining new war contracts while the problem 
iasted. Some were more effective in dealing with the situa-
ti on than others. When the Springfield-Decatur area was 
classified as having a severe labor shortage early in 1944, 
Springfield protested, but its industry and labor leaders 
also set to work to increase the labor supply and better 
manage manpower with employment ceilings, labor allowances 
and efforts to combat labor turnover and absenteeism by keep-
ing stores and banks open on certain nights. Decatur was 
much slower to react, partly because smaller plants feared 
that Caterpillar, a major employer, would enjoy preferred 
treatment. The company was unpopular due to its recruiting 
policies, so much so that in 1943, the United States Employ-
ment Service off ice called in company officials to impress 
upon them the need for cooperation with the area labor sta-
bilization program. Decatur did eventually adopt many of 
the measures that Springfield used in its program. Workers 
in areas of labor shortages had to work a 48-hour week. This 
stirred protests since many jobs did not require such a 
schedule. The goal was to release workers to jobs where they 
were needed. Unfortunately, long hours brought a decline in 
productivity and an increase in accidents and absenteeism. 
Another controversial measure was the job freeze for workers 
in essential jobs adopted by the War Manpower Commission in 
February, 1943. Labor leaders protested, especially Victor 
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oiander, secretary-treasurer of the Illinois State Federation 
of Labor, who likened it to slavery. Actually, workers could 
switch jobs in order to work at the highest level of skill in 
a war industry. They could not switch simply to make more 
40 
money. 
During the course of the war, labor and management 
sought to settle disputes peacefully through negotiation, or 
if agreement could not be reached, through settlement by the 
war Labor Board. Al though there were some strikes, many were 
due to intransigence on the part of one or both parties such 
as Sewell Avery, George P. McNear or John L. Lewis. Many 
others were short-lived walkouts arising out of minor 
grievances in a workforce unused to factory and union disci-
pline. Most union leaders sought to cooperate with manage-
ment in pushing production. Even companies with militant 
unions often experienced little trouble with them once con-
tracts had been settled. In order to achieve labor peace, 
labor agreed not to strike, while management reluctantly 
accepted maintenance of membership, a form of union securi-
ty. The War Labor board made this a standard feature of 
contract settlements, accepting labor's arguement that th 
would help bring labor peace by creating stability and pre-
venting jurisdictional raids by rival unions and other labor 
difficulties. The Board also was quick to discipline both 
labor and management if either violated agreements or simply 
refused to accept them. Most disputes, however, were set-
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tled with a minimum of difficulty. 
Another function of the War Labor Board was wage sta-
bilization to help hold down inflation. Its tool was the 
Little steel formula which limited pay hikes to keep pace 
with price increases. Management still sought various means 
of increasing wages to attract and keep workers, while unions 
pointed out that prices were rising faster than wages and 
demanded pay hikes. Al though cracks developed in Little 
steel, the policy generally held until the end of the war. 
Even with wages stabilized, most workers prospered during 
the war and improved their economic status. Many who had 
been unemployed before the war, now worked at high-paying 
jobs in war plants. Ultimately, this contributed to the 
postwar economic expansion. 
Labor unions generally benefitted from the war as the 
crush of business in the defense emergency and during the 
war forced companies such as International Harvester and the 
Little Steel corporations to accept unionization and union 
security. This changed the nature of postwar industrial 
disputes. With the battle for union recognition largely won, 
most were disputes over wages and benefits. 
The war brought an unprecedented degree of government 
control over the movement of labor even to the point where 
war workers were restricted in their freedom to change jobs. 
The War Manpower Commission sought to place workers in posi-
tions where their skills would be utilized most efficiently. 
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lt also ordered longer workweeks in areas of serious labor 
shortages. To further relieve labor shortages, the agency 
coaxed employers into hiring women and minorities in ever 
increasing numbers in highly-paid and highly-skilled jobs 
previously closed to them. Wartime gains ultimately led to 
the civil Rights Movement and the Women's Liberation Movement 
of the fifties, sixties and seventies. 
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CHAPTER V 
TRANSPORTATION IN A STATE AT WAR 
The Second World War imposed a massive burden on the 
nation's transportation system, especially the railroads. 
To handle the load, carriers were forced to coordinate their 
services and adapt to changes in traffic volume and direc-
tion. Before and after the war, all carriers of freight and 
passengers competed with each other to some degree. Competi-
tion was interrnodal and intramodal. Wartime conditions led 
government at the federal and state level to impose re-
strictions to eliminate competitive practices which impeded 
the flow of traffic. Government also ordered the curtailment 
of duplicate services in order to free equipment for use 
elsewhere and approved the establishment of new carriers and 
new routes to handle an increasing traffic load. Carriers 
also had to handle a much heavier traffic load, but could not 
get enough equipment to handle it since suppliers were 
building armaments instead of locomotives, freight cars, 
trucks, planes and ships. The War Production Board strictly 
limited the amount of equipment that could be produced and 
dictated the kind of equipment to be built. Carriers and 
shippers responded by making more intensive use of existing 
equipment. Government soon imposed similar restrictions of 
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its own. Although the government did not repeat its First 
world war takeover of the railroads, it did regulate the 
movements of the railroads and other carriers, dictate 
routings of shipments and how they should be loaded and even 
shifted some commodities such as oil from one means of 
transportation to another. 
Illinois has long been a major crossroads and termi-
nal for the transportation arteries of the nation, and as 
such played a significant role in the carrying of the 
nation 1 s troops and war supplies. In 1940, Illinois had 
11,949 miles of railroads, more mileage than any state except 
Texas. Chicago was a major transhipment center for east-west 
traffic and terminal for north-south movements with over 
twenty trunk-line railroads and several terminal roads 
serving the metropolitan area. Other Illinois cities also 
were major gateways, especially East st. Louis, Peoria and 
the Rock Island-Moline District. In 1940, railroad em-
ployment in the state totaled 104,044 or about 10 percent of 
the total national railroad workforce. Total state employ-
ment in transportation and communication industries was 
259, 776, which was also about 10 percent of the national 
total. About 9 percent of the state's workforce were 
employed in such industries. Illinois had over 14,000 miles 
of paved highways and 54 airports, including a major one in 
Chicago. Barges traveled from Chicago's port facilities on 
the Great Lakes down the Illinois and Mississippi rivers to 
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the Gulf of Mexico. 
The war did not really create any new trends in 
transportation, but did affect some existing ones. In the 
twenties, railroads carried 75 percent of all freight traf-
fie and dominated intercity passenger service. However, 
even then they faced increasing competition from other modes 
of transportation. By 1940, their share of the nation's 
freight traffic shrank to just under 62 percent, while less 
than 9 percent of intercity travelers went by train. The 
automobile dominated passenger transportation. Railroads 
still carried over 64 percent of those who did not go by car, 
but buses took almost 30 percent while airlines handled a 
small but growing percentage of the market. Railroads also 
faced growing competition for freight from trucks, barges and 
pipelines. The Second World War reversed the trend tempora-
rily. Railroads handled 90 percent of all defense freight 
and 97 percent of armed forces personnel moving in organized 
groups. Gas and tire rationing forced motorists out of their 
cars and into trains and buses. In 1944, automobiles still 
accounted for slightly over 54 percent of intercity passenger 
travel, but railroads handled almost 35 percent and buses 
over 9 percent. Freight business also skyrocketed and the 
railroad share of the traffic went up to almost 72 percent 
by 1943 before dropping slightly in the remaining war years. 
The war also retarded the growth of airline business though 
that was increasing by the end of the war. In 1940, airlines 
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1'ed only 1,041 million passengers or .37 percent of all carr 
intercity passengers. By 1945, they handled 3,507 million 
or 1.51 percent of intercity passenger traffic. 2 travelers 
The war also inhibited implementation of a major 
technological innovation in the railroad industry. During 
the thirties, railroads introduced streamlined passenger 
trains in a successful bid to recapture some of the passen-
ger business which they had lost to the automobile and the 
bus. Though some trains were pulled by streamlined steam 
locomotives, most streamliners were handled by diesels. A 
few railroads were already using a few diesels for some 
switching chores, but in the thirties, many railroads started 
dieselizing passenger service and switching, and in 1940 and 
1941, diesels were introduced in line-haul freight service. 
Diesels handled freight tonnage at a faster and steadier pace 
than steam and at a much lower cost. They had less difficul-
ty in starting a train. Unlike steam, diesels did not have 
to stop for water. Diesels were more available. After 
finishing one trip, they could be used on another run, unlike 
steam engines which often required some shop attention at the 
end of a run. Diesels were much more flexible and cost 
effective than steam since several diesel units could be 
operated together as one locomotive under the control of one 
crew with the number of units on a train dependent solely on 
the amount of tonnage to be hauled and the terrain. Every 
steam locomotive, however, had its crew. The implications 
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e not lost on the railroad unions, who fought unsuccess-tter 
fullY to put extra crewmen on diesels, and did manage to put 
firemen on diesels though they had no fires to tend. Though 
many railroads, especially those with a good deal of coal 
traffic, continued to buy or build steam locomotives, most 
began to dieselize their operations. By 1939, railroads were 
buying more diesels than steam locomotives. 3 
During the defense period of 1939 to 1941, railroads 
enjoyed a substantial increase in traffic. Freight tonnage 
increased from over 292 billion ton-miles (ton of freight 
carried a mile) in 1938 to over 481 billion in 1941, while 
passenger traffic went from over 22 billion passenger miles 
(passenger carried a mile) in 1938 to over 30 billion in 
1941. There was some debate over whether the railroads were 
preparing adequately to handle the increased load by buying 
extra equipment. Every year from 1929 to 1939, they retired 
more freight cars than they added. In September, 1939, 
Railway Age, an industry journal, argued that 2400 locomo-
tives and over 300,000 freight cars would have to be added 
to current rosters to handle the additional load. The 
railroads felt differently. Ralph Budd, head of the Chicago, 
Burlington and Quincy Railroad and head of the Transportation 
Division of the National Defense Advisory Commission, assumed 
that existing transportation facilities could handle the load 
since there was a surplus of capacity. Railroads were 
reluctant to purchase large amounts of costly new equipment 
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as theY had done in the twenties, only to suffer heavy losses 
of traffic in the Depression. By 1941, it was hard to get 
materials and builders were making armaments. As a result, 
the railroads never did get as much equipment as they needed. 
The commission did make recommendations for better utiliza-
tion of cars and worked with the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion's Bureau of Service, the Association of American 
Railroads Car Service Division and vigilance committees of 
the Shippers' Advisory Committee in developing a policing 
system to see that cars kept moving. 4 
In December, 1941, President Franklin Delano Roose-
velt created the Office of Defense Transportation and named 
Interstate Commerce Commission Chairman Joseph B. Eastman to 
direct it. Budd returned to his railroad in January. The 
new agency had seven carrier divisions: railways, motor, 
water, local, petroleum, Hawaiian and Puerto Rican. Some, 
including railways, motor transport and petroleum, had 
regional offices in Chicago. The agency also had district 
offices in Chicago and other Illinois cities. The Office of 
Defense Transportation worked closely with the Interstate 
Commerce Commission in coordinating transportation. Both the 
railroads and the government wished to avoid the government 
takeover experience of the First World War. At that time, 
rail service had broken down due to inadequate equipment and 
poor planning by government procurement agencies. Whole 
trains of cars backed up in terminals due to lack of facili-
. s for unloading. tie 
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Though the Railroad Administration, 
which operated the roads from December, 1917 to March, 1920, 
eliminated terminal delays, improved operations and intro-
duced new equipment of standard design, it also incurred 
heavy expenses, including a substantial wage hike and 
controversial "featherbedding" work rules. As a result, it 
was forced to raise freight rates and passenger fares. 5 
The Office of Defense Transportation sought to leave 
the carriers in private hands, but to coordinate their ser-
vices and utilize equipment to the fullest extent possible. 
The Justice Department facilitated the task by suspending 
anti-trust activity for the duration, thus allowing pooling 
of traffic, coordination of services, elimination of dupli-
eating services and other efficiencies. The Office of De-
fense Transportation banned the use of freight cars for 
movement of cargo within cities when trucks were available 
and also prescribed minimum limits for loading merchandise 
cars. The Interstate Commerce Commission approved incentive 
rates to encourage heavier loading. The Midwest Shippers 
Advisory Board, a regional group representing shippers in 
several states including Illinois, established 63 vigilante 
groups with 995 traffic executive members to call on ship-
pers in their communities who were holding cars on sidings 
too long. In peacetime, many shippers held cars on sidings 
for loading or unloading for an extensive length of time. 
Some used them as virtual rolling warehouses. During the 
183 
however, such behavior would elicit a call from a member 
'War, 
of a shippers vigilante committee. The committees sought to 
ioad cars as heavily as possible and as quickly as possible 
and unload them at their destination quickly. In 1943, the 
off ice of Defense Transportation made these measures manda-
tory. Shippers mounted Perfect Shipping Campaigns stressing 
more careful packing and loading to reduce loss and damage. 
unfortunately, some efforts to load cars more heavily 
resulted in damage to car structures, especially when cranes 
were used to flatten loads in open top cars. For the most 
part, though, heavier loading of cars and quick turnaround 
made them more available. The Association of American 
Railroads and later the Office of Defense Transportation and 
the Interstate Commerce Commission rerouted cars to avoid 
congestion and move by the most direct route to their 
destination. During peacetime, most carriers sought to haul 
cars on their own lines as long and as far as possible to 
maximize profits. This sometimes meant that a shipment had 
to travel by a roundabout route to its destination. Wartime 
measures eliminated much unnecessary backhauling. The Office 
of Defense Transportation Railway Division's Regional 
Director in Chicago, w. F. Kirk, was particularly successful 
in spotting areas of threatened congestion and routing cars 
away from those areas. In all, during the life of his 
office, from March, 1943 to October, 1945, Kirk diverted 
335, 000 carloads, ignoring priori ties which had caused a 
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great deal of trouble in World War I. Shippers also made use 
of alternative types of cars if the type they wanted were not 
available. In some case, they pooled cars. In the fall of 
1942, the Office of Defense Transportation, the Interstate 
commerce Commission and the Association of American Railroads 
set up a pool of refrigerator cars for hauling fruits and 
vegetables. Railroads themselves learned to cooperate with 
each other in moving traffic efficiently, whereas normally, 
they competed vigorously with each other. 6 
Even with such restrictions, car shortages developed 
as freight traffic skyrocketed. Freight ton-miles, which 
totalled 481,766 million in 1941, shot up to 747,168 million 
by 1944. The Illinois Central, which carried under 39 mil-
lion tons of revenue freight in 1938, handled over 80 mil-
lion in 1943. Other carriers experienced similar increases. 
To handle this traffic, railroads ran longer and more fre-
quent trains. on the Illinois Central, the average freight 
train handled around 44 or 45 cars in 1938. In 1944, its 
average freight train had about 62 cars. In 1945, the line 
operated 24.3 percent more freight trains than it had in 
1940. Although the railroads had less equipment than they 
had in the First World War, they handled a heavier traffic 
load. With freight ton-miles 81 percent over those of 1918, 
the railroads had 600,000 fewer cars to handle it. Fortu-
nately, equipment itself got bigger between the wars. 
Freight car capacity increased over 22 percent between 1918 
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4 while steam locomotive tractive effort increased 50 and 194 
percent. Even so, more equipment was needed.
7 
ouring the defense period, the increase in traffic 
prompted some carriers to acquire more cars and use existing 
ones more intensively. Construction of freight cars for 
American railroads in 1939 increased 42 percent over 1938. 
The supply of freight cars, which had been declining, star-
ted rising again in 1940. The Illinos Central acquired over 
9100 freight cars in 1939, 1940 and 1941, but as with most 
railroads, most simply replaced old, worn-out cars. More-
over, by 1941, material shortages delayed new car deliveries 
by 50 percent and many railroads eventually had to cancel 
their orders. Although the Office of Defense Transportation 
pressed for more equipment, the War Production Board insis-
ted that armaments required most of the steel and the rail-
roads would have to get along with what they had. In the 
end, though the Office of Defense Transportation asked the 
War Production Board for 311,000 freight cars, 4,159 locomo-
tives and 5, 150 passenger cars, the railroads got only 
130,826 freight cars, 2,500 locomotives and 1,977 passenger 
cars (Mostly troop sleepers and kitchen cars) . Between 1942 
and 1945, the Illinois Central received only 1, 681 new 
freight cars. In 1943, as the crisis neared its peak, it 
received none. Railroads responded by rehabilitating and 
reusing and modifying existing cars. Late in 1942, the Santa 
Fe converted some old box cars into cabooses until regular 
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cabooses were available again. With steel in short supply 
d the need for cars critical, the War Production Board an 
authorized railroads to build composite freight cars with 
steel framework and wooden plank side sections, which could 
readily be replaced with steel after the war. In 1944, the 
Illinois Central built 600 composite hopper cars in its 
Centralia, Illinois shops for coal traffic. The company also 
converted old gondola cars to pulpwood carriers, while the 
Santa Fe used steel ends from junked box cars to make sides 
and ends for gondola cars. In 1944 and 1945, railroads 
starting experimenting with lightweight plywood cars and some 
aluminum boxcars were built in Mount Vernon, Illinois for 
three Illinois railroads. Deliveries of freight cars 
bottomed out in 1943 and picked up in 1944 and 1945. The 
material situation eased, and by the fall of 1945, the 
Illinois Central was building all steel hopper cars in its 
Centralia shops. 8 
Even with these efforts, there were car shortages, 
particularly for agricultural products. In the spring of 
1941, a crisis developed when grain elevators were still 
filled with the previous harvest as a new harvest was star-
ting. Railroads scrambled to find cars while the Commodity 
Credit corporation, which owned the grain, frantically tried 
to get it out of the elevators. Ultimately, the grain was 
shipped in grain trains to Chicago and then to the East 
Coast. Similar problems cropped up during the war years, but 
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PY l943, there were no extra cars available to handle the 
wheat load, thus forcing farmers to store grain on their 
farms, and elevators to store it on the ground. The problem 
also hit soybeans, corn and other crops. The situation was 
aggravated in January, 1944 when the Off ice of Defense 
Transportation, the War Production Board and the War Food 
Administration diverted 200 cars a day to Canada to import 
40 million bushels of feed grain bought by the Commodity 
credit Corporation. Grain Belt congressional leaders were 
outraged. The diversion was reduced to 100 cars a day in 
February and eliminated in May. Even then, car supply 
remained tight. Snowstorms in the East caused car shortages 
in Illinois and other states early in 1945. Then in the 
spring, war traffic demands diverted grain cars. By June, 
coal cars were being used to carry wheat. The situation 
persisted until the end of the year. The spring of 1945 
brought a heavy traffic shift from the East Coast to the West 
Coast as the war in Europe ended and the nation focused on 
the Pacific theater. In May, the Office of Defense Transpor-
tation rerouted 1000 eastbound freight cars and sent them to 
Pacific ports. The traffic shift imposed peak loads on 
Illinois railroads, especially in Chicago, which bore the 
brunt of the movement. Traffic peaked in May and June and 
did not drop much until the end of the war. 9 
Besides cars, the railroads needed locomotives to pull 
them. In 1939, the railroads were plagued with motive power 
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obsolescence. Only four and a half percent of the locomo-
tives of major railroads were less than 9 years old, while 
70 percent were at least 19 years old. Almost a third were 
29 years old or older. By the end of 1940, 69 percent were 
21 years old or older. Older locomotives were inadequate to 
meet modern service requirements and cost more to maintain 
as they got older. As in the case of freight cars, defense 
production and a recovering economy spurred motive power 
purchases. Locomotive production went from 272 engines in 
1938 to 338 in 1939, 435 in 1940 and 104 7 in 1941. War 
Production Board restrictions cut the output to 936 locomo-
tives in 1942, but then production peaked at 1171 engines in 
1944 before dropping to 935 in 1945. 10 
The War Production Board was more willing to authorize 
locomotives than freight cars, theorizing that enough motive 
power would make additional cars unneccessary by permitting 
quicker hauls and more intensive handling of existing cars. 
Still, the agency did require authorization of motive power. 
Since diesels were built for stock to standard designs, the 
War Production Board issued blanket restrictions to builders 
covering the number of locomotives needed, while steamers 
required specific authorizations by the Board since they were 
built to order for individual carriers. The agency also 
restricted builders to construction of certain types of 
diesels. American Locomotive Company and Baldwin Locomotive 
Company produced only 600 or 1000 horsepower switchers, while 
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the Electro-Motive Division of General Motors, which had 
'oneered passenger and freight diesels, built 5400 horse-p1 . 
power four-unit freight diesels. Even then, the latter had 
a difficult time filling orders due to its own war production 
for the Navy. Not until late in the war was the company able 
to increase production of diesel locomotives. By July, 1945, 
it was turning out 63 units a month. Because of these 
restrictions, most diesels built during the war were used for 
switching, a task at which they were much faster and more 
efficient than steam. When Fairbanks-Morse, a builder of 
submarine engines, started producing diesel locomotives in 
1944, its first unit was a switcher, which went to the 
Milwaukee Road. Steamers released by diesels were reassigned 
to other duties. Most steam locomotives built during the war 
were high-performance freight engines such as the twenty 
4-8-2 or mountain type engines built by the Illinois Central 
at its Paducah, Kentucky shops in 1942 and 1943 and the ten 
4-8-4 or northern type engines built in 1944 for the Rock 
Island. 11 
In addition to new construction, railroads also leased 
or rebuilt locomotives to fill their needs. The Chicago and 
North Western disposed of 100 locomotives, partly through 
sale to Mexico, but mostly through leasing to other lines. 
In January, 1943, the War Production Board banned the 
scrapping of surplus locomotives without authorization, but 
required them to be repaired and made available for service 
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on other lines. The Baltimore and Ohio rehabilitated 2-8-2 
vikado type (called MacArthur type during the war as a or ,., 
patriotic gesture) engines for service on its Chicago 
Division, including some pre-World War I engines. The Alton 
Railroad modernized 32-year-old 4-6-2 or Pacific type 
iocomotives to increase their horsepower from 2200 to 2800, 
enabling them to haul longer passenger trains. Fuel saving 
campaigns also helped to improve the efficiency of motive 
12 power. 
During the course of the war, many railroads upgraded 
track and signaling. In 1943 and 1944, the Pennsylvania 
Railroad upgraded and double-tracked much of its line to st. 
Louis, including one eight-mile segment, which was relocated 
and straightened. The improvements, which were done without 
interfering with heavy wartime traffic, substantially in-
creased the capacity of the line. The Baltimore and Ohio 
also improved its lines in Illinois between 1941 and 1946, 
installing heavier rail, strengthening bridges and construe-
ting additional yard tracks and other facilities. Other 
lines installed new rails and ties, eliminated grade cros-
sings, added spurs to serve defense plants and improved 
yards. The Burlington expanded its Galesburg yard to cut 
delays in movement of cars through the yard. When labor 
shortages hit track gangs, several railroads introduced new 
machinery to reduce manpower needs. Signaling improvements, 
such as Centralized Traffic Control (CTC), allowed a single-
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k line to carry the load of a double-track road. An trac 
r ater at a CTC control station handled all signals and ope 
mainline switches on the line. By automatically transmitting 
information about train movements to dispatchers, CTC 
eliminated the need to stop and throw switches by hand, thus 
speeding operations. Fast freights could pass each other 
using passing sidings without slowing down. In 1942, the 
Burlington installed CTC on its line from Chicago to st. Paul 
and in 1943, the Rock Island installed CTC, cab signals and 
radio control on its busy main line between Chicago and Rock 
Island. These innovations cut the running time of fast 
freights by reducing delays. 13 
In the spring of 1941, a crisis arose in the transport 
of crude oil from Texas to the East Coast. Tankers, which 
carried most of it, were diverted to carrying oil to Britain. 
Although existing pipelines, which handled part of the load, 
managed to take on more, they could not replace the tankers. 
The Office of Petroleum Coordinator, later the Petroleum 
Administration for War, turned to the railroads, which had 
lost most of the traffic to pipelines and tankers, mainly 
because of high freight rates. Only two percent of petroleum 
deliveries to the East coast went by rail. The Off ice of 
Petroleum Coordinator persuaded the oil companies to ship by 
tank car and the companies coaxed the railroads to slash 
freight rates. Trainloads of oil were soon running from 
pipeline terminals in Ohio, Kentucky and Illinois to the East 
coast. 
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The railroads, which had been carrying only 5000 
barrels of oil to the East Coast daily before the crisis, 
were up to 141,300 barrels daily by the week of October 18. 
Although the British returned most of the tankers in October 
and November, a new crisis arose after Pearl Harbor when 
military needs again diverted tankers to other routes and 
German submarines sank those venturing along the Coast. 
Again, tank cars filled the gap and by August, 1942, train-
loads of tank cars were delivering over 800,000 barrels a 
day to the East Coast, usually through Illinois due to con-
nections between carriers. Soon, 70 percent of oil bound for 
the East Coast went by rail. In August, the Office of 
Petroleum Coordinator banned the use of tank cars to haul 
gasoline in 20 states, including Illinois, in order to di-
vert them to the oil trains. In March, 1942, the agency also 
banned the use of tank cars to deliver fuel oil to points 
within 100 miles (later 200 miles) of pipeline terminals. 
This permanently shifted much of this traffic to tank trucks. 
Other cars also carried oil and other fuels in containers. 
There was a heavy movement of kerosene in oil drums in box 
cars to New England. Barges also carried a good deal of oil 
on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers while Great Lakes tankers 
delivered oil to lake ports. 14 
Meanwhile, Harold Ickes, head of the Office of Petro-
leum coordinator, had been trying since the fall of 1941 to 
get a large pipeline built from Texas to Salem, Illinois and 
then to the East Coast. 
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Although vetoed at first by the 
supply Priorities and Allocations Board, Pearl Harbor and 
tanker sinkings gave the project new importance. In June, 
194 2, the War Production Board approved construction of the 
Big Inch, a 24-inch pipeline. When completed late that year, 
the line extended from Longview, Texas to Norris City, 
Illinois, where a railyard was built for tank car trains, 
which carried the oil on to the East Coast. Branches were 
built to Enfield, Illinois, where a pipeline was built for 
tank car trains, which carried the oil on to the East Coast. 
Branches were built to Ensfield, Illinois to connect with 
existing pipelines and to Mount Vernon, Indiana to feed oil 
to barges on the Ohio River. In the summer of 1943, the Big 
Inch was extended to the East Coast, and later that year, a 
20-inch Little Big Inch was constructed along the same route 
to carry petroleum products. It was completed in February, 
1944. Meanwhile, by July, 1943, tank car trains aided by 
the Big Inch terminal at Norris City, were delivering over 
a million barrels a day to the East Coast with a pool of 
10,000 tank cars. After June, 1943, tank cars were increas-
ingly diverted to carry oil to the West Coast for the Pacific 
War, but as late as April, 1945, 30 percent of deliveries to 
the East Coast went by rail as opposed to 4 O percent by 
pipeline. 15 
Water traffic, which grew rapidly during the Depres-
sion due to cheap rates, rose still more under the influence 
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of defense business. Tonnage on the Illinois Waterway, which 
t from half a million in 1934 to 7 million in 194 o, 11en 
dropped slightly in 1942 and 1943, but then peaked in 1944 
at 7 ,250,000 tons. Ice cutters kept the waterway open during 
the winter months. The war eliminated some sources of 
traffic such as automobiles and shifted steel to the rails 
since companies faced with priori ties wanted steel in a 
hurry, and railroads could deliver it much faster than barge 
lines, though at a much higher cost. Barge traffic also 
shifted direction. Before the war, most of it went down-
stream to the Gulf of Mexico. During the war, most of it 
went upstream. Petroleum products from Texas went up the 
Ohio River to Pittsburgh and also up the Illinois Waterway 
to industrial plants in the Chicago area. For a time, 
restrictions on materials threatened to force operators to 
use wooden barges, which they considered inflammable, but in 
1943, the War Production Board freed enough steel to build 
108 steel barges for petroleum traffic. Some wooden barges 
were used, but mainly by the armed forces. Other bulk 
cargoes included agricultural products, sulphur, scrap iron 
and mine products. Restrictions by the Off ice of Defense 
Transportation on some types of traffic prevented full use 
of the waterways and actually reduced tonnage carried on some 
routes. In the Spring of 1943, the agency barred establish-
ment of a rail-water route for movement of iron ore from 
Northern Minesota to Southern Illinois, which would have 
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. rted traffic from all-rail routes. The agency reasoned dive 
that the route would have hurt coal traffic going by barge 
on the Illinois River. Barges shipped coal from Southern 
Illinois to the Twin cities and to Commonwealth Edison power 
in Chicago. 16 plants 
The Great Lakes also handled a good deal of traffic, 
much of it coal shipped by rail to Chicago where it was 
transferred to lake boats at a new Rail-to-Water Transfer 
Terminal on Chicago's South Side. During its first year of 
operation in 1943, the terminal shipped over a million tons 
of coal to Canada. some lake carriers, such as Chicago Tri-
bune newsprint carriers, took on loads of coal for the re-
turn trip to Canada. The growth in steel production placed 
heavy demands on Great Lakes oreboats. In 1939, U. S. 
steel's Pittsburgh Steamship Company had only 80 percent of 
its fleet in operation. By July, 1940, the entire fleet of 
74 steamers and barges was in service. Other carriers had 
similar increases in business. By August, 1941, shortages 
threatened and the Off ice of Production Management recom-
mended that 25 oreboats be built. By the end of 1942, 16 
were under construction. In addition, the Office of Defense 
Transportation curtailed the use of lake carriers for 
domestic coal traffic in order to free them for ore traffic. 
Grain carriers were also diverted to ore traffic. Finally, 
in October, 1942, the Office of Defense Transportation 
assumed control of commercial vessels operating on the Lakes 
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der to secure enough cargo space to carry iron ore and in or 
b r war materials. In 1942, the Army constructed a new ot e · 
k at the Sao Locks at Sault Ste Marie, Michigan and also }OC 
built a new ore dock at Escanaba to feed oreboats in the 
event that the Sao Locks were sabotaged. This did not 
transpire and the dock was dismantled after the war. 
Meanwhile, Great Lakes traffic boomed. By 1941, tonnage 
passed the 1929 prewar peak of 138 million tons, and ship 
operators sought to keep their vessels in service later in 
the season and start earlier in the Spring. This was risky 
due to storms in the Fall and heavy ice packs in the Spring. 
Ice-breakers were used to open shipping lanes. Ultimately, 
ton-nage peaked at over 184 million tons in 1944 with Chicago 
handling over 51 million tons. 17 
Trucks did a heavy volume of business during the war 
years, though their share of intercity freight business ac-
tually declined. In 1938, motor carriers handled 37 billion 
ton-miles or 8.03 percent of the total intercity traffic, 
while in 1944, they carried over 49 billion ton-miles, but 
only 4.57 percent of the total volume. Most of the freight 
was high-value cargo. Most livestock and a large part of 
other agricultural products was shipped to Chicago by truck. 
Most local traffic went by truck. Some Illinois railroads 
used trucks for pick up and delivery and local traffic. Such 
coordinated rail and truck traffic expanded during the war. 
During the war, the Office of Defense Transportation worked 
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. truckers and the states to eliminate inefficiencies. 
with 
Illinois and other states lifted restrictions on truck weight 
d length though this did not come easily. Unlike most an 
states, Wisconsin required out of state trucks to buy extra 
Finally, in April, 1943, Illinois and Wisconsin licenses. 
aqreed to end restrictive legislation covering each other's 
trucks for the duration. A thirty-five mile an hour wartime 
speed limit was modified in 1943 for heavy trucks carrying 
war freight. The Off ice of Defense Transportation also 
insisted on full loading of trucks and curtailment of 
unessential mileage. Daily deliveries were discontinued. 
In July, 1042, the agency ordered over-the-road truckers to 
cut their mileage 25 percent. Truckers also had to carry 
loads on return trips unless this was impossible. In July, 
1943, the Office of Defense Transportation and the Interstate 
Commerce Commission approved a plan drawn up by 33 Chicago-
area common carriers for pooling highway freight in the 
Chicago suburban area. Under the plan, truckers reported to 
a central dispatching office the loads they booked and 
destinations. The office then assigned the actual hauling 
to the carrier best suited to handle it. Empty miles were 
eliminated and trucks were loaded inbound and outbound, with 
unneeded equipment sitting it out. Trailers were inter-
changed, while tractors worked 24 hours a day. Later, the 
pool set up a new terminal for interchange of freight among 
participants. over-the-road truckers also pooled cargoes. 
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In August, 1942, Chicago-based truckers set up a Joint 
Information Service which acted as a clearinghouse for 
freight. Truckers without a return load had to phone the 
office for information on pos-sible cargoes, and if neces-
sary, wait a few hours until one materialized. Even farm 
trucks participated in this program. The Army Transportation 
corps 1 Chicago Agency routed military freight through the 
Joint Information Service. In 1943, the Army leased a 
Chicago truck terminal and consolidated and rerouted military 
freight. In March, 1944, the Office of Defense Transporta-
tion took over the Joint Information off ices and required 
over-the-road truckers to register in the agency's district 
offices, which in turn ordered empty or partially loaded 
trucks to handle cargo. 18 
Rationing also hit truckers. The Office of Defense 
Transportation issued certificates of war necessity enabling 
truckers to buy gasoline, tires and other essential mate-
rials. The agency relied on local war price and rationing 
panels to handle gas rationing and in 1944 turned over the 
whole program of issuing certificates to the Off ice of Price 
Administration. Still, shortages of tires and parts persis-
ted throughout the war. Trucks themselves were also ra-
tioned, starting in March, 1942. Manufacture of big trucks 
was suspended in the Spring of 1942 and trailer production 
ended in November. By March, 1943, the stockpile of new 
trucks, which totaled 185,000 in March, 1942, had dwindled 
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tO 82 I 328 • In May, the War Production Board authorized 
production of 7350 trucks for sale to operators with certifi-
cates of necessity issued by the Office of Defense Transpor-
tation. Even then, production never met needs and shortages 
persisted. Highways also suffered from wartime restrictions. 
construction was cut sharply and even materials were diff i-
cult to obtain. By 1943, some roads were becoming unsafe for 
travel. 19 
Gasoline rationing affected automobiles more than any 
other means of transportation. In 1937, automobiles accoun-
ted for 228,364 million passenger-miles or 85.08 percent of 
the total. Wartime restrictions on gas and tires cut into 
highway traffic. In January, 1943, the first full month of 
gasoline rationing, travel on Illinois highways fell off 60 
percent and the number of cars 39 percent. Travelers conti-
nued to use their cars for local transportation and for short 
intercity trips, but for longer journeys, many turned to 
public transportation. In 1944, private autos handled only 
151, 251 million passenger-miles or 54. 03 percent of the 
total. Many had to give up their cars entirely. In Illi-
nois, auto registrations dropped from 1,825,142 in 1941 to 
1,508,222 in 1945. 20 
As with freight, the biggest share of the burden fell 
on the railways, who saw their passenger load soar from 448 
million passengers in 1935 to 916 million in 1944, before 
dropping to 897 million in 1945. Passengers traveled far-
200 
ther, too. In 1935, the average journey was between 41 and 
42 miles. In 1944, it was over 104 miles. Trains got lon-
ger and more frequent. In 1939, 85,202 trains operated in 
and out of Chicago Union Station with an average of 233 a 
day. The station handled a total of 546,393 cars and trains 
averaged about 6 or 7 cars. In 1944, the station saw 98,217 
trains at an average of 268 a day. The station handled a 
total of 769,671 cars and trains averaged between 7 and 8 
cars. The Illinois Central saw its average passenger train 
grow from seven cars in 1939 to more than nine by the end of 
the war. The Pullman Company, which served 15,539,849 pas-
sengers in 5124 cars in 1938, handled 35,837,908 in 7485 
cars in 1944. 21 
Much of Pullman's traffic was military. During the 
war, 97 percent of armed forces personnel moving in organized 
groups traveled in special troop trains. In August, 1940, 
railroads moved over 150,000 troops for special army maneu-
vers. Similar movements occurred in 1941. Within seven 
weeks after Pearl Harbor, railroads moved over 600, 000 troops 
to new posts. By December, 1942, they were moving two 
million soldiers a month and by June, 1943, were operating 
2500 troop trains a month. To handle the increasing load, 
Pullman-Standard built troop sleepers and kitchen cars and 
by 1945 was operating 1667 such cars, some railroad-owned and 
others government-owned. By then, over two-thirds of all 
Pullman sleepers were continuously assigned to troop move-
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Jllents. such military commitments cut into the number of cars 
1 for civilian use.H availab e 
To handle the crush of civilian and military travel, 
the off ice of Defense Transportation imposed restrictions on 
rail and bus traffic. On the eve of the war, railroads were 
still adding streamliners. In 1941, the Illinois central 
added the Land O'Corn between Chicago and Waterloo, Iowa. 
In May, 1942, in an effort to meet wartime traffic demands, 
the line reinstated the Panama Limited, a luxury train from 
Chicago to New Orleans, which it had dropped in 1932. Soon 
afterward, the Office of Defense Transportation proposed 
abolition of all luxury trains like the Panama Limited, but 
nothing came of this. However, some luxury cars, such as 
parlor cars, were dropped from trains to add to their passen-
ger-carrying capacity. The Chicago and North Western conver-
ted about half of its parlor and cafe-lounge cars into 
coaches. Old Pullmans were also converted to coaches. 
Special trains for excursions, conventions and other events 
were cancelled, and in many cases, the conventions them-
selves. In 1942, Governor Dwight Green cancelled the 
Illinois State Fair for the duration. Schedules were 
lengthened to provide more stops, thus providing an alterna-
tive to the automobile. Many roads required reservations and 
some raised fares to discourage vacationers. On October 1, 
1942, the Office of Defense Transportation froze passenger 
schedules and prohibited extra trains. This hit travel to 
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llorida especially hard and Florida was quick to protest, but 
to no avail. Several lines coordinated their trains between 
Chicago and Florida. In Illinois, the Alton and the Illinois 
central coordinated sleeper service between Chicago and 
Springfield. Very little equipment was added in 1942 and 
much of it was ordered in 1941. Difficulties with priorities 
and the emphasis on freight traffic and war goods prevented 
construction of new passenger equipment. In April, 1942, all 
new construction was banned, leaving some cars still uncorn-
pleted. No new cars were ordered after that date until 1944 
when the railroads orderd 54 o new cars. Meanwhile, the 
off ice of Defense Transportation and the railroads sought to 
discourage would-be passengers from traveling, especially 
during holidays, all to no avail. Trains were packed with 
civilians and soldiers on leave. People stood in the aisles, 
vestibules and anywhere else there was space. Diners ran out 
of food despite rationing. In the spring of 1944, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation made numerous arrests for 
black markets in Pullman accornodations. Ultimately, this 
hurt efforts by the railroads to increase their passenger 
business after the war as passenger recalled their wartime 
experiences and deserted the rails for other means of 
travel. 23 
One of the more controversial means of accomodating 
passengers was cancellation of existing trains. In July, 
1941, the Illinois Commerce Commission allowed the Southern 
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Railway to drop a pair of trains in Southern Illinois to free 
equipment for use in serving military posts and other defense 
transportation needs. The Illinois Central dropped several 
mixed trains and local passenger trains on several branch 
lines in Illinois and also made other changes to free cars 
for the armed forces. Other Illinois railroads also dropped 
money-losing locals during the war. In February, 1942, they 
asked the Illinois Commerce Commission for permission to drop 
any trains they wished without notice as a war measure, but 
were denied it, though they did gain this permission in other 
states. In July, however, the Office of Defense Transporta-
tion coaxed the Illinois Commerce Commission into calling a 
meeting of railroad and bus officials to identify duplicate 
and unessential runs which could be eliminated. They iden-
tified 70, some of which were discontinued. However, others 
continued to run due to protests from local communities, who 
wanted transportation, especially since tires were rationed. 24 
One of the most controversial disputes pitted local 
communities and the Illinois Commerce Commission against the 
War Production Board and the Office of Defense Transporta-
tion. The Illinois Terminal System, an electric interurban 
railway, operated passenger and freight service on over 400 
miles of lines from Peoria via Springfield to St. Louis, 
Springfield via Decatur to Danville and Decatur through 
Bloomington to Peoria. In July, 1942, the Illinois Commerce 
Commission approved bus competition along its routes from 
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peoria to Decatur and Champaign, largely due to dissatisfac-
tion with the interurban•s service. The company responded 
bY petitioning to abandon the affected lines, arguing that 
it was losing money on the routes and business would not 
support both bus and rail service. The proposal met with 
howls of protest. The interurban operated 26 daily passen-
ger trains on these lines as well as freight service, mostly 
in grain, coal, oil and some manufactured goods. Local com-
munities depended on the Illinois Terminal for mail and 
other necessities as well as passenger service, while far-
mers, grain elevators and some industries relied on it to 
ship their products. Shortages of trucks, buses, tires and 
gasoline gave added weight to their protests. In October, 
the Commerce Commission denied permission to abandon, but 
also revoked its approval of bus competition. Meanwhile, 
however, the War Production Board requisitioned the lines in 
September in the hope of realizing 18,000 tons of scrap me-
tal from rails and bridges. The Commerce Commission, howe-
ver, ordered the Illinois Terminal to keep the lines running 
and was later upheld in the courts. Politicians, including 
both of the state's Senators, became involved and Congress 
started investigating War Production Board seizures of rail-
road branch lines. The Office of Defense Transportation, 
wishing to eliminate duplicate service, investigated and 
found the lines unneeded, but the Commerce Commission felt 
differently and in December ordered the Illinois Terminal to 
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continue operating the lines and to improve service. The 
company said it wanted to use the cars from the lines to 
carry workers to the Illiopolis ordnance plant. (Actually, 
it soon started using rejuvenated elevated cars from New York 
for the purpose.) Finally, in March, 1943, with the scrap 
metal situation easing, the War Production Board gave up the 
fight and later returned the lines to the Illinois Terminal, 
who continued to operate them until the fifties. The Office 
of Defense Transportation also caved in under the barrage of 
protests and concluded that the lines were needed. The bus 
lines, meanwhile, charged that they were being sacrificed to 
keep the Illinois Terminal alive and went to court to get 
permission to offer bus service. In July, 1945, the Illinois 
Commerce Commission found Illinois Terminal service inade-
quate and allowed some, but not all, of the bus companies to 
compete with the interurban. 25 
other proposals to abandon rail lines were more suc-
cessful. The Illinois Central did not protest when the War 
Production Board requisitioned the rails of its branch from 
Freeport, Illinois to Dodgeville, Wisconsin. The line was 
a money-loser. The Illinois Commerce Commission denied per-
mission for the Chicago and North Western to abandon a line 
from Caledonia to Cortland despite an Interstate Commerce 
Commission order allowing it, but was overruled in a federal 
court. Although several branch lines were abandoned in 1942, 
the War Production Board no longer needed rail for scrap 
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after 1942, while wartime rationing conditions necessitated 
retention of many branches which might otherwise be aban-
doned. Indeed, many of the rails from abandoned lines were 
reused at war plants. Abandonments dropped after 1942 and 
there were none in Illinois in 1943 and 1944 and only a short 
segment in 1945 despite efforts of some roads to get rid of 
lightly-used branches.u 
Early in 1945, with railroads straining under heavy 
passenger loads, the Office of Defense Transportation again 
tried to eliminate unnecessary services and ordered railroads 
to drop 50 trains operating with less than 35 percent 
capacity. This provoked a confrontation with the Illinois 
commerce Commission when the Office of Defense Transportation 
ordered the Chicago and Illinois Midland to drop a pair of 
trains between Peoria and Springfield. The Commission 
directed the railroad to ignore the order and the trains 
continued to run until the late forties. The travel situation 
worsened as the nation shifted its armed forces from the 
European Theater to the Pacific. In June, President Harry 
s. Truman asked Americans not to travel in order to free cars 
for troops. In July, the Office of Defense Transportation 
ordered sleepers off passenger runs of under 450 miles to 
free 900 sleeping cars for troops. Illinois railroads 
promptly took off sleepers on runs from Chicago to Cincin-
nati, Cleveland, Detroit, st. Louis, the Twin Cities and 
other cities in Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Wisconsin and 
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Michigan. Even then, soldiers had to sleep in shifts. The 
off ice of Defense Transportation also ordered coaches pooled 
for use by the Army. On July 11, the nation's railroads 
handled a record 54,814 soldiers in one day. As in the case 
of civilians, the soldiers were dissatisfied with the service 
and many swore off rail travel after the war. 27 
Like rail service, bus lines were subject to wartime 
restrictions. Buses had to carry full loads and could not 
travel over thirty-five miles an hour even though designed 
for higher speeds. New buses were unavailable in 1942 and 
1943 and parts were hard to get. Greyhound established a 
plant in Chicago to repair existing parts. The Office of 
Defense Transportation and the Illinois Commerce Commission 
sought to eliminate duplicate routes, but still maintain 
adequate service. One solution was pooling of routes. 
Several bus companies pooled routes between Chicago, Peoria, 
Springfield and other communities for the duration of the 
war. There also was a great demand for additional service, 
especially to serve war plants. The Office of Defense 
Transportation and the Illinois Commerce Commission worked 
out a policy under which a potential bus operator had to 
first gain approval from the Office of Defense Transportation 
and then the Commerce Commission and then request gas, tires 
and equipment from the Office of Defense Transportation. 
Many applicants were existing carriers, which simply secured 
additional routes, but many were private individuals such as 
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truckers and farmers operating overage or makeshift buses. 
Wildcat operators charged what they pleased and ran where 
tbeY pleased. Hundreds sprang up to carry workers to war 
plants, including 41 serving Western Cartridge at East Alton. 
The Illinois Commerce Commission forced those at Western 
cartridge to conform to state requirements on insurance and 
safety, but relaxed its requirement for incorporation in view 
of the need for the service, and only required approval of 
tbe Office of Defense Transportation. The company itself 
resolved disputes over routes and schedules. Aside from 
serving war plants, some carriers added other routes where 
a need arose, sometimes only for the duration. Many com-
panies expanded during the war. Black Hawk Motor Transit 
Company grew from 13 buses running over 522 route-miles in 
1941 to 27 buses in July, 1942 operating 998 miles. 28 
City and suburban transit systems were subject to some 
of the same restrictions as intercity bus lines as well as 
some geared to local transit. Like intercity carriers, city 
and suburban systems had to contend with equipment shortages. 
The Chicago Surface Lines installed some buses in 1942, but 
could not get any more until 1944 due to a freeze on new 
eguipment by the Office of Defense Transportation. No new 
streetcars or trolley buses arrived during the war, though 
opening of the city's first subway in 1943 helped relieve 
congestion. Work on a second subway was suspended for the 
duration. To save gas and tires, the Surface Lines opened 
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W bus garage and other storage yards. The Chicago Motor a ne 
company introduced a 11Victory" bus with high narrow seats, 
which could handle more passengers and also tested synthetic 
tires on some buses. The Quad cities bus system lengthened 
68 buses and renovated others it had planned to junk. 
Transit systems in Chicago and other Illinois cities added 
or extended routes to accomodate war plants and military 
posts and areas hard hit by tire and gas rationing. However, 
the office of Defense Transportation, in a controversial move 
to save tires, forced the Surface Lines to cut three routes, 
one of which was used by workers at the Dodge-Chicago plant. 
Despite vehement protests by city officials, they were not 
restored until after the war. Chicago Motor Coach had to cut 
its mileage to 85 percent of its prewar level. Sunday and 
holiday and non-rush hour buses were cut. Chicago was better 
off than some cities since it still had streetcar lines. The 
Off ice of Defense Transportation urged greater use of the 
carlines to save gas and tires. Still, these restrictions 
hit the transit lines as they were handling a big increase 
in traffic, which was intensified by tire and gas rationing. 
Ridership on the Surface Lines rose from 676,258,744 in 1939 
to 884, 704, 135 in 1945 while the Chicago Rapid Transit 
Company handled 202,988,763 passengers on the elevated lines 
in 1945 as compared to 145,394,382 in 1939. This did not 
include servicemen who rode free on the city's transit lines. 
To handle this increased load, Chicago and other cities 
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r ted to staggered hours for stores, schools and facto-reso 
ries. shoppers were urged to shop at noon and avoid the rush 
Even so, many riders, forced out of cars by gas 
rationing, froze at wintry bus stops as jammed buses went by. 
surface carriers also skipped stops to speed service. The 
bUS system in Bloomington cut a fifth of its stops for the 
duration, while Chicago Motor Coach cut a fourth of its 
stops. There was no protest at this. However, when the 
office of Defense Transportation coaxed the Chicago, Aurora 
and Elgin Railroad, an electric railway serving the western 
suburbs, into eliminating 16 flagstops, riders screamed in 
protest and the Illinois Commerce Commission ruled against 
the cuts. One wartime innovation in Chicago transit was a 
river transit service between the Chicago and North Western 
station and Michigan Avenue instituted in June, 1943. 29 
All forms of transportation were restricted to some 
extent during the war, but only airline passengers had to 
get a priority to travel. Priori ties were issued by the 
Army's Air Transport Command in Chicago in several classes. 
Non-priority and low-priority passengers had to deplane in 
favor of higher priority passengers and cargo, often at re-
fueling stops. Airlines lost many of their planes to the 
armed forces. The rest flew longer on more restricted sche-
dules. Airlines coordinated services to eliminate duplicate 
flights and cancelled some short-distance runs from Chicago 
and St. Louis to nearby states. Airlines started adding 
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flights in 1943, and 1944 as the Army started returning 
planes. By July, 1945, Chicago's Municipal Airport (Midway 
Airport) had 238 daily flights. By the end of the war, the 
airlines were increasing their share of the inter-city tra-
vel market. In the Spring of 1941, Chicago improved its 
Municipal Airport by relocating a railway bisecting its run-
ways. Airport construction lagged during the war, but after 
the war, Chicago used the Douglas aircraft plant airfield 
for O'Hare field and several Illinois cities built municipal 
. t 30 airpor s. 
One of the biggest problems of transportation systems 
in wartime was the shortage of labor. Many of their emplo-
yees went into the armed forces at the same time that traf-
fie was rising. Greyhound lost a large percentage of its 
drivers. Trucks were idled for lack of drivers and a shor-
tage of mechanics to repair them. Railroads had severe 
shortages of labor in train crews, track gangs, roundhouse 
and shop fore es and other jobs. To help solve manpower 
shortages, roundhouses recalled older employees who were 
still able to work. Railroads and truckers hired vagrants 
for jobs at freight docks and track gangs. The Illinois 
Central hired sixteen and seventeen-year-old boys to work as 
switchmen, firemen and brakemen and set up a school in Car-
bondale to train them. The company also hired younger 
teenage boys to work as telegraphers at country stations. 
The Wabash hired high school boys to work on track gangs in 
• • 31 
tral Illinois. cen 
A major source of labor was women. 
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By March, 1943, 
r ailroad, which was losing men at the rate of 2000 a one 
month was replacing them with 1500 women and 500 men. Women 
soon comprised eight percent of its employees. The Illinois 
central hired women for office jobs, station and ticket 
agents, messengers car cleaners, electrical and machinist 
helpers, engine wipers and flagmen on commuter trains. By 
October, 1943, the company employed 69 women at its Centra-
lia shops. Women changed freight car wheels for the Illi-
nois Central, loaded freight cars for the Burlington, wiped 
engines and cleaned coaches for the Milwaukee Road, worked 
as yard office clerks in the Belt Railway of Chicago's 
Clearing Yard and worked on track gangs on various rail-
roads. Women also operated interurban trains on the Chica-
go, North Shore and Milwaukee Railroad, drove buses in Rock-
ford and trucks between Chicago and Iowa. Employment of wo-
men in transportation jobs met with some opposition from 
railroad unions, which felt them unsuited for rail jobs. 
The head of the switchmen's union said he hoped that he would 
never see a woman switchman. He was soon to be disappointed. 
By April, 1945, there were 57 woman switchtenders, 1.82 
percent of the total nationwide. The unions also felt that 
any employment of women should be limited to the duration of 
the war, but as late as 1948, railroads continued to employ 
women in many traditionally male jobs, including switchmen, 
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although only in small numbers. 32 
Blacks were another source of labor, but one which 
met with union hostility. Railroad unions generally barred 
blacks from membership or enrolled them in auxiliary locals 
dominated by conventional all-white locals. A notable ex-
ception was the largely-black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
porters, headed by blacks. Its president, A. Philip Ran-
dolph, fought a long battle in the twenties and thirties for 
union recognition, not only with the Pullman Company, but 
with other railroad unions. In the late thirties, redcaps 
formed their own union, which became the United Transport 
service Employees in 1940 and affiliated with the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations in 1942. It went on to organize 
black dining car workers. Some blacks were employed as lo-
comotive firemen in the South since this was hot dirty work. 
However, they could not join a union or be promoted to engi-
neer. In 1941, railroad unions reached an agreement with 
railroads operating in the South to ban blacks from serving 
on diesels and to reduce the number of black firemen. The 
Fair Employment Practice Committee held hearings on the is-
sue and on discrimination by other railroads and unions 
against blacks. In 1943, it ordered the railroads and the 
unions to cease discriminatory practices, but they refused 
since the agency had no powers of enforcement. The President 
then appointed a committee to meet with the agency, the 
carriers and the unions, but without success. Meanwhile, 
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two black firemen pursued the case through the courts and in 
December, 1944, the Supreme Court ruled that a union repre-
senting a craft of railroad workers could not negotiate an 
agreement preferential to its members and discriminate 
against other employees because of race. However, the ru-
ling did not affect discrimination barring blacks from em-
ployment in the first place. 33 
Even in the North, railroads offered many jobs to 
blacks, but only lower-level positions. Blacks could serve 
on trains only as porters, waiters and maids. Blacks served 
as coach cleaners, but were barred from the Carmen's Union. 
This sometimes led to delays. On one occasion, a train of 
soldiers and sailors on the Chicago and North Western was 
delayed for over seven hours for lack of white carmen to 
service the train, though there were plenty of blacks who 
could do so. The Pennsylvania Railroad employed over 17,000 
blacks, but restricted them to jobs on track gangs, dining 
car crews, coach cleaning, loading cars and the like. The 
New York Central hired two blacks as carmen's helpers at its 
yard in Chicago, but refused to employ more for other jobs, 
claiming that the public and the unions would not accept 
this. The Illinois Central and the Pennsylvania hired black 
women for track gangs, and the former employed some at its 
Centralia shops. By and large, blacks made few gains in 
railroad employment during the war. Airlines did no better, 
employing blacks mainly in service jobs. Blacks did gain 
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jobs on Chicago's transit lines in 1943 as streetcar motor-
men and conductors, elevated trainmen and conductors and bus 
drivers. By December, 1944, there were over 500 blacks 
employed on the city's transit lines with few complaints from 
the public or other employees. 34 
In addition to hiring women and blacks, railroads im-
ported Mexicans, mainly for work on track gangs. Track 
maintenance jobs were very difficult to fill and by November, 
1942, the Office of Defense Transportation was urging 
recruitment of Mexicans. After the United States made ar-
rangements with the Mexican government, 6000 Mexicans were 
imported to work on western railroads. More followed and 
some Illinois carriers made use of them. In 1945, over 
68,500 Mexicans were in service on the nation's railways as 
track workers. 35 
A more controversial means of addressing labor shor-
tages involved relaxation of work rules. Railroad unions 
responded to the threat of unemployment due to dieselization 
by insisting that firemen be employed on diesels even though 
they had no fires to tend. The unions even tried to get a 
full crew for each diesel unit in multi-unit locomotives. 
Many states, including Illinois, had full-crew laws requi-
ring employment of a set number of crewmen on a train and 
unions insisted on their enforcement. Such full crew laws 
often forced railroads to employ more crewmen than they 
really needed. Railroads also had to pay a full day's work 
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for a train crew traveling only 100 miles, which could be 
done in a few hours. Unions, however, charged that the 
railroads were wasting manpower due to unnecessary delays 
and argued that better wages and working conditions would 
solve the labor shortage. The Office of Defense Transporta-
tion pressed for a relaxation of work rules with limited 
success. Not until well into the postwar era was there any 
meaningful progress on work rules. 36 
In 1941, the work rules issue caused a strike and 
government takeover of the Toledo, Peoria and Western Rail-
road, a 239-mile road running straight across Illinois from 
Effner, Indiana to Keokuk, Iowa. George P. McNear, its 
puritanical owner, built the line into an important bridge 
route between eastern and western railroads and by-pass 
around Chicago, saving up to 28 hours on a cross-county run. 
He also scrapped with important shippers, alienated promi-
nent Peorians and even other railroad executives by his out-
spoken opinions, though the latter supported him in his fight 
over work rules. McNear, who refused to deal with unions 
even after they won an election in November, 1940, considered 
the standard work rules obsolete and inefficient. In the 
fall of 1941, he issued new ones under which 55 men would do 
work previously done by 83, though at higher pay. The 
unions, fearing loss of jobs and reduced wages for their 
members, struck on December 28, 1941, the date the rules were 
to take ef feet. The National Mediation Board, the United 
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states Conciliation Service and the War Labor Board tried to 
settle the strike without success. McNear rejected all 
suggestions for arbitration even as the unions accepted them. 
Meanwhile, he hired replacements, mostly rejects from other 
railroads, and tried to run trains under the new rules. This 
led to violence. Strikers stoned trains, tried to burn 
locomotives and company buildings, shot at trains, railyards 
and homes of company officials. Court orders banning 
violence and mass picketing were ignored. Three men were 
convicted of plotting to blow up a bridge. McNear sought 
additional protection from local police and state militia, 
but was unsuccessful. Other railroads complained of unsafe 
practices by the strikebreakers employed by McNear. Since 
the strike held up war supplies, the President urged McNear 
to arbitrate and when he refused, ordered the Office of 
Defense Transportation to take over the road on March 22, 
1942. The agency settled with the unions and operated the 
road for the rest of the war. Even so, the settlement was 
not far different from McNear's own work rules. The agency 
found that standard work rules insisted on by the unions 
would triple labor costs. Arbitration resulted in an 
agreement more costly than under McNear's rules, but far less 
than the unions wanted under standard work rules. Railroad 
and business leaders generally backed McNear's efforts to 
change work rules, but the public had mixed feelings. Some 
felt he was an obstructionist, others blamed the unions, 
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while others felt both sides were wrong. 37 
Nationwide railroad labor disputes also arose during 
the war years. In 1940, fourteen non-operating unions sought 
paid vacations. The National Mediation Board took up the 
dispute, but could not resolve it. In June, 1941, these 
unions were joined by five operating unions in seeking wage 
hikes. Essentially, railroaders wished to retain the advan-
tages in pay and prestige they had enjoyed compared to in-
dustrial workers and which were now threatened by increases 
in industrial wages. Operating unions also wanted to put 
extra crewmen on diesel locomotives. The railroads, howe-
ver, wanted changes in work rules which the unions refused 
to accept. Again, the Mediation Board tried to mediate the 
dispute but without success. In October, the Board offered 
arbitration, but the unions refused to accept and called a 
strike. However, the President appointed an Emergency Board, 
which approved a temporary wage hike and paid vacation. The 
unions rejected this as insufficient and again threatened to 
strike. On November 27, the President, anxious to avoid a 
strike, reconvened the National Mediation Board. The 
carriers made concessions and on December 2, an agreement was 
reached giving the unions essentially what they wanted in pay 
and vacations. Other issues were left unresolved. 38 
In the fall of 1942, the non-operating unions sought 
additional wage increases and a union shop. The Mediation 
Board took up the dispute in January, 1943, but could not 
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resolve it and suggested arbitration, which the unions re-
fused. The National Railway Labor Panel, created by the 
president on May 21, 1942 to handle wartime railway labor 
disputes, appointed an Emergency Board. It was unable to 
mediate the dispute, but did recommend a wage increase, but 
no union shop. The wage increase would have become law, but 
the Economic Stabilization Director found it in violation of 
wage restrictions. The unions protested and threatened a 
strike. The Director suggested that the unions and the 
carriers negotiate a settlement, but when they did on August 
7, it was the same as the rejected one and he disapproved 
it. Meanwhile, in January, 1943, the operating unions also 
asked wage increases. The Mediation Board also failed to 
mediate this dispute and in May the National Railway Labor 
Panel appointed an Emergency Board, which recommended a wage 
hike within the constraints of the Little Steel formula. 
The Economic Stabilization Director approved it and it be-
came law on October 26. However, the unions rejected it and 
threatened to strike. Meanwhile, on October 16, the Presi-
dent appointed a Special Emergency Board to reconsider the 
case of the non-operating unions and recommend wage hikes 
conforming with the stabilization policy. The Board made a 
recommendation which the Stabilization Director approved, 
but the unions dissatisfied, asked the Mediation Board to 
investigate and prepared to strike. They also had resolu-
tions introduced in Congress to validate their agreement of 
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August 7. The Senate passed it on December 9, but the House 
deferred action. Later in December, both the operating and 
nonoperating unions announced a strike to begin December 30, 
1943. When three operating unions refused the President's 
offer to arbitrate, he ordered the War Department to take 
over the nation's railroads. The unions then called off the 
strike and talks continued while the Army ran the roads. 
seven railroad executives were commissioned as colonels to 
supervise operations. The President also rendered his deci-
sion as arbitrator, which in effect, gave the unions the wage 
hikes they wanted. The Stabilization Director accepted the 
agreements on January 18, 1944 and the roads were returned 
to their owners. During 1943, the operating unions also 
tried to get extra crewmen on diesel locomotives, but were 
unsuccessful except in passenger trains, though they did get 
pay increases for engineers on diesel locomotives. 39 
Strikes were not confined to the railroad industry. 
On May 16, 1945, truck drivers in Chicago struck in protest 
over a War Labor Board award of a pay increase that fell 
short of their demands. The Army moved some supplies in 
military trucks, while the carriers asked for a federal 
takeover. The Office of Defense Transportation took over 
operations on May 23 and the strike ended on May 25 while 
the War Labor Board took up the dispute. A second strike 
came on June 16. Again, the Office of Defense Transporta-
tion took over the carriers, and when truckers refused to 
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work, the Army moved in and troops drove and guarded trucks. 
The truckers finally conceded defeat and the strike ended 
3une 27. In November, 1944, train crews struck the Chicago, 
Aurora and Elgin and the Chicago, North Shore and Milwaukee, 
disrupting commuter service and causing substantial absen-
teeism in local war plants. The unions had petitioned for 
a wage increase, but when an Emergency Board appointed by the 
president approved a wage hike, they rejected it as insuffi-
cient. Unlike other disputes, the President refused to in-
tervene in the 17-day strike despite requests that he do so, 
and the two sides finally settled on the increase awarded by 
the Emergency Board. 40 
The railroads and other carriers generally profited 
from the war. Many Illinois railroads emerged from a De-
pression-induced bankruptcy and reorganized during the war. 
In the fall of 1942, the New York Central paid its first 
dividend since 1931. Many carriers also used profits to 
reduce debt. The Illinois Central paid off over $100 mil-
lion in debt. 41 
The railroads also persuaded the government to elimi-
nate land-grant rates, which the government had imposed on 
the railroads in return for land grants for railroad cons-
truction. The Illinois central land grant, one of the first, 
provided for free transportation for government goods and 
personnel, but this was soon modified to a discount of fifty 
percent. Non-land-grant roads adopted equalization rates to 
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Jlleet competition from land-grant roads. During the thirties, 
the railroads, hit with Depression losses and a large 
increase in government traffic at low rates, tried to get 
this provision eliminated. The Transportation Act of 1940 
eliminated land-grant rates for non-defense traffic, but kept 
it for military transportation. In exchange, railroads gave 
up any unpatented lands. The defense program and the war 
brought a huge increase in military traffic, all of it 
carried at a fifty percent discount. Again, the railroads 
sought repeal, but the Army objected and Congress did not 
repeal the land-grant rates during the war, thus saving the 
government an estimated $20 million a month. The railroads 
did not do so well on land sales. The Atchison, Topeka and 
Santa Fe earned a total of $25 million from all sales up to 
June 30, 1947, but granted the government a total of $215 
million in reduced rates.~ 
Wartime traffic loads placed heavy burdens on the 
state and national transportation system. The vast quanti-
ties of military supplies and armies of soldiers and sailors 
were of no use unless they could be transported to where they 
were needed. The biggest share of the burden of trans-
porting military equipment and personnel as well as civilian 
freight and passenger traffic fell on the railroads, which 
groaned under huge increases in freight and passenger traf-
fic. Other modes of transport also experienced a significant 
rise in traffic. To handle this burden, commercial carriers 
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had to cease their normal competitive practices and cooperate 
with each other. 
Government played a significant role in this. Al-
though the government did not repeat its World War I takeover 
of the railroads, it worked with the carriers and shippers 
to regulate the flow of traffic and direct shipments to their 
destination by the most efficient means of transport and by 
the most direct route. Federal and state agencies worked to 
eliminate duplicate services and establish new services where 
needed. The Office of Defense Transportation, the Interstate 
commerce Commission and other agencies worked with shippers 
and with the carriers themselves to insure the efficient use 
of equipment and in some cases, divert it to the military or 
to special projects such as the carriage of oil to the East 
Coast. The War Production Board allocated equipment to the 
carriers as scarce resources became available. Al though 
equipment was always in short supply, government worked with 
the carriers to make maximum use of existing equipment. 
Labor was also scarce during the war as the armed 
forces drained off train crewmen, truck and bus drivers and 
other personnel. To replace them, commercial carriers, like 
other employers, had to turn to new sources of labor. As 
with other industries, railroads, truckers and local transit 
companies hired women and blacks. Railroads employed women 
in many traditionally male jobs and increased their employ-
ment of blacks, often despite union resistance. 
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The war did not introduce any major changes in trans-
portation, though women and blacks gained increased job op-
portunities. The main effect of the war was on existing 
trends. Prior to the war, the railroads faced growing com-
petition, especially from the automobile in passenger tra-
vel, but also from trucks and barges in freight transporta-
tion. The war reversed the trend temporarily. Auto usage 
declined sharply as auto production ceased and existing 
autos, gasoline and tires were rationed. Motorists crowded 
mass transit systems for local transportation and trains for 
long-distance travel. After the war, however, they deserted 
the rails to return to their cars. Airline travel did re-
tain its wartime gains and expand on them after the war, but 
it too was growing before the war, and the chief effect of 
the war, at least initially was to retard this growth. The 
postwar era brought the elimination of most rail passenger 
service and the loss of much rail freight traffic. The war 
also delayed the full impact of one technological change. 
Railroads had to wait until peacetime to dieselize their 
operations, though their wartime experience further con-
vinced them of the advantages of the diesel locomotive. 
Illinois continued to be a major transportation crossroads 
after the war, but in highway, air and water transport as 
well as rail. 
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CHAPTER VI 
HOGS, SOYBEANS AND HEMP: ILLINOIS AGRICULTURE DURING 
THE SECOND WORLD WAR. 
Illinois farm production during the second world war 
was a complex problem. Farmers had to produce more, but did 
not have enough equipment and manpower to do the job. At the 
same time, their incomes were somewhat restricted by price 
controls on farm products, controls which they resented in 
the light of rising industrial wages. Government played a 
major role, orchestrating production goals while regulating 
prices and the supply of labor and equipment. The war also 
brought changes in the types of crops planted. While 
traditional crops, especially corn, continued to dominate, 
soybeans, a relative newcomer, gained rapidly in acreage 
after Pearl Harbor. Illinois farmers experimented with new 
war crops such as hemp while reducing the planting of less 
essential crops. 
Illinois agriculture was highly diversified. Corn was 
the chief crop, especially in the central and northern 
counties. Other crops planted in these counties included 
soybeans, oats and other grains, asparagus and other vege-
tables. Farmers in the southern counties grew winter wheat, 
peaches, apples, pears and other fruits and also cotton and 
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tobacco. Many Illinois farmers raised livestock for meat or 
dairy products. In 1945, Illinois ranked fifth among the 
states in total acreage of crops harvested. At that time, 
ss.3 percent of the total area of the state was farmland. 
The state also was first in soybeans, second in corn, hogs 
and cheese, fourth in chickens, fifth in milk production and 
sixth in eggs. Food processing industries ranged from Chi-
cago meat packinghouses to soybean and corn processing plants 
in Decatur, vegetable canneries, dairies and egg processors. 1 
Agriculture was slow to prepare for war, having been 
in a depression since the early twenties. During the thir-
ties, New Deal agencies such as the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration (AAA) and the Soil Conservation Service worked 
to restrict farm production. As late as the fall of 1940, 
few of them were adapting to changed conditions. Agri-
culture did not plan for war because farmers and agricul-
tural agencies feared that increased production would bring 
surplus crops and depressed farm income. There was no inde-
pendent war agency set up to handle agriculture. Though the 
National Defense Advisory Commission had an agricultural di-
vision, it was abolished in May, 1941 and its functions 
transferred to an office of Agricultural Defense Relations 
within the Department of Agriculture. Other agencies of the 
Department such as the Agricultural Adjustment Administra-
tion and the Extension service handled much of the task of 
promoting increased production, although in March, 1943, the 
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war Food Administration was established within the Department 
to handle food production and distribution. 2 
Some of the agricultural agencies established during 
the thirties relied a great deal on local farmers to run 
their programs. Administration of crop reduction and soil 
conservation programs rested on state, county and township 
committees composed of farmers. Local committees were 
elected annually by cooperating farmers. Not all farmers 
participated in agricultural programs. Even those who signed 
up sometimes had misgivings. The committees themselves were 
sometimes criticized as mere rubber stamps for higher 
officials. Big farmers accepted the AAA program more readily 
than small farmers. They were better informed of its 
benefits, and as commercial farmers were able to profit from 
its provisions more effectively than small farmers. The 
latter were assisted by the Farm Security Administration, 
which provided low-cost loans enabling them to buy land and 
improve their farms. 3 
Farm organizations played a major role in shaping 
agricultural programs. The most powerful was the American 
Farm Bureau Federation, whose Illinois affiliate, the 
Illinois Agricultural Association, was headed by Earl c. 
Smith, a Pike County farmer. The Illinois organization was 
the most powerful state farm organization in the country, 
representing about two-thirds of Illinois farmers by the end 
of the war. Though accused of representing only big farmers, 
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it included small farmers and tenants as well. It did rep-
resent successful commercial farmers as opposed to subsis-
tence farmers. In 1947, with a membership of 145,851, the 
Illinois Agricultural Association easily outranked the Na-
tional Grange which had only about 9200 members in Illinois 
and the National Farmer's union. In 1942, John L. Lewis 
tried to organize dairy farmers in the united Mine Workers 
union's District 50, but with little success. Though some 
locals were organized, the united Farmers of Illinois dis-
affiliated from District 50 in 1944. The Illinois Agricul-
tural Association generally supported the Agricultural Ad-
justment Administration programs and even helped to write 
the 1938 law. Indeed it was criticized by the United Far-
mers of Illinois for its support of the New Deal. However, 
the Farm Bureau and its Illinois affiliate objected to the 
Farm Security Administration and during the war, backed the 
efforts of Illinois Congressmen Everett Dirksen and others 
in seeking to curtail the agency's activities despite its 
popularity even with anti-New Deal critics, who praised its 
efforts to help small farmers. When criticized for this by 
the Bloomington Pantagraph, the Illinois Agricultural Asso-
ciation replied that it had no objection to how the program 
was administered in Illinois. In fact, many members of the 
Farm Security Administration county committees were also 
leaders in the Farm Bureau. Still, the Bureau and its state 
affiliate were generally apathetic toward small farmers. 4 
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one reason for the Farm Bureau's strength was its af-
filiation with the federal-state agricultural extension ser-
vice. county Farm Bureaus organized and funded by farmers 
themselves and affiliated with the national Farm Bureau hired 
county agricultural agents from a list of applicants approved 
by the extension service and paid in part by the Farm Bureau. 
The extension service cooperated with the Farm Bureau and 
the Illinois Agricultural Association in promoting farm 
programs and new farming methods. The farm organizations 
themselves lobbied the General Assembly to keep the extension 
service well-funded. In 1938, under an agreement between the 
Department of Agriculture and land grant colleges such as 
the University of Illinois, state, county and neighborhood 
land-use planning committees were created. The land grant 
colleges and the extension service were responsible for 
implementing the plan. The director of the extension service 
was the state chairman of the state committee with authority 
to appoint farmer members. Farmers representing different 
types of agriculture in the area composed the majority of 
members of the state and county committees. State or county 
offices of agricultural agencies also were represented. The 
committees dealt not only with land-use planning, but any 
local problem concerning farmers and their families. The 
University of Illinois started organizing the committees in 
1939. The defense emergency hastened organization. The 
University's advisors presided over county committees, which 
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consisted of representatives of each agricultural agency 
operating in the county, teachers of vocational agriculture 
and home economics and eight to fifteen farm men and women 
named by farm and home advisors and farm and home bureau 
presidents. The farm advisor was chairman and the home 
advisor co-chairman. The advisors and bureau presidents 
appointed township chairmen who in turn nominated and the 
county committee approved neighborhood leaders--a farmer and 
a farm woman for each school district. Some were suspicious 
of the committees since the Farm Bureau had a hand in the 
selection of county committees and township chairmen, though 
the program included all farmers and not just members of the 
Farm Bureau. During the war, the committees discussed 
general production problems, rural fire protection, wartime 
food preservation and other problems. They also made plans 
for cooperative use of farm machinery, canning equipment, 
transportation and labor. The University's College of 
Agriculture issued bulletins on war crops, fertilizers and 
other wartime farm production problems. Governor Dwight 
Green named the members of the State Land-Use Planning 
Council as an advisory committee to the Illinois War Coun-
cil's Committee on Agricultural Resources and Production. 
The Council set up a program for relaying information on 
wartime agricultural requirements to every farm family in 
the state. It also directed recruiting and training of farm 
labor. 5 
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on July 5, 1941, Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wic-
kard ordered the establishment of state and county defense 
boards, later war boards, under the AAA committee chairmen. 
The state agricultural war board, headed by Lee Gentry, state 
AAA director, was composed of the principal field officers 
of the various agencies of the Department of Agriculture 
operating in the state, while county agricultural war boards 
were composed of representatives of the agencies operating 
in the county. As head of the extension service, the 
chairman of the State Land-Use Planning Council was a member 
of the state U. s. Department of Agriculture War Board and 
also a member of the Illinois War Council. The state and 
county agricultural war boards administered federal war 
programs, broke down state production goals into county and 
farm units and canvassed farmers to secure pledges of pro-
duction. on January 12, 1943, Farm Mobilization day, far-
mers meeting in AAA committees heard a radio address by James 
Byrnes, Director of Economic stabilization, delivering a 
message from the President urging increased farm production 
to meet the 194 3 crop goals. The farmers then discussed 
means of meeting these goals. From 1942 to 1944, the war 
boards handled the rationing of farm equipment. They also 
presented farmers' requests for materials or labor and 
reported bottlenecks in storage and transportation to the 
proper authorities. 6 
In April, 1941, the Department of Agriculture embarked 
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on a program increasing food production to meet the needs of 
Britain and others fighting the Axis powers. Soon afterward, 
the Illinois extension leaders urged a 20 percent increase 
in hog production for 1941, but also advised farmers to 
maintain their acreage of corn, wheat and oats at current 
levels. There was no shortage of grain at the time. Indeed 
a surplus developed by July. Though federal agricultural 
agencies were no longer trying to cut farm production, they 
still wished to restrict it. On September 11, Lee Gentry 
advised Sangamon County farmers to put 80 percent of their 
cropland in whatever crops they were planting, but conserve 
20 percent as grassland to avoid soil depletion. Even though 
the nation was preparing to feed 10 million people under 
Lend-Lease, it planned to do so by restricting surplus crops 
such as wheat in favor of others such as soybeans, though 
the Department of Agriculture did make plans to canvass all 
farmers to ascertain their 1942 production goals. After 
Pearl Harbor, however, the Department of Agriculture eased 
restrictions and told farmers to plant every acre. Produc-
tion goals were revised in the light of the new situation. 7 
Though Illinois farmers grew a variety of crops, their 
main contribution to wartime food production lay in corn, 
soybeans, dairy products, hogs, cattle, chickens and eggs. 
The actual acreage harvested during 1942 to 1945 grew less 
than five percent over the prewar years. Production in-
creased because farmers managed to increase production per 
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acre. Farmers made heavy use of fertilizers. Illinois led 
all states at the beginning of the war in the use of lime-
stone to sweeten the soil. Despite shortages, the use of 
limestone increased during the war. Chemical fertilizer use 
also increased. Soil conservation was a problem. Soil con-
servation districts increased during the war from 25 in June, 
1942 to 66 by the end of the war. They covered over four-
fifths of the state's cropland. Some soil was lost, however, 
due to heavy wartime planting. Soil loss in the Corn Belt 
states of Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Ohio and Missouri in-
creased 12 percent in 1943-1944 over 1935-1939. Even 
marginal land was put into production. Hilly pasture land 
was plowed for cropland, though contour planting minimized 
soil erosion. Farmers utilized contour plowing and the 
planting of grasses and clover on fallow lands to conserve 
and improve the soil and produce higher yields. In 1943, the 
Department of Agriculture urged farmers to reduce the 
planting of crops deemed unessential such as watermelons and 
cantaloupes. In Illinois, growers reduced their areage in 
watermelons from 4300 acres in 1940 to 2600 in 1943 and for 
cantaloupes from 1900 acres in 1940 to 1050 in 1943. 
However, there were no price ceilings on these fruits and 
growers soon found that watermelons were the most profitable 
crop. Prices quadrupled between 1939 and 1943 with the big-
gest increases in 1942 and 1943. Watermelon acreage in-
creased in 1944 though not to the prewar level. Cotton 
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production also dropped, though flax increased from 6000 
acres in 1941 to 29,000 acres, then declined to 972 acres in 
8 1945 as demand eased. 
The chief crop in Illinois was corn, which had a 
variety of uses. Sweet corn fed consumers while field corn 
was used to feed livestock. Corn was also refined to pro-
duce starches, syrups, vegetable oils, alcohol and other 
products. The A. E. Staley Company in Decatur developed a 
new type of corn starch for use in making waterproof boxes 
to carry supplies on to beaches. The boxes were thrown off 
the ships and floated into shore. Corn starch also replaced 
imported tapioca in a number of products. Even corn cobs 
were ground up to make animal feed, engine cleaners for naval 
aircraft, furfural, a refining agent used in making buta-
diene, and other products. 
produced hybrid corn seed. 
Several Illinois companies 
Usually, Illinois planted an 
average of around nine million acres in corn. In 1942 to 
1945, average annual acreage was 8,624,277, slightly under 
the average for 1935 to 1939 of 8, 869, 250. Planting in-
creased after 1943 so that acreage went from 7, 721, ooo in 
1941 to 9,056,000 in 1945. The average annual yield, how-
ever, went from 331,000,000 bushels in 1935 to 1939 to over 
405,000,000 bushels in 1942 to 1945. 9 
Illinois wheat declined during the war years. Early 
in 1941, a large stockpile of wheat from the previous har-
vest glutted storage space as the 1941 winter wheat crop 
started filling elevators. 
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The situation worsened and by 
July, a government appointed grain storage committee warned 
wheat shippers not to send carloads of wheat to Chicago due 
to lack of storage space. By August, American farmers were 
harvesting the largest wheat crop in 22 years. The huge 
wheat stockpile led the Department of Agriculture to recom-
mend that farmers reduce their acreage in wheat in 1942 and 
grow soybeans, flax and other crops that were needed. Sto-
rage space was in short supply and many farmers were seeking 
bins to store their wheat to prevent spoilage. The Commodi-
ty Credit Corporation eased some of its own storage problems 
by selling some of the wheat stockpile for livestock feed at 
85 percent of the parity price. This aroused protests from 
farm bloc congressmen, who tried unsuccessfully to ban the 
sale of commodities below the parity price. On May 2, 1942, 
wheat growers voted in AAA elections to accept the Department 
of Agriculture's recommended quotas. Under the quotas, 
farmers could make loans on their wheat crop, but they were 
penalized if they seeded over their allotment unless they 
held the excess on their farms until the quota was lifted. 
In Illinois, the acreage harvested in 1942 was about half 
that of 1941 and the 12, 623, 000 bushels produced was the 
lowest since 1912. In December, 1942, the acreage planted 
in winter wheat was the lowest in 7 8 years. However, in 
February, 1943, the marketing quota was ended since the need 
for wheat was rising. By March, 1944, there was a serious 
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shortage of wheat and Illinois farmers planted more wheat in 
1944 and 1945, though production did not reach the prewar 
10 level. 
Soybean production expanded rapidly during the war 
with Illinois the leading producer in the nation. In 1939, 
the state's farms produced half the national output. In 
1942, the Department of Agriculture sought an increase in 
oil-bearing crops to make up for the loss of vegetable oils 
from the Far East. It sought a national increase in soybean 
production of 54 percent but only 27 percent for Illinois 
since the state already produced over half the national to-
tal. Before the war, soybean acreage was about a fourth that 
of corn. By 1943, it was almost half. Soybean production 
increased every year to peak at 75,200,000 bushels in 1945. 
Production declined after the war, but still topped the 
prewar level. Decatur was the center of a soybean pro-
cessing industry with its A. E. Staley Company as the indus-
try leader. In 1949, 30 processing plants in the state 
handled 46 percent of the nation's output. The Illinois 
Agricultural Experiment Station developed new varieties of 
the soybean. One which was produced during the war was more 
productive and richer in oil content. The Department of 
Agriculture's Northern Regional Research Laboratory in Peoria 
and a special soybean regional laboratory at the University 
of Illinois discovered new uses for soybeans, which were 
usually crushed to produce soybean oil and other products 
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including animal feed. Most soybean oil went into food 
products, but some went into glycerine, a component in 
munitions. Vast quantities of soy flour went to England 
through Lend-Lease for use in sausage. The Staley Company 
built a new soy flour plant which went into production in 
1942. By the end of 1944, however, there was a surplus of 
soy flour and the new plant was shut down. The company did 
build a new solvent extraction soybean mill in 1944 and 
started production in 1945. 11 
During the war, the state's soybean processing plants 
proved inadequate to handle the increased wartime crop. To 
avoid building new plants, soybeans were shipped south and 
west to cottonseed and copra mills. Unfortunately, this 
produced shortages of soybean meal in the fall of 1942 and 
early 1943. Soybean meal was used to supply proteins to 
livestock. Farmers protested vehemently and threatened to 
withhold their crops from the market to feed their own 
livestock. Another controversy arose over margarine, a sub-
stitute for butter. Margarine, which used soybean oil, was 
cheaper than butter and thus threatened dairy farmers, who 
responded by seeking to have it banned or taxed heavily to 
make it noncompetitive. Farm publications backed them up 
only to discover that many farmers and even dairymen bought 
margarine. 12 
One controversial issue affecting most farm products 
was farm prices. over the years, farmers sought to obtain 
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parity prices for their crops. Parity prices would give them 
the same purchasing power they had between 1910 and 1914. 
The Administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
championed their cause and tried various means of getting 
farm prices up to parity during the Depression. The outbreak 
of war brought an increased demand and higher prices for farm 
products. It also brought fears of inflation, which led to 
price control. However, the initial price control legisla-
tion included provisions setting farm prices at 110 percent 
of parity. Consumer prices continued to rise and in April, 
1942, President Roosevelt asked Congress to reduce the 
ceiling on farm products. congress balked, however, until 
the President asked for legislation lowering the ceiling to 
100 percent of parity and threatening to take action on his 
own. Many congressmen and farm leaders were angered by what 
they considered an unfair deal for farmers, but they finally 
gave in and the legislation passed on October 2, 1942. The 
Department of Agriculture also used support payments, 
incentive payments and subsidies to encourage farmers to 
plant more essential crops such as soybeans and increase 
production of hogs, chickens, eggs and dairy products. The 
Department also used subsidies to reduce consumer prices. 
farmers had mixed feelings over such payments. As a rule, 
they preferred that the free market rule farm prices and that 
the government refrain from fixing prices. They saw sub-
sidies as a sort of stigma and feared an unfavorable reaction 
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from consumers. However, they opposed the abolition of 
subsidies if it meant lower farm prices. While they objected 
to ceilings on farm prices, they were willing to accept 
government intervention to keep prices at parity or above. 
They also felt that consumers should be willing to pay higher 
prices in view of their higher wages. Farm leaders demanded 
that wages and other prices be controlled if farm prices were 
restricted. During 1943 and early 1944, the Farm Bureau and 
its congressional allies made repeated efforts to ban 
subsidies, but consumers and labor unions wanted subsidies to 
hold down food costs. Whenever Congress passed bans on 
subsidies, the President vetoed them and the vetoes were 
sustained. 13 
Ceiling prices on meat and corn helped produce shor-
tages of both in 1943 and 1944. Illinois was a major produ-
cer of livestock, especially hogs, cattle and chickens, all 
of which ate corn. Feeder cattle were often shipped in from 
western states to be fattened in feedlots in Illinois before 
going to market. Farmers and feedlot owners benefitted from 
the outbreak of war in Europe and the national rearmament 
program which followed. German invasions of Poland and other 
countries cut off the supply of Polish hams and other 
products, while Lend-Lease, the war effort and higher domes-
tic consumption increased demand. 14 
In Illinois, hog production made the biggest gains. 
In December, 1940, the Secretary of Agriculture asked for 
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more pigs and announced a program of price supports (mostly 
through government purchase) for hogs, chickens, eggs and 
dairy products to encourage production. Illinois farmers 
responded with 8,500,800 pigs in 1941, over half a million 
above the 1940 total. The pig crop grew rapidly, finally 
peaking at 11,009,000 in 1943, twice the 1935 to 1939 ave-
rage. The Department of Agriculture helped encourage pro-
duction by increasing support prices for live hogs from 
$9.00 per hundredweight in April, 1942 to $13.25 per hund-
redweight in the fall. Meanwhile, in February, 1942, live 
hog prices hit 110 percent of parity, which was about $13.00 
per hundredweight. The Office of Price Administration then 
froze wholesale ... ork prices at a level for early March. 
However, hog prices continued to rise, thus forcing many 
small packers to operate at a loss. Large packers had inte-
grated processing sidelines to offset this. In the spring 
of 1943, with live hog prices hitting $16.00 a hundredweight, 
the Office of Price Administration recommended ceilings on 
live hogs to relieve the pressure on small packers. The War 
Food Administration agreed and announced that prices would 
have to drop or ceilings would be imposed, but then increased 
the support price to $13.75 per hundredweight to encourage 
continued high production. The Office of Price Administra-
tion further encouraged hog production when it imposed a 
ceiling on corn. The objective was to encourage farmers to 
feed their corn to their hogs, thus producing more meat. 
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This was exactly what happened. Farmers found it more 
profitable to feed their corn to their hogs than sell it on 
the market. In June, 1943, a Department of Agriculture 
survey of the pig crop discovered that farmers had exceeded 
the Department's requests by 50 percent and were planning for 
more pigs in the fall. 15 
Meanwhile, despite record crops in 1942, the promotion 
of hog production led to a crisis in corn. The hogs soon ate 
all the surplus from 1942. By the spring of 1943, farmers 
were using seven bushels of the 1942 crop for every five they 
grew in 1943. In six months, they used two-thirds of the 
corn supply, leaving only a third to last them through the 
rest of the year. This led to a shortage of corn which made 
farmers even more reluctant to sell their corn. Those who 
did not need corn for feeding held it in the hope that the 
ceiling would be lifted. The Commodity Credit Corporation 
called in loans on corn crops, only to find that farmers had 
the money to pay off the loans and could continue to hold 
their corn. Soon, a black market developed in corn. 
Truckers bought corn from farmers at up to $1.50 a bushel, 
well above the ceiling of $1.07 a bushel, then sold it in 
areas where corn was scarce. They avoided elevators where 
the ceiling would be enforced, though some elevators bought 
and sold corn above the ceiling in order to save livestock 
from starvation. Some industries, such as distilleries, also 
bought on the black market. Others, such as the Corn 
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products Refining Company's Pekin plant, shut down for a time 
in June due to a lack of corn. On June 25, with other plants 
in Decatur and Argo threatening to close, the War Food 
Administration seized corn in 96 midwestern terminal eleva-
tors and allocated it to industries using corn. A shortage 
of soybean meal further complicated the feed situation. 
f_rairie Farmer advised its readers to stretch out protein 
feed and rely more on hay, small grains and pasture. 16 
The shortage of feed, especially corn, finally led 
hog growers to send their animals to market. The huge crop 
glutted the market and overcrowded processing, storage and 
transportation facilities. The Agricultural Adjustment Ad-
ministration and other agencies asked farmers to market their 
hogs more evenly, but the glut continued. The peak came in 
December, 1943 and January, 1944. Packers were swamped with 
hogs and truckloads roamed the Midwest looking for a market. 
The National Stockyards in East st. Louis embargoed further 
shipments for a time. Some farmers even sold their breeding 
stock and unfattened hogs. Prices fell to the government 
support level and this was lowered in October, 1944. The 
Off ice of Price Administration stopped rationing most pork 
products for a time. However, feed shortages reappeared in 
1944 and, together with the market experience of 1943 and 
another glutted market in the spring of 1944, led to a sharp 
drop in hog production in 1944. In 1945, there was a pork 
shortage. 17 
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The decline in the pig population did not end the corn 
shortage. Other livestock also ate corn and various indus-
tries used huge amounts of corn. In July, 1943, the War Food 
Administration authorized country elevators to buy corn for 
the commodity Credit Corporation and urged farmers to sell, 
promising supplemental payments if the ceiling price were 
raised and if they sold by August 10. This brought a big 
movement of corn to market. In December, the ceiling was 
raised to reflect an increase in parity prices. Neverthe-
less, shortages returned as farmers held corn to feed their 
hogs or sold it on the black market. In March, 1944, the War 
Food Administration ordered country grain elevators in 125 
counties in parts of Illinois and other states to allocate 35 
percent of corn to industries making products essential to 
the war effort. Soon afterward, the allocation was changed 
to 60 percent. on April 24, the War Food Administration 
froze all sales of corn in those counties except to the 
Commodity Credit Corporation and along with the War Depart-
ment and the War Production Board, appealed to farmers to 
sell their corn at country elevators with a small allowance 
for shelling and trucking if they sold within a certain time. 
Stockmen who needed corn to feed livestock had to get a 
permit from the county AAA office to buy it and even then 
were limited to a 30-day supply. This brought more corn to 
market, but not before Corn Refining Plants at Pekin and 
Argo shut down for lack of corn. They reopened in May, but 
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shortages persisted. There simply was not enough corn to 
supply industry and feed livestock. In June, county Agricul-
tural Adjustment Administration officials started contracting 
with farmers for the sale of corn to the Commodity Credit 
corporation. Later that month, the freeze on corn sales was 
lifted. Shortages reappeared in 1945 and 1946 and even led 
to tie-in sales by some country grain dealers in which 
farmers had to buy barley to get corn. Terminal dealers 
offered premiums to get corn, including nylons, whiskey, 
automobiles and tractors. 18 
Shortages also developed in beef cattle during the 
war, mainly due to price regulations. In March, 1942, the 
Off ice of Price Administration imposed wholesale and retail 
price ceilings reflecting 110 percent of parity prices to 
producers. However, prices on live cattle continued to rise 
as the government made large purchases of beef. Retail pri-
ces also rose, leading the Office of Price Administration to 
impose dollar and cents ceilings late in 1942. Meanwhile, 
by July, 1942, feeders started reducing the number of cattle 
they were buying to fatten for slaughter. Feeder cattle cost 
too much and ceilings on beef made the price on fattened 
cattle too low to make a profit. Small packers were also 
hurt by price ceilings, which left only a small margin 
between the cost of live cattle and the price of beef. They 
asked for ceilings on live cattle, but the Department of 
Agriculture opposed this. Instead, it established subsidies 
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for small packers and slaughterers starting in 1943. one 
result was a general advance in cattle prices and an in-
creased spread between lower and higher quality beef until 
price control eased in July, 1946. Cattlemen regulated the 
flow of cattle to force packers to pay steadily higher pri-
ces for cattle. 19 
Meanwhile, late in 1942, cattle went to market well 
before they were fattened, thus leading to a drop in beef by 
December. cattle sales to packers slackened and farmers sold 
on the black market. small slaughterers butchered livestock 
that normally would have gone to Chicago packers. Cattle 
rustlers killed cattle in fields, dressed them and hauled 
away the meat, much of which went to eastern markets. 
criminal elements gained control of small packers. In 
March, 1943, the Department of Agriculture set up a system 
of permits for slaughterers and livestock dealers, but some 
were issued in error and had to be withdrawn. Rationing of 
meat started March 29. Later that summer, beef became more 
plentiful as grass-fed cattle went to market and in the 
summer of 1944, there was a glut of beef cattle. Rationing 
was sharply curtailed until the end of the year when meat 
shortages returned and lasted into 1945. The price of fee-
der cattle dropped and feedlot owners started buying again 
in the summer of 1944. Later that year, they were given a 
subsidy on higher quality beef, thus permitting a wider 
spread between fattened and unfinished cattle. 20 
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Poultry, unlike other meat, was unrationed and thus 
in high demand. However, it was also subject to price ceil-
ings and when feed shortages developed and costs went up, 
black markets arose in poultry. Truckers visited poultry 
farms and paid prices well over the ceiling and sold direct-
ly to consumers willing to pay higher prices. Many consumers 
bought directly from farmers, who claimed ignorance of 
regulations or simply ignored them. Poultry dealers also 
ignored regulations and despite vigorous attempts by the 
office of Price Administration to enforce them, poultry price 
controls eventually broke down. Although chickens were the 
main item, many farmers raised turkeys. Turkey production 
grew from 98,000 birds in 1929 to 818,000 in 1944 and almost 
doubled between 1939 and 1944. 21 
Unlike other farm products, egg supplies generally 
exceeded demand during the war. Eggs were in short supply 
late in 1942 when price ceilings were first imposed on them, 
but by January, the supply increased and prices dropped be-
low the ceiling. By March, when dollar and cents ceilings 
replaced the previous prices, the output of eggs was soar-
ing. During the summer, demand again exceeded supply and 
prices went up again, but then maximum wholesale prices were 
established and prices dropped below the ceiling and re-
mained there with few interruptions into 1945. The War Food 
Administration bought eggs simply to support the price in 
addition to buying some to be dried for military use and 
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Lend-Lease. Egg drying plants turned out egg powder as fast 
as they could with a 1 imi ted labor supply. A Harvard, 
Illinois egg drying plant produced 10, ooo pounds a day. 
Instead of shortages, the War Food Administration had a sur-
plus of eggs and had to scramble to find markets and storage 
space. Some eggs were given away in Chicago schools. 
others were sold as animal feed. Many eggs could not be sold 
and sat in warehouses or were shipped across the country 
until they spoiled and became unfit even for animal feed. 
Even then, the War Food Administration continued to buy eggs 
due to congressional pressure to support the price. 22 
In 1941, the Secretary of Agriculture asked for in-
creased milk production. Illinois farmers responded with an 
increase of eight percent between 1940 and 1942. Local com-
munities pushed milk production. On June 18, 1942, Harvard 
held its first annual milk festival, an event originally 
conceived to honor dairy farmers, but also used to push milk 
production as part of the local contribution to the war ef-
fort. At the 1943 festival, a Chicago radio director from 
WLS, the Prairie Farmer's station, led 1500 farmers in a 
pledge to increase milk production until victory was won. 
Nationwide milk production faltered in the summer of 1943 
and the War Food Administration responded with a feed sub-
sidy. Illinois farmers in 34 northern counties received the 
minimum subsidy. In 1944, Illinois produced five and a half 
billion pounds of milk as well as large amounts of other 
dairy products. 
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By May, 1945, milk production was at a 
record level. Although some dairymen sold their cows due to 
labor shortages, others expanded their herds. By 1945, the 
number of cows on Illinois farms was 150,000 above that in 
1939. As a result of relatively high milk production, milk 
remained unrationed though sales were restricted for a time 
in the fall of 1943. The Office of Price Administration im-
posed price ceilings on milk at the retail level in March, 
1942 and for producers in February, 1943. Although the 
agency established some price differentials for different 
communities and subsidies to lift supply, the price of milk 
remained relatively stable throughout the war. Other dairy 
products, such as butter, cheese and evaporated milk, were 
used by the armed forces and thus were much scarcer. Lend 
Lease and military requirements pushed up the output of eva-
porated milk by 70 percent in 1942 and also increased the 
use of dried milk. New plants were built in several Illi-
nois communities. Military purchases led to shortages of 
butter by the fall of 1942 and soon all dairy products other 
than fluid milk were rationed. 23 
Some farmers grew crops unusual to Illinois during 
the war. In 1943, farmers in four counties switched from 
melons and cantaloupes to castor beans, which were used to 
produce castor oil. Aside from being an unpopular medicine, 
the oil was used in lubricating airplane motors and to re-
place tung oil in paints. Though the farmers produced about 
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600,000 pounds of beans in 1943, none were planted after that 
year. Hemp also emerged as a war crop in 1943 due to the 
cutoff of supplies of sisal and Manila hemp due to Axis 
victories in the Far East and the Mediterranean and subma-
rines in the Caribbean. Hemp was used to make rope for ships 
and army tents and twine for other uses. The Defense Plant 
corporation, a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance 
corporation, financed construction of hemp mills in several 
mid western states. The Commodity Credit Corporation es-
tablished a subsidiary, War Hemp Industries, to build and 
operate the mills and provide seed and equipment to farmers. 
The Agricultural Adjustment Administration lined up farmers. 
Hemp growers had to pay a special tax and keep records for 
the Bureau of Narcotics of the Treasury Department since the 
leaves and flowers of the hemp plant were used in making 
marijuana. The stalk contained the fibers used in making 
rope. Illinois farmers planted 36, 000 acres in 1943 and 
produced 33,120,000 pounds of hemp fiber. Profits varied 
from nothing to as high as $200 an acre. Most fell somewhere 
in between. This led to some difficulty in getting farmers 
to sign up in 1944. Due to Allied victories, which freed 
other sources of supply, the need for hemp was reduced in 
1944. Planting was reduced, though the ten mills built in 
various communities in Illinois opened to process the 1943 
crop. Only four remained in 1945 to handle the 1944 crop. 
No hemp was planted in 1945 and the mills closed. There were 
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some efforts to establish a peacetime industry making hemp 
cloth, but this did not materialize. War Hemp Industries 
also sponsored efforts to gather milkweed floss which was 
used as a substitute for kapok in lifejackets. Normally 
destroyed by farmers and railroad maintenance crews as a 
pest, it was allowed to grow. School children harvested the 
floss. 24 
Although they achieved record food production during 
the war, Illinois farmers experienced many difficulties, of 
which the worst was the shortage of labor. While many of 
the state's farm workers were unemployed or underemployed in 
1940, shortages appeared by the spring of 1941 as the draft 
and defense plants drained off workers. Will County farmers 
lost hired hands to army ordnance plants, thus forcing them 
to rely on themselves and their families. One woman worked 
an so-acre farm with the aid of a 12-year-old grandson. As 
young men entered the armed forces during war, farmers had 
to rely on their wives, daughters and younger sons to handle 
chores previously done by older sons of draft-age. Farmers 
also worked long hours, often 80 or 90 a week. Seven-day 
weeks were quite common. Neighbors helped each other with 
certain chores such as harvesting. Farmers joined together 
to assist those who were ill. Still, many farmers found it 
impossible to secure the help they needed and had to quit 
farming. Newspapers in rural areas were filled with ads 
during the war years announcing the sale of farm equipment 
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and livestock due to the shortage of farm laborers. Dairy-
men were especially hard hit and some had to sell their 
cows. The quality of farm laborers also declined during the 
war years. Many of those available were inexperienced, un-
trained or incompetent. One such farmhand made the mistake 
of pouring cold water into a very hot tractor motor, thus 
putting the tractor out of commission when it was needed 
most. Many farmers had to supervise workers more closely. 
one result of the loss of men to the armed forces and to war 
industries was a decline in the farm population of Illinois 
from 978,907 in 1940 to 759,429 in 1945, a decrease of over 
28 percent, This was a nationwide development, but Illinois 
lost more than other states.a 
There were efforts to raise farm wages and thereby 
attract and retain farm workers. In October, 1939, the ave-
rage monthly wage for farm workers in Illinois was $32.25 
with room and board and $43. 25 without it. By October, 
1943, the average was up to $65. 25 with room and board, 
$82.50 without. By April, 1945, hired hands were earning 
$81.75 with room and board or $106 without it. In 1945, farm 
wages in Illinois were 248 percent of what they were in 1939. 
Nationally, the increase was even higher at 274 percent. 
Some farmers were more willing than others to raise wages to 
attract workers. The United States Employment Service found 
it difficult to recruit workers to pick cotton in Alexander 
and Pulaski counties since farmers in Missouri offered better 
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wages than did Illinois farmers. Missouri growers also 
rented sacks to cotton pickers while Illinois farmers 
expected workers to bring their own. Missouri growers had 
agents in Cairo to recruit pickers and transport them to 
Missouri each day to work. When Decatur area farmers 
complained of a labor shortage, the Employment Service found 
that almost all complainers paid poor wages and provided 
housing unfit for human habitation. Several denied needing 
any help or were reluctant to pay more or furnish better 
living quarters. Several farmhands did leave to take better 
farm jobs further north. 26 
One of the more controversial aspects of the farm la-
bor situation was the draft status of farm workers. When 
Selective Service was first established, farmers and farm 
hands were inducted regardless of the impact on farm produc-
tion, though few were taken until after Pearl Harbor. Not 
until March 16, 1942, did the system develop a system of 
essential industries, which included agriculture. In Octo-
ber, 1942, the War Manpower Commission drew up a list of ag-
ricultural occupations qualifying for deferment. Even then, 
the General Selective Service Questionnaire was inadequate 
to properly classify agricultural registrants. In December, 
1941, the Logan County draft board developed a special ques-
tionnaire for such registrants and in January, 1942, the 
Illinois State Director of the Selective Service System 
called a meeting of agricultural leaders which resulted in a 
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questionnaire for state-wide use. It was later adopted by 
other states. In February, the National Director urged lo-
cal draft boards to seek information from the Department of 
Agriculture county war boards on the farm labor situation 
and farm production, though not on individual registrants. 
Beginning in March, 1943, the county war boards could appeal 
cases of individual registrants, though they rarely did so. 
They generally cooperated with local draft boards. 27 
Meanwhile, the growing shortage of farm labor raised 
fears that it would hurt farm production. In the fall of 
1942, Congress passed the Tydings Amendment to the Selective 
service Act, which provided for deferral of farm workers as 
long as they remained in that occupation. However, if they 
left farm work, local boards had to reclassify them to make 
them eligible for the draft. By this time, local boards in 
Illinois generally were deferring agricultural laborers who 
were needed in their particular jobs. To secure deferment 
of a hired hand, a farmer had to show that the man was ne-
cessary and could not be replaced without reducing the yield 
of the farm. A local board also had to consider the wor-
ker•s skill and experience. The importance of the farm and 
its products and the shortage of farm labor in the area. 
Farm workers could move from farm to farm without losing 
their deferments if the draft board felt that this would 
increase production, but if they simply left farm work, they 
were generally drafted. Also that fall, the Department of 
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Agriculture prepared a list of war units or work requirement 
standards. Each class of livestock and crop was given a 
factor based on the work required in its production. Thus, 
the care of one milk cow was considered one war unit. Since 
beef cattle took less time to care for, three beef cattle or 
five yearling steers or heifers were required for one war 
unit. With all livestock and crops assigned war units, it 
was easy to determine if a farm worker was making an impor-
tant contribution to farm production and the Selective Ser-
vice System quickly adopted the plan. Standards varied from 
county to county, however. At first, a worker had to handle 
only 8 war units to be deferred, but this was gradually 
raised to 16 late in 1943 due to increasing demands from the 
armed forces. Some Illinois counties adopted higher stan-
dards. Of 97 counties which reviewed the situation, only 16 
stuck with 16 war units and 5 with local variations of les-
ser amounts, while 19 went to 18 units, 44 to 20 units and 
13 to over 20 units ranging up to 25 units per worker. the 
southern counties had the lowest requirement due to the rough 
topography which made agricultural conditions less favor-
able. 28 
One result of the Tydings Amendment was to halt the 
cityward movement of farm workers. Many returned to farm 
work. As the farm labor situation worsened in the spring of 
1943, draft officials and others urged people with farm ex-
perience who were working in other jobs to return to farm 
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work, especially if they were in non-essential work. The 
selective Service referred registrants with farm experience 
to the United states Employment Service and gave the agency 
30 days to place them in farm jobs before inducting them. 
Later, farm workers took war jobs in the winter when farm 
work was slack, returning to farm work in the spring. Many 
took jobs with Chicago meat packers in the winter. 29 
Throughout the war, the United states Employment Ser-
vice and the War Manpower Commission sought to recruit farm 
laborers, either to assist individual farmers or to handle 
specific crops in the field or in canneries. There were some 
efforts to utilize workers on Works Progress Administration 
projects, but some workers refused farm work due to low 
wages, lack of transportation and inadequate housing. Many 
were married and thus less attractive to farmers who could 
not provide adequate housing for families, though some did 
accept married men. In 1943, the United States Employment 
Service and the Farm Security Administration recruited 
farmers and farm laborers from poor soil regions for work in 
more productive areas. Many came from southern Illinois 
where unemployment was high and farmers barely made a li-
ving. After two weeks training in tractor operation and 
dairy methods at the University of Illinois in Champaign or 
the Illinois State Normal University in Normal, they were 
placed on farms in central and northern Illinois. The Farm 
Bureau and some Illinois congressional critics of the Farm 
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security Administration attacked the program as impractical 
and costly, but backed down under fire from the downstate 
newspapers and local farmers. Migrant workers, often re-
viled in the past, were a welcome source of labor, though 
not as common as before the war due to gas and tire ration-
ing and improved job opportunities near their homes. Work-
ing for individual farmers or processors, they followed the 
crops. Some workers from Missouri planted and chopped cotton 
in the spring, then went north in June to work for a vege-
table cannery in Rochelle, Illinois, returning to Missouri 
in October to pick cotton. 30 
The Farm Bureau, American Legion posts, civic groups 
and the press also helped recruit farm and cannery workers, 
especially for special projects. In September, 1942, seve-
ral women's groups went to work at tomato canneries in 
Bloomington-Normal to handle a bumper crop. In other commu-
nities such as Harvard and Sycamore, groups of businessmen 
or "farm commandos" volunteered to assist farmers short of 
help. Farmers near Sycamore simply called the local Chamber 
of Commerce to secure the men they needed. In January, 1943, 
the Secretary of Agriculture announced creation of a land 
army of Victory Farm Volunteers to assist in farm produc-
tion. The War Food Administration eventually took over the 
program and the agricultural extension service organized it 
at the local level. Each county had a farm labor committee 
to recruit local businessmen, women, senior citizens and 
274 
students for farm work. Adults received training at nearby 
colleges while high school students were trained at school. 
Farmers had varying opinions about utilizing city people in 
farm work. Many felt that city people would be unable to 
handle farm work while others were quite happy to use them. 
victory Farm Volunteers often worked on large projects such 
as detasseling corn to produce hybrid seed. Local community 
groups and newspapers such as The Bloomington Pantagraph 
conducted extensive campaigns to enlist Boy Scouts, civic 
groups and ordinary citizens to detassel corn in 1943, 1944 
and 1945. Servicemen from Camp Grant, Chanute Field and 
other military posts also helped harvest crops, but only if 
the armed services deemed the agricultural emergency of 
greater danger to the nation than the military situation. 31 
A major source of farm labor during the war years was 
students. In the spring of 1942, the United States Employ-
ment Service and other agencies started recruiting city 
teenagers, including many from Chicago, for work on farms. 
Boys did field work and other chores while girls helped farm 
women in household duties. Many farmers were reluctant to 
use them at first, but by the summer of 1943 they were an-
xious to hire them. High schools themselves offered cour-
ses in vocational agriculture to train boys for farm work. 
In Galesburg, several agencies cooperated in a program to 
train high school boys to operate farm equipment. While 
teenagers working for individual farmers lived on the farms, 
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camps were set up to house those working on special projects. 
When corn was detasseled in central Illinois, a seed company 
housed men and boys at its warehouse and women and girls at 
a local high school. Groups of students working on commer-
cial vegetable farms in Cook County lived in camps run by the 
Boy Scouts and religious organizations. Sometimes, schools 
made special arrangements to enable students to harvest 
crops. During the asparagus harvest in the spring of 1943, 
students attending schools in the Hoopeston area worked in 
the fields cutting asparagus in the morning, then attended 
school until late in the afternoon. Otherwise, 70 percent of 
the crop would have been lost. In some cases, other crops 
were lost due to inadequate labor to harvest them. 32 
Starting in 1943, the War Food Administration augmen-
ted domestic labor resources by importing Mexicans, Jamaicans 
and Barbadians to work in the fields and canneries. Mexicans 
usually worked in the Southwest though some worked as field 
hands on vegetable farms in Will County and near Rochelle. 
Jamaicans and Barbadians, however, detasseled corn, harvested 
peaches and other crops, and worked in canneries. They were 
employed under a contract specifying the dates of their 
employment. However, when the imminent departure of all 
Jamaicans threatened to cause a labor shortage in northern 
Illinois during the corn and lima bean canning season in 
1943, arrangements were made to have some continue working an 
extra week until replacements could be secured. Employers 
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provided food and housing and subsidized transportation 
between their homelands and their jobs in the United states. 
Residents of one community were aroused at first when the 
black Jamaicans were housed in a school gymnasium, but the 
war Food Administration stood its ground and the Jamaicans 
stayed. Wages were the same as paid to American workers, 
but a portion was sent to their home governments and deposi-
ted to their credit in local banks. Sometimes, local labor 
supplies proved sufficient, especially when drought cut farm 
production. The West Indians then found other jobs in 
foundries, ordnance plants, steel mills and other factories. 
Importation of West Indians continued into 1945. Employers 
generally found them good workers. 
hours a week. 33 
Some worked 60 to 80 
Prisoners of war also worked on farms and in canne-
ries, soya plants, corn products refineries and other pro-
cessing plants starting in 1943 and continuing until after 
the war. There were some Italians at first, but most were 
Germans. They always worked under guard. Most were housed 
at military posts such as Camp Grant, and trucked daily to 
their workplace. As a result, the number who could work was 
limited by the number of guards available and also by the 
distance from the camp. Prisoners could not be taken any 
farther than would permit them to be returned daily to the 
prisoner of war camp. As the use of prisoners of war in-
creased, special camps were set up at or near their place of 
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work. Prisoners were paid at the same rate as Americans but 
received only a small portion of their wages and that was in 
script to be used at camp canteens. The rest went to the 
united States Treasury. Prisoners could not have American 
money. They received the same rations as American soldiers. 
They generally performed satisfactory work, though sometimes 
problems occurred. On one occasion, German-speaking farmers 
hired as foremen drove the prisoners at a pace they could 
not maintain in cutting asparagus near Rochelle, and the men 
refused to work. Even after this was resolved by taking 
management out of the fields, the prisoners were still re-
sentful and did not do as well as others near Hoopeston. In 
some cases, prisoners refused to do field work, which they 
considered below their standards and were reassigned to un-
skilled jobs in canneries. Occasionally, local communities 
objected to the presence of prisoners of war, but this was 
uncommon. Some residents were actually more opposed to the 
employment of Japanese-Americans. Arrangements were made 
with unions regarding employment of prisoners of war, but 
only when domestic labor was insufficient. The unions agreed 
not to enroll the prisoners as members. 34 
One means of alleviating labor shortages was mechani-
zation. During the war years, Illinois farmers increased 
their use of farm equipment despite shortages. The trend 
toward mechanization started before the war. Some farms had 
tractors during World War I. By 1940, they were quite com-
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mon. During the thirties, Illinois farmers reequipped their 
farms and when prosperity returned in 1940, they increased 
their purchases. Despite restrictions on materials, 1941 
topped previous records in sales of farm machinery. Many 
bought tractors for the first time, while others bought corn 
pickers and hay tools. The war increased the demand for food 
production and in 1942, farmers estimated their new equip-
ment requirements as 107 percent of 1940 purchases. However, 
with steel in short supply, they could only obtain 40 percent 
of 1940 production and even then they encountered long delays 
in delivery. Ultimately, this led to some crop losses for 
lack of harvesting equipment. In the fall of 1942, the 
Department of Agriculture ordered rationing of farm machinery 
by county committees headed by the chairmen of agricultural 
war boards. There were three classifications of equipment. 
The committees approved the sale of scarce and much needed 
equipment in Group A such as tractors, corn pickers, combines 
and the like if the farmer could not meet production goals by 
repairing, purchasing, renting or exchanging equipment. 
Machinery in Group B could be sold if the farmer certified to 
the dealer that it was necessary to meet farming needs. 
Group C implements included smaller hand operated or horse 
drawn equipment and could be sold without restrictions. 
Later, county quotas were established. Some farmers were 
turned down because their farms were too small to justify 
the equipment. Small farmers could either get bigger farms 
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or join with other small farmers to buy machinery for shared 
use. Many farmers shared their equipment. They also haunted 
auctions and paid premium prices for used or repairable 
implements or even junk that could be used to repair other 
equipment. When ceiling prices were reached in the bidding, 
they drew lots. Some farmers even made their own machinery. 
Federal and state agencies also sponsored classes in repair 
of equipment. More implements began to appear in 1944 as the 
war Production Board eased restrictions. Rationing ended in 
the fall of that year. In spite of restrictions, mechaniza-
tion increased during the war years. Tractors on Illinois 
farms went from 126,069 in 1940 to 174,270 in 1945. One 
result was that by 1944, horses sold cheap and farm hands 
with obsolete skills could not get jobs. 35 
Besides shortages of labor and equipment, farmers had 
to contend with rationing of gasoline, tires, building 
materials, fencing, tools and other supplies. Permits were 
required to buy lumber to build bins and cribs for storage 
of crops. Lack of storage capacity proved a serious problem 
when freight car shortages caused delays in shipping farm 
products to processing plants. Elevators quickly filled to 
capacity, thus forcing farmers to store their crops on their 
farms until it could be marketed. The Commodity Credit Cor-
poration had steel bins at elevators to store surplus commo-
dities, mostly corn and soybeans, and in 1942 sold 50,000 
wooden bins to farmers. still, storage problems persisted 
36 throughout the war. 
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Rural electrification was interrupted by the war. 
Most of northern Illinois was already electrified before the 
war, largely due to pioneering efforts by Commonwealth Edi-
son's Public Service Company of Northern Illinois. Down-
state utilities were more reluctant to build power lines in 
rural areas which they feared would be unprofitable. In some 
southern Illinois counties, less than 10 percent of the farms 
had electricity. The Rural Electrification Administation 
offered low-interest loans to cooperatives to build power 
lines. By July, 1942, Illinois electric cooperatives built 
19,274 miles of line serving 48,247 customers. Electric-
powered equipment performed a variety of farm chores such as 
shelling corn, grinding feed, milking cows and churning 
butter. The defense buildup reduced the supply of copper, 
thus leading to cutbacks in new construction after Pearl 
Harbor. For a time, there were no new extensions, but in 
1943, the War Production Board eased restrictions to allow 
extensions when a farm was near a power line and elec-
trification would aid food production. This led to several 
extensions. By July, 194 6, electric cooperatives in the 
state served 67,000 customers and 59 percent of farms had 
electricity. 37 
Agriculture has always been at the mercy of the wea-
ther and natural pests and the war years were no exception. 
Floods struck in 1943 slowing planting and forcing the re-
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planting of some fields after the waters had receded. The 
following year brought drought in some areas of the state. 
Insect pests such as corn borers and chinch bugs also caused 
38 
crop losses. 
In spite of difficulties with weather, farm prices 
and shortages of labor and equipment, Illinois farmers gene-
rally prospered during the war. They built up bank deposits 
and paid off mortgages. Between 1940 and 1945, farm mart-
gage debt in the state fell over 20 percent and by 1949, it 
was almost halved. Many farmers also bought land. They 
could farm more land with a tractor than they could with a 
horse. Though the number of farms in Illinois fell from 
213,439 in 1940 to 204,239 in 1945, the average size of the 
farm increased from 145 acres to 154 acres. The number of 
large farms also increased while medium-sized farms de-
creased. There were fewer farmers in 1945, but more were 
owners or part owners. There were fewer tenants since many 
tenants became owners. Even farmers who rented all or part 
of their lands increased their holdings. There also was an 
increase of small farms of 10 acres or less. city people 
bought small farms as country homes and for small-scale 
farming to supplement income from their jobs and as an in-
flation hedge. Some city dwellers also bought larger farms 
as and investment in hopes of benef itting from farm prospe-
rity. By 1943, a land boom was underway which continued into 
the postwar years. Land values, which rose gradually from 
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1933 to 1941, jumped almost 50 percent between 1942 and 1945. 
city dwellers bid up the price of land, often paying more 
than it was worth. This raised fears that land values would 
follow the pattern of World War I when they jumped sharply 
between 1912 and 1920, then plunged below the 1912 level 
before finally bottoming out in 1933. The rise in prices 
also made it more difficult for many farmers, both owners and 
tenants, to buy land at reasonable prices. There were no 
price ceilings on land values. Though some farmers saw the 
land boom as a good thing, others disliked the speculation 
and some wanted restrictions on sales to non-farmers. None 
materialized, possibly because most of the land sold still 
went to farmers. 39 
Illinois agriculture during World War II was a mix-
ture of old and new. Agricultural agencies established under 
the New Deal set a precedent for the expansion of government 
power and planning and the manner in which policies were 
implemented. Their decentralized structure, which was echoed 
in special wartime agricultural agencies, placed much of the 
responsibility for carrying out policies in the hands of 
farmers and their local representatives. The war brought an 
expansion of their role and that of farm organizations, and 
a shift from restriction of production to expansion. Farmers 
were encouraged to grow crops essential to the war effort and 
reduce those considered unnecessary. New crops were intro-
duced for the duration while certain existing ones, notably 
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soybeans, gained a new and lasting importance. Some efforts 
to stimulate production of specific crops led to scarcities 
in others that were also needed. Ceilings on farm prices 
combined with shortages of some farm products to produce 
black markets. Meanwhile, farmers had to contend with 
shortages of labor and equipment. In spite of these dif-
ficulties, they managed to feed the nation, the armed forces 
and many of the allied nations. Though the war did not 
produce any major technological breakthroughs, it did 
reinforce trends such as farm mechanization that were already 
underway. It also brought farmers out of the long Depres-
sion, which had started after World War I, into a period of 
prosperity which continued into the postwar era. 
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CHAPTER VII 
PRICE CONTROL, RATIONING AND THE BLACK MARKET 
During the Second World War, the Federal Government 
imposed price and rent control and rationing in an attempt 
to hold down inflation in the wartime economy while achie-
ving an equitable allocation of scarce commodities. While 
these restrictions met with a good deal of success, they were 
unpopular with much of the public. Rising wartime incomes 
increased consumer purchasing power just as cutbacks in 
civilian production created shortages of goods to buy. The 
business community wished to take advantage of the in-
creased demand and wartime shortages and was angered by the 
government's efforts to restrict their profits, while some 
of the public was willing to pay whatever price was demanded 
in order to get what they wanted. Hence, compliance, which 
was fairly good at first, declined as the war went on so that 
violations were skyrocketing by the end of the war. Price 
control and rationing grew out of the Administration's 
efforts to mobilize the economy to support the defense 
buildup. 
Inflation was a serious problem during the First World 
War and one which the Administration hope to avoid if war 
came again. The National Defense Advisory Commission 
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established in the spring of 1940 included Leon Henderson as 
an advisor on price administration. Henderson built a small 
staff, which formed the basis for the Office of Price Admi-
nistration and Civilian Supply, established by President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt on April 11, 1941. In August, Ci-
vilian Supply shifted to the Office of Production Management, 
leaving the Off ice of Price Administration to focus on price 
control. 1 
Meanwhile, the boom in defense spending stimulated 
wage hikes, which in turn tended to raise prices. Increased 
consumer spending resulting from higher earnings intensified 
inflationary pressures. The Office of Price Administration 
relied on persuasion to keep prices down since it had no au-
thority. Many industrial leaders complied voluntarily for 
reasons of self-interest, patriotism and fear of bad publi-
city. By the fall of 1941, these informal controls were 
effectively restraining prices of about 40 percent of the 
wholesale price index components. Henderson and his staff 
purused a policy of selective price control which was loose 
enough to allow some price increases where necessary. Most 
large industrial corporations had an inherent interest in 
price stablity as existing prices were high enough to cover 
costs without creating new competition or adverse publicity. 
They also liked the agency's flexibility on price increases. 
Throughout the war, large industrial corporations and their 
allies in the trade press generally supported price control 
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to hold down inflation. It was the smaller businessman and 
the farmer, who opposed it and the laborer, who wanted prices 
held down, but wages increased. 2 
In July, 1941, the Roosevelt Administration intro-
duced a price control bill in Congress. Two controversial 
issues were the extent of controls and the standards to be 
applied. At first, the Administration wanted to limit con-
trols to key commodities, but it soon decided to seek a 
general price freeze. This created numerous difficulties as 
groups dissatisfied with the representative base period 
sought one more favorable to their interests. Also, exis-
ting legislation prevented any general freeze of farm pri-
ces, which were based on a parity relationship and not pegged 
to any fixed figures. The parity price of farm commodities 
could rise or fall with the fluctuation of other prices, and 
the ceiling on farm prices was based on the parity price. 
Similarly, farm price increases would affect other costs so 
that parity helped stimulate inflation. Farm groups, 
however, opposed any standard other than parity, and in fact 
demanded that farm price ceilings under the proposed legisla-
tion be no lower than 110 percent of prevailing parity 
prices. Farm prices were approaching parity after a long 
depression and farmers and their congressional allies wished 
to see the trend continue. Organized labor was also leery 
of price control legislation, fearing that it would be used 
to restrict wages. Labor leaders advised the President that 
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they would support the bill only if it avoided any mention 
of wage control. After Pearl Harbor, Congress was more re-
ceptive to price control legislation. Labor agreed to a no-
strike pledge and creation of a War Labor Board to settle 
wage disputes, but they still rejected wage controls and li-
mits on wage hikes. Farm groups also continued to insist on 
110 percent of parity. Hence, the final bill passed on Ja-
nuary 28, 1942 had only weak restraints on wages and farm 
prices. Still, the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 did 
provide a base for price and rent control and rationing. 3 
Inflation worsened with consumer prices rising at an 
annual rate of 14 percent. On April 27, the President re-
sponded with a program to combat inflation, including higher 
taxes, bond drives, wage controls, more rationing and the 
General Maximum Price Regulation, which froze the price of 
all consumer products as of March, 1942 and extended rent 
control to many areas. The Office of Price Administration 
promptly declared a price freeze on April 28. However, con-
sumer prices continued to rise, mainly due to uncontrolled 
farm prices and wages. In July, the National War Labor Board 
limited wage increases under its Little Steel formula, but 
labor leaders agreed to accept wage ceilings only if they 
could be assured that the cost of living would not go up any 
further. Farm groups, however, insisted on 110 percent of 
parity protection because rising industrial wages made it 
difficult to attract farm labor and undervalued their own 
efforts. 
298 
Both groups feared that the Administration would 
hold down their own earnings while others' rose. With food 
prices rising and wage hikes threatening, Leon Henderson 
asked the President to seek legislation to stabilize wages 
and farm prices. Roosevelt, wishing to retain labor support, 
wanted to focus on farm prices and rely on an executive 
order. Henderson persuaded him that this would not be 
enough, and the Administration introduced a bill lowering 
farm price ceilings to 100 percent of parity and authorizing 
wage stabilization under the Little Steel formula. Congress 
angrily accused the President of dictatorial policies. 
Finally, after intense pressure from the White House, 
including a threat by the President to take action on his 
own, Congress passed the Stabilization Act of 1942 on October 
2. Roosevelt also established the Office of Economic 
Stabilization to coordinate the policies of the Office of 
Price Administration, the War Labor Board and the Department 
of Agriculture. 4 
Soon after passage of the Stabilization Bill, Hender-
son sought to hold down food prices through payment of sub-
sidies to farmers to provide them with parity incomes without 
raising commodity prices to parity. Farmers condemned this 
policy as wasteful welfare, arguing that they could earn good 
prices in the market. When the Democrats suffered heavy 
losses in the 1942 congressional races, especially in rural 
areas, they blamed the Office of Price Administration and 
its controversial Administrator. 
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Henderson resigned on 
oecember 15 and was replaced by Prentiss Brown, a defeated 
Michigan Senator whose support of the Administration's price 
control policies had cost him his seat. Henderson's forced 
resignation encouraged renewed opposition to his agency's 
policies from congressional conservatives. Congressional 
committees investigated the agency. Small businessmen 
protested its replacement of a general freeze with specific 
product ceiling prices, which threatened profits. Labor 
leaders alarmed at rising consumer prices, threatened to 
seek higher wage increases. Consumers protested the growing 
inconvenience of rationing, which was extended to a variety 
of products by late 1943. They particularly objected to 
gasoline rationing imposed late in 1942. Rural congressmen 
sought legislation to ban subsidies, and in the spring of 
1943, Congress passed such a bill. However, on April 2, 
President Roosevelt vetoed it, arguing that such subsidies 
were needed to maintain wage stabilization. After the veto 
was upheld on April 7, Roosevelt issued a "hold the line" 
executive order directing the Office of Price Administration 
and the War Labor Board not to permit any price or wage 
increases unless permitted by law. The order was implemented 
with new price regulations and rollbacks, subsidies, improved 
retail compliance efforts and wage restraints, all of which 
helped to stabilize prices. 5 
However, the Office of Price Administration's shift 
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to tight price controls instead of more flexible ones brought 
renewed criticism of the agency from conservative congressmen 
and small business groups for its "impractical" and "anti-
business" policies. Many congressmen blamed the agency's 
policies on its economists and lawyers and passed legislation 
requiring that policy be set by people with business ex-
perience. Congressional guerrilla warfare against the agency 
took its toll on Prentiss Brown who resigned in August after 
only nine months on the job. His successor, Chester Bowles, 
was more politically astute and sensitive to public opinion 
and public relations. Bowles appointed businessmen to 
policy-making positions in the agency, established standards 
for adjusting price ceilings to conform to the hold-the-line 
pol icy, and directed the agency's economists to monitor 
conformity to those standards. He also met regularly with 
heads of farm, labor and business groups and increased the 
role of Office of Price Administration advisory committees 
for industry, labor, farmers and consumers. By early 1945, 
the agency had in its national and field offices, 536 
industry advisory committees, 61 agricultural advisory 
committees, 40 consumer advisory committees and 102 labor 
advisory committees. Bowles also strengthened the 5500 War 
Price and Rationing Boards in local communities, which had 
been created in early 1942 to administer local rationing. 
The local boards took a larger role in ensuring compliance 
with the regulations. As a result of these changes in 
301 
procedure and policies, the Office of Price Administration 
became more popular for the duration of the war and opposi-
tion was largely confined to conservatives and business 
. t' 6 organiza ions. 
Immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, the War 
production Board asked the Off ice of Price Administration to 
set up a nation-wide system for rationing tires. The latter 
asked state governors to organize tire rationing boards 
through their councils of defense. Although the Office of 
Price Administration had a field organization, it had no 
state or local units, only regional ones. On December 14, 
Governor Dwight Green named Henry Pope, Jr. state tire 
rationing administrator. By January 5, Pope organized 101 
tire boards. Since he had no staff or even an office, the 
Illinois War Council gave him office space and staff support 
for several weeks. In the spring of 1942, the federal 
government provided a paid clerical staff to assist in sugar 
rationing, and by summer, assumed full responsibility for 
paid personnel, though the state continued financial assis-
tance whenever federal funds were slow in coming. Besides 
tires, other commodities ranging from automobiles and 
gasoline to various food items were also rationed. Pope 
direxcted the rationing program in Illinois until he retired 
in May. He was replaced by carter Jenkins, who stayed with 
the Off ice of Price Administration until it closed its state 
office in 1946. Jenkins had previously served as state 
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coordinator of civilian defense and directed the organization 
of local defense councils. Even after joining the Office of 
price Administration, he continued to attend meetings of the 
Illinois War Council and report on the progress of rationing 
and price control in Illinois. Relations between the two 
agencies were close and relatively free of conflicts that 
often arose between civilian defense organizations and other 
federal agencies. 7 
As was the case of case with other war agencies, the 
Office of Price Administration made the Chicago metropolitan 
area a separate division within the region. The Chicago 
division was headed by John C. Weigel, and later by Raymond 
S. McKeough and finally Rae E. Walters. Michael F. Mulcahy, 
President of the Board of Local Improvements and assistant 
corporation counsel, administered the tire rationing program. 
Since the Chicago District was separated from the rest of the 
state, Mayor Edward J. Kelly had a good deal of influence 
over appointments to major administrative positions. Hence, 
while Weigel was previously an administrative assistant in 
the Illinois Department of Welfare, McKeough was a former 
Chicago congressman and unsuccessful senatorial candidate in 
1942 who made no secret of his ties to the Kelly machine. 8 
In the spring of 1943, the Office of Price Adminis-
tration divided downstate Illinois into four districts with 
offices at Rockford, Peoria, Rock Island-Moline and Spring-
field. In August, 1943, the Rockford office closed and its 
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territory was divided among the Chicago, Rock Island and 
peoria offices. Each district office organized its staff 
into departments on prices, rationing, information and local 
board operation. Each also had its own attorneys and inves-
tigators to assist in enforcement of price control and 
rationing regulations. Advisory committees consisting of 
members of agricultural, labor, consumer and business 
interests counseled the staff. Local boards, hastily 
organized early in 1942, had offices in city halls, post 
off ices, local war council headquarters and a variety of 
other places. Members were local citizens serving as 
volunteers. Many boards started with only two or three 
members, but then grew to twenty or thirty. Members came 
from all sectors of the community. In the fall of 1942, 
certain downstate boards had a total of 800 members, includ-
ing 56 women, 61 union representatives, 64 attorneys, 105 
merchants and 145 farmers. There was some concern that all 
elements of the community be represented. Labor unions and 
blacks, in particular, pressed for representation on the 
boards. In East St. Louis, the board rejected requests from 
labor unions and blacks for representation, arguing that it 
wanted a community-wide rather than group representation. 
In Springield, the board resisted Urban League pressures to 
appoint a black member. In Chicago, after blacks protested 
racial discrimination by the Office of Public Administration, 
Michael Mulcahy, the metropolitan rationing official, 
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announced in June, 1942 that blacks would be appointed to 
rationing boards and hired as clerical help. Although this 
was done, most were segregated in positions in all-black 
neighborhoods. 9 
The Rock Island board was typical of many in its 
organization and operation. Members were divided into price, 
rationing and community service panels with the rationing 
groups divided in turn into three panels-food and shoes, 
transportation, and fuel oil and stoves. The transportation 
panel had sub-panels on gasoline and tires. Members of the 
panel made decisions on the allocation of automobiles, 
gasoline and tires to members of the community. At a typical 
meeting in February, 1945, the transportation panel granted 
a certificate for a used-car to a public-school maintenance 
man; extra gasoline went to a marine on furlough, to a 
teacher whose first ration had been miscalculated, to a woman 
for trips to fire the furnace of her aged mother, to an 
elevator repairman for emergency night calls, to a farm owner 
to supervise repairs and to a family to move to Wisconsin. 
The panel denied several other requests because public 
transportation was available. Applications for extra 
gasoline in cases of illness or death of relatives were 
particularly troublesome due to community pressure. In 
March, 1943, several members of the Logan county War Price 
and Rationing Board resigned when the Office of Price 
Administration District Supervisor objected to the transpor-
305 
tation panel's issuance of emergency gasoline rations to a 
iocal woman so that she could attend her mother's funeral. 
Most returned after a conference with Carter Jenkins of the 
state office of the Office of Price Administration, who 
stated that all such requests were to be denied. Sometimes, 
actions by boards could arouse protests for other reasons. 
The Highland Park Ration Board gave information to the 
village police department on motorists who had obtained 
gasoline ration cards and stamps from the board. The police 
department used the information to track down auto owners 
who had not bothered to obtain a village licnese for their 
cars. Motorists naturally were furious about the board's 
violation of their confidence. Later, it turned out that 
the board had erred: such information was confidential and 
not to be shared. 10 
A constant problem for the local boards was lost 
ration books, though delays in getting new ones and reduc-
tions in coupons in replacement books helped encourage people 
to be more careful. Some local boards were overly generous 
in granting replacements, thereby leading to a local black 
market in ration stamps. Early in 1943, the Office of Price 
Administration relieved the local boards of some of the 
paperwork connected with rationing by shifting it to local 
banks. Under this system, which was first tested in Albany, 
New York, merchants opened ration book accounts for each 
rationed commodity they sold, and deposited all ration 
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coupons collected from customers into these accounts. 
Merchants wishing to replenish their stocks wrote a check 
against their accounts drawing as many ration coupon units 
as they needed. They then delivered these checks to their 
suppliers who deposited them in their own rationing accounts 
to be cleared through the banks the same as money. The 
commercial banks acted as agents of the Office of Price 
Administration and exercised all control over suspected 
forgery, counterfeiting and other fraudulent activities. 11 
Price panels did not appear in Illinois in great num-
bers until June, 1943, when 527 were set up in the seven-
state Chicago region, though some were previously established 
on an experimental basis. At first, their main function was 
to distribute information on price regulations to retailers, 
though they also passed on consumer complaints of violations 
to the district off ice of the Off ice of Price Administration 
or tried to persuade the offending merchants to cease 
noncompliance. Volunteer price panel assistants visited 
stores, informed merchants of price control regulations, 
distributed price lists and checked prices to see that they 
conformed to price ceilings. In the fall of 1943, Chester 
Bowles pushed through a major decentralization of his agency, 
which shifted operational decisions and some staff down to 
the field offices and local boards. In the spring of 1944, 
he initiated a nation-wide check by the boards of retail 
compliance with price ceilings. Since this was well-re-
307 
ceived, he made such surveys a regular part of the boards' 
duties. Later, he also delegated to them the authority to 
negotiate treble-damage civil suits so that they would be 
better able to deal with price violators. By mid-1944, local 
boards were regularly reviewing the compliance of almost 
every retailer in the country. Bowles felt that price 
control and rationing would function better if compliance 
could be secured at the community level. As local bodies, 
the boards were more aware of violations than the Off ice of 
Price Administration's regular enforcement staff and less 
likely to cause resentment in dealing with noncompliance. 
Also, the agency did not have the staff to check out every 
violation, especially since many were of minor importance. 12 
In order to secure compliance, price panels held 
hearings in which they would try to settle disputes with 
local retailers. If unable to secure compliance, they 
referred the cases to the Office of Price Administration. 
In July, 1945, 261 retailers appeared before price panels in 
the Springfield district. Of these, 180 signed compliance 
agreements, 50 agreed to make full refunds to customers 
overcharged and 16 to settle the administrator's claim on 
behalf of the United States Treasury. The panels also 
recommended warnings to 5 retailers and referred 10 cases to 
the district office of the Office of Price Administration. 
Price panels generally were lenient with first offenders who 
were cooperative, but they were tougher on second and third-
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time offenders and those who were defiant as some were. A 
Chicago fruit and vegetable dealer, when confronted with 
charges of ignoring ceiling prices in sales of fruit, 
1aunched into a tirade on the difficulties of business in 
wartime and finally threatened to quit business. Price 
panels represented a cross section of the community. A 
Chicago panel included an insurance agent, a businessman, a 
realtor, a district superintendent of schools and a house-
wife. Ration panels followed similar procedures. When a 
Chicago board found that a local couple had secured gasoline 
ration coupons from sources other than their ration board, 
they revoked the couple's rations and ordered them not to 
use their car. When the couple continued to drive, the board 
turned the case over to the Office of Price Administration, 
which prosecuted and won a court decision confirming the 
local ration board's order. 13 
There was considerable debate over whether price and 
ration panels and consumers should check up on retailers. 
The Illinois War Council refused to recommend that local war 
councils sponsor price-checking activities despite pleas of 
Administrator Carter Jenkins, who hoped that the Womens' 
Activities Committees of the local councils would lead in 
price checking. The State War Council finally passed a 
resolution instructing local councils to do what they thought 
best. One member expressed the hope that retailers and 
consumers could cooperate to avert any policing. He sug-
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gested an educational program, but opposed any efforts by 
the off ice of Price Administration to get women to spy on 
retailers for fear it would split the community wide open. 14 
Some local war councils were controlled by local 
business interests, who opposed price control activities. 
Indeed, some local ration boards objected to price panel 
activities and especially to price panel assistants, usually 
housewives. In Chicago, several ration boards refused to 
accept their assistance in checking prices, claiming that 
the violations they uncovered were minor and the result of 
insufficient knowledge on the part of the merchants. Many 
housewives themselves objected to "snooping" even though they 
felt prices were too high. Conservative critics such as the 
Chicago Tribune spoke of Gestapo tactics. still, others, 
including the editor of the staunchly conservative Bureau 
County Republican, supported these policies, arguing that it 
was necessary for civilians to police each other in wartime 
and for the community to express its disapproval when 
citizens got out of line in the war effort. Eventually, in 
the fall of 1943, the Office of Price Adminstration intro-
duced the Home Front Pledge, under which housewives agreed 
to pay no more than ceiling prices and to exchange ration 
stamps for all commodities they bought. Even so, while 
millions of housewives took the pledge, many were more 
interested in securing scarce commodities than in paying 
lower prices. Gasoline rationing, however, was another 
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matter as consumers were quick to report violators, even 
friends and relatives, to the Office of Price Administra-
• 15 tion. 
Violations of price control took several forms 
depending on the type of commodity. Businessmen often over-
charged, forcing customers to pay overceiling prices. Others 
required payment of extra cash on the side, payment for goods 
not delivered or payment for a higher quality of goods than 
were actually delivered. They might also require customers 
to buy something for which they had no use. Many ignored 
regulations requiring them to keep records for inspection by 
the Off ice of Price Administration. Landlords ignored rent 
restrictions and regulations requiring them to register 
apartments with the agency. All of these violations con-
stituted part of the black market, which also included cattle 
rustlers, racketeers and hijackers trafficking in rationed 
commodities, burglars who stole rationed foods and ration 
coupons to sell, and gangs who counterfeited such coupons. 
Organized crime was heavily involved in the black market, 
taking advantage of shortages of various products as it had 
done with liquor during Prohibition. Indeed, liquor became 
a black market commodity during the war years as higher taxes 
and shortages of some brands sent prices soaring. Chicago 
gangsters resorted to hijackings and thefts from taverns and 
warehouses. 16 
Tire rationing began soon after the United states 
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entered the war. Japanese conquests in the Far East cut off 
much of the supply of crude rubber. Since rubber was needed 
to prosecute the war, civilian supplies had to be curtailed. 
Hence, the need for tire rationing. When rationing began in 
January, 1942, Illinois was given an allotment of 17, 875 
tires and 14, 949 tubes to supply the needs of owners of 
1,aoo,000 autos and 225,000 buses and trucks for that month. 
Later monthly allotments varied but never came close to 
meeting demand. Even before rationing began, there was an 
outbreak of tire thefts. The General Assembly responded by 
making tire theft a felony punishable by a prison term of up 
to ten years. 17 
Most motorists resorted to more legal means of 
obtaining tires. All motor vehicle owners registered with 
their local ration boards and had their vehicles inspected 
by tire rationing officials at inspection stations, usually 
tire distributors. Inspecting officials made recommendations 
to the local ration boards, which issued certificates for 
tires and tubes. Most of those who got tires were physi-
cians, nurses and others whose work was essential to the 
public safety or to the prosecution of the war effort. 
Others had to make existing tires last. Many motorists 
resorted to retreads and recaps, but these too were soon 
rationed. Some motorists simply drove less and used car-
pools to get to work. On November 24, 1942, Peorians staged 
a "carless Tuesday" in which those with odd-numbered license 
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plates left their cars at home and depended on other means 
of getting to work. Many motorists bought bicycles until 
these too were rationed. Businesses dependent on trucks for 
deliveries, including the Chicago Tribune, turned to horse-
drawn vehicles. A Waukegan creamery used wooden tires on 
its horse-drawn vehicles. Another means of conserving tires 
was to reduce speed. In March, 1942, the state imposed a 
forty-mile-an-hour speed limit. Meanwhile, scrap drives 
collected used rubber, which was then deposited at filling 
stations and sent to reclamation plants to help relieve the 
shortage of rubber. 18 
Finally, in the fall of 1942, the Roosevelt Adminis-
tration decided upon nationwide rationing of gasoline as a 
means of saving rubber. Gasoline rationing had started on 
the East Coast where there was a shortage of gasoline and 
fuel oil resulting from sinkings of coastal tankers by German 
submarines. The shortage was essentially a transportation 
problem, but gasoline rationing offered a means of saving 
tires and rubber by forcing people not to drive, therefore 
making tires last longer. The Administration also imposed 
a thirty-five-mile-an-hour speed limit and rationed fuel oil. 
In response to protests by trade organizations, the Office 
of Price Administration made allowance for traveling salesmen 
to receive gas to travel 8600 miles a year. Motorists 
responded to gas rationing by flocking to gas stations and 
filling their tanks. Some hoarded gasoline in drums stored 
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in their homes, only to see it flushed into sewers by local 
firemen, who took a dim view of the potential fire threat 
posed by the stored fuel. Gas rationing brought increased 
use of public transit and ride-sharing pools and a decrease 
in traffic deaths. It also brought hardship for gasoline 
station owners, many of whom closed their doors. This was 
especially true of the smaller stations, which did not offer 
as many services as did larger ones, which could repair cars 
and tires and sell lubricating oils and other accessories. 19 
Gas rationing brought a wide variety of abuses. 
Motorists were supposed to turn in ration coupons when they 
bought gas, but many sped away without doing so. In July, 
1943, the Off ice of Price Administration closed down one 
Chicago filling station for a year after its undercover 
agents bought gasoline at overceiling prices without exchang-
ing coupons and also bought nylon hosiery, another black 
market staple, for a premium price. In the same month, it 
charged 200 other stations with similar violations. Mean-
while, black markets in gasoline and ration couposn developed 
as burglars broke into ration board off ices and stole 
coupons. In Chicago, a policeman assigned to guard the 
coupons was caught peddling them. In southern Illinois, a 
dispute among thieves involved in stealing gasoline ration 
coupons led to a gangland-style slaying of two thugs. 
Bootleggers brought in gasoline from refineries, while other 
criminals siphoned gasoline from parked cars. Counterfeiters 
20 produced bogus coupons. 
314 
Sometimes, efforts by the Office of Price Administra-
tion to enforce compliance with rationing became controver-
sial. In June, 1943, its agents stopped Chicago motorists, 
who had driven to Wisconsin. on June 19, more than 50 
automobiles with Illinois licenses were stopped in Fond du 
r,ac, a city about 150 miles from Chicago, by city policemen 
working under the direction of the agency's field inspectors. 
The Fond du Lac War Price and Rationing Board sat in session 
all day to conduct an investigation and impose penalties. 
The motorists had to explain how they got enough gasoline to 
come that far. Most were able to show that they had done 
nothing illegal and were allowed to proceed, but seven were 
found guilty of illegal possession of gasoline and saw their 
gasoline and coupons confiscated and rationing privileges 
suspended for some time. The episode raised questions about 
the legality of the agency's actions. Critics accused the 
agency of conducting illegal searches and seizures. Un-
deterred, the Office of Price Administration made plans to 
stop more out-of-state motorists in Green Bay on the Fourth 
of July weekend, but dropped them when Wisconsin Governor 
Walter s. Goodland refused to allow police cooperation. The 
agency resorted to stationing agents near resorts to copy 
down license plates of out-of-state drivers and turn them 
over to the drivers' own ration boards. This brought more 
protests when 417 Chicago-area drivers were caught driving 
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in adjacent states. Most were either on business or on short 
vacations, and the latter included many war workers who had 
saved gas for weeks in order to take a vacation. The agency 
backed down amid renewed public criticism. 21 
Meat and other food items presented special problems 
in price control and rationing since food prices depended on 
farm prices, which were uncontrolled at first. Despite large 
increases in farm production, shortages appeared, partly due 
to substantial government purchases of foodstuffs to supply 
the armed forces and the Allies. At the same time, consumers 
who now had good paying jobs in war plants, were increasing 
purchases of food items, especially meat. All of these 
factors sent prices soaring and made rationing inevitable. 22 
The most serious problems developed with meat and 
covered every step in meat production. In September, 1942, 
the Office of Price Administration put the entire meat 
industry under license and limited the amount that could be 
sold for civilian consumption. Later, it imposed ceiling 
prices on farm production. However, some farmers sold their 
livestock at overceiling prices to packers and slaughterers, 
who willingly paid these prices to get the meat. Packers 
) 
passed on the overcharges to wholesalers and to retailers, 
who in turn passed them on to consumers. Wholesalers selling 
to retailers required their customers to make side payments 
of extra cash and to purchase items such as sausage, clean-
sers and other items the customers did not want. The Office 
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of Price Administration did make some progress in stopping 
the upgrading of inferior meat by packers, but the practice 
continued among retailers. Consumers themselves hoarded meat 
in locker plants while other consumers could not get meat at 
all. Eventually, federal officials found it necessary to 
seize meat in locker plants and distribute it. The Office 
of Price Administration required slaughterers to register 
with the agency and assigned quotas to each slaughterer. 
Many, however, ignored these regulations and slaughtered well 
above their quotas. Packers shifted meat to markets command-
ing the highest prices. Thus, meat intended for Chicago 
often went to the East Coast. One of the most serious 
problems existed in poultry. Consumers themselves often 
bought directly from the farmer and paid premium prices. 
Despite vigorous efforts by the Office of Price Administra-
tion, price controls on poultry soon broke down. 23 
Criminal elements, including the remnants of Al 
Capone's old gang, got involved in the black market in meat 
and other foodstuffs, buying livestock from farmers, slaught-
ering it and selling it to butchers. In some cases, they 
intimidated butchers into accepting it. Some criminals 
secured control of small packing houses in various Midwestern 
states. In April, 1943, the federal government indicted 
Peter Golas and several others in a conspiracy to move ten 
million pounds of black market meat from the Midwest to the 
East Coast. The scheme involved seven firms in the Midwest 
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and New Jersey. Until the fall of 1942, Golas was simply a 
small-time meat. peddler in the Fulton Street Market on 
Chicago's West Side. Golas was eventually convicted and 
sentenced to prison. While the illegal operators usually 
bought livestock from the farmers, they also resorted to 
cattle rustling, stalking the animals they wanted, shooting 
them, dressing them on the spot and hauling them away in 
trucks. Sometimes, they were caught in the act and gunfights 
ensued. Black market slaughterhouse facilities were often 
unsanitary, thus posing a health hazard. 24 
Rent control was a response to housing shortages, 
which developed as job-seekers crowded into areas where there 
were heavy concentrations of new defense industries. The 
same problems arose where new military posts were established 
and old ones were reactivated and expanded. In Rockford, a 
city with several defense industries as well as a major Army 
post (Camp Grant), migrants moved into trailers, old street-
cars, garages and other structures. Similar conditions 
prevailed elsewhere. Meanwhile, rents soared as landlords 
took advantage of the situation. In some communities, 
including Chicago, local real estate interests sought to keep 
down rents through community pressure. Such efforts were 
generally inadequate. At first, the federal government could 
do little except keep tabs on the situation. However, the 
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 provided for rent 
control, and in April, the Office of Price Administration 
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established defense rental areas in certain counties in the 
state, including those in the Chicago area. Landlords could 
not raise rents above what they were on March 1, 1942. 25 
Landlords naturally objected to rent control and many 
tried various means of getting around it. One method was to 
require the tenant to buy furniture in an apartment. Other 
landlords charged for the use of appliances. Others cut off 
the heat or removed appliances if tenants refused to pay 
higher rents. Many, of course, willingly paid higher rents 
in order to get living quarters. Some landlords considered 
rent control illegal, and when an Indiana federal judge ruled 
it unconstitutional, Office of Price Administration offices 
in several communities were flooded with phone calls from 
landlords notifying the agency that they would no longer 
comply. Though the ruling was eventually overturned by the 
Supreme Court, the agency was hard pressed for a time to 
ensure compliance. Other landlords simply defied the 
government. A Rantoul landlady was locally notorious for 
her refusal to comply with rent control regulations. Her 
arrest and conviction, however, quickly prompted others to 
comply with the law. Many landlords also took advantage of 
the emergency to discriminate against some classes of 
tenants. Many refused to rent to soldiers and their fami-
lies. Couples with children frequently found it difficult 
to obtain housing. One landlord forced a young couple living 
near Chanute Field to move a month before their baby was 
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born. Many tenants resorted to buying property in order to 
get living quarters free of eviction. However, this some-
times led to schemes in which homeseekers were tricked into 
buying empty lots. Real estate firms selling the lots 
promised to build homes on these lots even though housing 
construction required a government priority for building 
materials, which the firms did not have. 26 
Although the war sharply curtailed most residential 
construction, some new homes were built. Private developers 
built new houses around aircraft engine factories and other 
defense plants. Many of the homes were small "defense" homes 
or "war" homes constructed primarily for employees of these 
defense plants. They were cheaply built, often prefabricated 
for quick construction. Some established neighborhoods 
objected to them for fear that they would lower property 
values. In March, 1942, the Chicago City Council reformed 
the city's building regulations to permit the construction 
of such homes, but limited them to outlying areas where they 
would not disturb existing property values. All housing 
construction required priori ties from the War Production 
Board for building materials. In 1942, the agency estab-
lished quotas limiting the number of new homes to be con-
structed. To further alleviate the need for housing, the 
Home Owners Loan Corporation leased private homes and even 
commercial structures and subdivided them into flats for war 
workers. Private owners also were granted priorities. to make 
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similar conversions of attics and other spare rooms. 27 
In some communities, public housing supplemented 
private efforts. Prior to the war, the City of Chicago 
embarked on a program of slum clearance and construction of 
public housing. While wartime restrictions on residential 
construction curtailed the program, some projects were built 
to house war workers and military personnel. Naval noncom-
missioned officers lived in the Frances Cabrini Hornes while 
stationed at Navy Pier. After the war, these projects became 
low-rent housing for low-income families. Similar housing 
was constructed in other Illinois cities. In some com-
munities, such as Seneca, Illinois, war workers lived in 
temporary war housing projects and trailer camps. Unlike 
private housing, public housing was not subject to rent 
control. This led to some embarrassment for the Office of 
Price Administration when federal housing projects raised 
rents even as the agency was holding down rents charged by 
private landlords. In Joliet, this led to a long campaign 
by the mayor and others to cut rents at a federal housing 
project. Finally, the Office of Price Administration managed 
to negotiate substantial reductions in rents at the project. 28 
Attitudes toward price and rent controls and ration-
ing varied immensely even within the business community. 
The larger companies, especially industrial firms, generally 
supported these controls, fearing the effects of inflation 
on their own costs. A plant manager in a Woodstock "factory 
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advised a rent control official that every manufacturer in 
McHenry County supported rent control. His company even 
offered to underwrite any advertising to get the message 
across in the county. Editorials in trade journals general-
ly supported price controls to fight inflation, though 
criticizing some policies. Most of the opposition to 
controls came from retailers and landlords, though even then, 
the record was mixed. In Springfield, businessmen cooperated 
with local Office of Price Administration officials in 
setting up a model store to demonstrate the proper means of 
posting prices and also set up a window display at a local 
business to educate consumers on price control. Still, 
retailers complained of problems. Though they tried to keep 
prices down for fear of inflation, many found th ems elves 
caught between rising wholesale prices and the ceilings fixed 
by the Off ice of Price Administration and wished to pass on 
extra costs to their customers. Some owners of downstate 
cafes, who were denied price adjustments, threatened to quit 
serving meals. Many retailers also complained of excessive 
record-keeping required under price control and rationing. 
Rationing itself brought scarcities of some items and even 
forced some shops to close. Gas rationing, however, helped 
many merchants, especially those in smaller communities by 
forcing people to shop closer to home. Many small retailers 
regained business previously lost to chain stores. Most 
merchants generally cooperated with price control, but there 
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was a significant amount of cheating, particularly in certain 
trades. Meat merchants often violated price and rationing 
regulations. A 1946 study by the American Meat Institute 
found 91 percent of meat merchants in Chicago to be in 
violation. Similar problems prevailed in produce and other 
trades. Most of those who were caught had to pay fin es. The 
Office of Price Administration gnerally was lenient with 
first offenders. For others, the agency generally sought 
treble damages, but usually had to settle for a lesser 
amount. Occasionally, a flagrant violator drew a prison 
sentence, but this was uncommon. 29 
The public, of course, was another matter. Labor 
unions supported price controls and demanded greater enforce-
ment. By 1943, they were citing price increases for food-
stuffs to justify their demands for substantial wage in-
creases. While many businessmen felt that the controls were 
excessive, labor leaders felt they were inadequate. Certain-
ly, much of the public supported price control. Hence, the 
Office of Price Administration was able to enlist housewives 
to monitor prices. Many Illinoisans also resorted to raising 
Victory Gardens to supply their need for fresh fruit and 
vegetables. Communities encouraged these efforts with 
canning centers for the use of the gardeners. Victory 
Gardens increased the supply of foodstuffs and helped 
alleviate shortages caused by rationing. Still, not everyone 
could raise a garden, and some needs, such as meat, could not 
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easily be met through private efforts. At the same time, the 
rise in personal incomes generated increased consumer 
spending power, but there were fewer goods to buy. Many 
consumers resorted to the black market, usually by paying 
their retailer a little extra or by buying directly from 
farmers. Many also resorted to eating out at restaurants. 
some, of course, had a more difficult time making up for 
deficiencies due to rationing. Hence, in the summer of 1945, 
10,000 coal miners in southern Illinois struck in protest 
against inadequate meat rations. 30 
Overall, price control and rationing was moderately 
successful in holding down inflation and distributing scarce 
goods on an equitable basis. Official government statistics 
show that retail prices of living essentials rose 31.1 
percent between August, 1939 and August, 1945 with most of 
the increase prior to the introduction of price control. 
Prices rose only 11.1 percent between May, 1942 and August, 
1945 and only 3 percent after May, 1943. The chief diffi-
culty with these statistics is that there is no good way of 
ascertaining how many consumers patronized the black market 
or how many retailers engaged in black market practices or 
the extent to which this activity affected prices that 
consumers actually paid. Those who traded on the black 
market were unlikely to confess their misdeeds to government 
statisticians. Still, given the fact that prices were 
restricted, any overcharges or extra payments had to start 
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with a restricted price base. Even on the black market, many 
consumers probably paid less than they would have if prices 
were left uncontrolled and inflation allowed to rise un-
checked as it did after controls ended in 1946. Rationing 
provoked a good deal of grumbling, but it put everyone on 
the same level. A Woodford County woman recalled that during 
the First World War, her family had been unable to buy sugar 
at all because of the price, while neighbors had a bag for 
which they had paid a high price. During the Second World 
war, sugar was rationed and its price restricted, but every 
family got its share at an affordable price. So it was with 
other commodities. This was the chief success of price 
control and rationing. 31 
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CHAPTER VIII 
RECONVERSION 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt died on April 12, 
1945 as the Allied armies swept across Europe. A month la-
ter, the war was over in Europe and on August 15, the end 
came for the Pacific conflict. As elsewhere in the nation, 
the end of the war brought wild rejoicing in communities all 
over Illinois. It also brought dramatic changes in the eco-
nomy and society. War industries shut down or converted to 
civilian production. Price controls, rationing and other 
restrictions were eased and then lifted entirely. There were 
temporary dislocations as war workers sought peacetime jobs. 
Unions struck to secure wage increases and benefits denied 
them and their members during the war. It was a period of 
uncertainty as the economy and society adjusted to new 
conditions. 1 
The civilian defense program was the first casualty 
of reconversion. Early in 1944, the Army discontinued its 
early warning system. Soon afterward, on March 31, Chicago's 
Advance Air Raid Warning System ceased operations. In May, 
the Citizens's Defense Corps was placed in reserve and 
regional offices of the Office of Civilian Defense closed. 
In May, 1945, President Harry S. Truman, Roosevelt's succes-
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sor, abolished the Office of Civilian Defense. Illinois 
Governor Dwight Green promptly put the Illinois War Council 
on a voluntary basis and ceased state appropriations for its 
operations. In June, the state council and local war coun-
cils disbanded. In Chicago, however, Mayor Edward Joseph 
Kelly argued that there was still a need for the program to 
regulate troop movements and handle salvage campaigns, bond 
drives and other activities. He also wanted to keep his 
supporters on the payroll. When the federal program ceased 
at the end of June, he continued the Chicago office as the 
Chicago War Service corps until September. 2 
During the summer of 1945, war industries started 
shutting down. By the end of May, the shipyard at Seneca, 
which employed 10,900 at its peak, was down to 3400 employ-
ees and they were soon to leave. The last landing ship tank 
(LST) was launched on June 8. Two weeks later, the completed 
vessel left the outfitting dock and started downriver. The 
remaining workers soon left town and Seneca returned to a 
quieter pace, albeit with several improvements resulting from 
the war-boom. In August, the ordnance plants started 
shutting down. on August 31, the Green River Ordnance Plant 
near Amboy ceased operations. On the same day, the Dodge-
Chicago factory turned out its last B-29 engine. The other 
aircraft and engine plants in the city also shut down, ending 
the city's dreams of becoming a major aircraft manufacturing 
center. Many of the closed factories were put to new uses. 
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International Harvester bought the Buick engine plant in 
Melrose Park to manufacture diesel engines and a new type of 
large crawler tractor, while Western Electric acquired the 
Studebaker engine plant in Chicago. The Dodge-Chicago 
complex was taken over by the Preston Tucker Corporation for 
an ill-fated attempt to manufacture automobiles. Later, it 
became Ford City, a combined industrial district and shopping 
center. The city of Chicago acquired the Douglas plant and 
used its airfield facilities as the basis of a new airport, 
O'Hare Field. Several companies moved into buildings used 
by the Crab Orchard Ordnance Plant. Reynolds Metals bought 
a government-built aluminum rolling mill in McCook operated 
during the war by the Aluminum Company of America. Many 
other companies bought government-financed mills and fac-
tories which they had operated during the war. 3 
Conversion to civilian production started as priori-
ties eased. In May, 1945, the War Production Board lifted 
130,000 orders prohibiting the use of materials for civilian 
goods and permitted the manufacture of some scarce and ur-
gently needed consumer products, including appliances. The 
lifting of restrictions did not lead to a sudden increase in 
civilian goods as materials were still in short supply, es-
pecially metals. Nevertheless, in June, the Electric House-
hold Utilities Company started making electric ironers at a 
Chicago factory and in July, resumed the manufacture of 
washing machines at its Bloomington plant. Other industries 
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started partial reconversion. A Bloomington firm continued 
to fill war contracts while making oil heaters for civilian 
use. In August, the end of the war led the War Production 
Board to lift most of the remaining controls on industry. 
The Board itself was replaced by the Civilian Production 
Board in November. Other restrictions were also lifted in 
August, though others remained. The Office of Price Admin-
istration ended rationing of many consumer items, including 
gasoline, but price controls continued. The Office of De-
fense Transportation lifted some restrictions on commercial 
freight traffic while the War Manpower Commission removed 
all controls on the free movement of labor. 4 
Meanwhile, the armed forces cancelled billions of 
dollars in contracts. By August, only half as many people 
worked in war plants around the country as in May. Most 
remaining contracts were cancelled with the end of the war 
in the Pacific. On August 15, over $2 billion in contracts 
with Chicago-area plants were terminated. On the next day, 
the Air Force eliminated another $4 billion in contracts with 
Chicago-area industries. Thousands of workers were laid off 
on short notice. Still, Chicago and other Illinois com-
munities probably suffered less than other parts of the the 
country since the Middle West was in a better position to 
reconvert to peacetime production. Many Illinois industries 
were food processors, which had no conversion problems. They 
could simply sell to consumers instead of the armed forces. 
The same situation prevailed with the steel mills. 
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Other 
Illinois firms produced consumer products and capital goods, 
which were in high demand. Many companies, such as Pullman-
standard, already had large backlogs of orders and were soon 
in search of workers to help fill them. By October, Interna-
tional Harvester's Chicago Tractor Works was in full produc-
tion making tractors for civilian use. The company soon 
introduced a new small Farmall tractor as well as a giant 18-
ton 180 horsepower crawler tractor. The Electro-Motive 
di vision of General Motors converted from production of 
diesel engines for naval vessels to diesel locomotives. Ekco 
Products Company of Chicago resumed production of kitchen 
utensils. Shortages of materials and labor plagued many 
industries at first. Uncertainty over price ceilings 
hindered the supply of some commodities and parts, while many 
workers chose to draw unemployment checks rather than take 
jobs that paid less than they had been making. Strikes also 
held up production. By 1947, however, materials shortages 
and labor problems were alleviated and factories were able 
to fill their huge backlogs of orders. 5 
The war increased the size and number of industries 
operating in Illinois. In 1939, there were 11,983 manufac-
turing establishments in the state. By 194 7, there were 
15,988. Some plants closed during the war, but others rose 
to take their place. Many firms, large and small, increased 
in size during the war. Though some small and medium-sized 
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firm reverted to their prewar status after the war, others 
emerged as major participants in the postwar industrial 
world. There also was a significant shift in the relative 
status of different types of industries operating in the 
state as heavy industry grew in proportion to food, clothing 
and printing. In 1939, iron and steel and machinery repre-
sented 37.7 percent of employment in the Chicago area. In 
1948, it comprised 44.6 percent. Reconversion was a new 
start for the state's industries. Many firms introduced new 
products and entered new markets. International Harvester 
and others promoted freer foreign trade. There were new 
industries in light metals, plastics and other commodities. 
Though at first, some feared a Depression, they soon found 
themselves hard pressed to keep up with the pent-up demand 
unleashed by the end of the war. Though there was a mild 
recession in the winter of 1948-1949, in general, the level 
of business activity in the state remained above the prewar 
level. 6 
Farmers prospered during the postwar years. Though 
price controls continued until late 1946, so did price sup-
ports. The latter proved unnecessary for a time as prices 
for corn, soybeans, wheat and other commodities soared in 
1946 and 1947. Shortages of corn persisted in 1946, leading 
terminals to offer premiums to get it, including nylons, 
whiskey, automobiles and tractors. Many farmers responded 
to rising farm prices by increasing production, especially 
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in corn and soybeans, the chief postwar crops. Production 
levels for these crops in the late forties far surpassed 
wartime peaks. Falling prices in 1948 led to demands that 
90 percent of parity price supports be continued beyond 1950. 
In 1949, Congress extended them to 1952. Acreage controls 
were restored in 1950. Meanwhile, the War Food Administra-
tion ended in 1945 and the Department of Agriculture con-
solidated some of its agencies, including the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration, into the Production and Marketing 
Administration. The new agency had state and county commit-
tees much like the old Department of Agriculture state and 
county boards. 
trols. 7 
These committees handled the acreage con-
Rising farm prices contributed to a rise in land 
values during and after the war. Though the total number of 
farms decreased, the average size increased as farmers added 
to their acreage. There were fewer medium-sized farms and 
more large ones, most of them owned by the farmer. Mechani-
zation, which continued in the postwar era, was a major fac-
tor in the increase in farm size. Farmers could work more 
land with a tractor than with a horse. Mechanization also 
reduced the need for farm labor, which continued in short 
supply during the postwar years. Returning servicemen re-
fused to accept farm work, preferring higher paid industrial 
labor. Young men growing up on farms, who in the past would 
have taken jobs as hired hands, now preferred to drive their 
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cars over new farm-to-market roads to jobs in town. Farmers 
themselves preferred to replace men with machines. 8 
One major change in rural life during the war and af-
ter was the rapid decline of the one-room schoolhouse. The 
movement for consolidation of school districts started many 
years earlier, but the war greatly accelerated it. One-room 
schoolhouses generally had poor facilities, poorly-paid tea-
chers and low attendance. Many lacked water or even outhou-
ses. During the war, the draft and war industries drained 
off teachers forcing schools to close at the rate of 1000 a 
year and leading the affected districts to send their stu-
dents to larger schools in other districts. The trend con-
tinued after the war. In 1945, the General Assembly set 
minimum salary levels for teachers. Later, it authorized 
construction of new rural roads. Still, many farmers resis-
ted the the demise of one-room schools, partly because of 
higher taxes and partly out of fear of loss of local con-
trol. Some also objected for reasons of nostalgia, espe-
cially in the case of high schools. Country schools served 
as community centers and local high school bands were a 
source of community pride. Nonetheless, between 1942 and 
1948, the number of school districts in Illinois was almost 
halved as consolidated schools replaced one-room schools and 
the smaller high schools. 9 
Unlike most wartime restrictions, price controls con-
tinued after the cessation of hostilities. The Office of 
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Price Administration foresaw that the growth of consumer 
savings during the war and pent-up demand for goods would 
create serious inflationary pressure until industry could 
produce sufficient goods to satisfy demand. To facilitate 
reconversion, the agency developed special price ceilings 
for appliances and other durable goods that had been out of 
production during the war. However, the ceilings provided 
only modest increases over prewar prices. This brought 
protests from small companies, which found them too low. At 
the same time, the Truman Administration relaxed most other 
restrictions on the economy, including wage controls. This 
left the Off ice of Price Administration to carry the burden 
of fighting inflation. 10 
The Truman Administration tried to continue the war 
Labor Board, but both management and labor wished to escape 
wartime restrictions and take their chances with collective 
bargaining. The National Labor-Management Conference held 
in November failed to reach any agreement on a replacement 
for the War Labor Board, which ceased operations at the end 
of the year. Meanwhile, a wave of postwar strikes hit seve-
ral industries, including steel, as workers sought wage hikes 
to offset the loss of overtime pay as well as adjust for 
wartime increases in the cost of living. The Office of Price 
Administration argued that industry could pay moderately 
higher wages without raising prices, but major corporations 
argued that they could not raise wages without increasing 
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prices. In February, 1946, President Truman, concerned about 
the lagging pace of reconversion, gave in to the steel 
companies and ended a steel strike by approving a substantial 
wage increase and a compensating increase in steel price 
ceilings. Chester Bowles, head of the Office of Price 
Administration, immediately resigned in protest. Some other 
wage disputes were settled along similar lines. The Office 
of Price Administration became increasingly unpopular as 
large corporations sought looser controls and smaller firms 
demanded an end to the program. Farmers also pushed decon-
trol. In June, Congress passed a bill substantially weaken-
ing price control. Though Truman vetoed the bill and coaxed 
Congress into passing a slightly better one, price control 
was doomed. Livestock ranchers withheld cattle and hogs when 
meat ceilings were reimposed in September. Meat disappeared 
from stores. The public blamed the shortage on the Office 
of Price Administration. Truman finally gave up and ended 
meat controls in October, then abolished the Office of Price 
Adminstration following the November election. Consumer 
prices shot up by 9.4 percent in the next twelve months and 
continued to rise until 1948. Rising prices, in turn, 
encouraged further strikes. 11 
The postwar years also brought resolution of an issue 
that had troubled many labor leaders for years, especially 
in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). For some 
years, known or suspected Communists had participated in 
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union activities. They were hard workers, and some rose 
through the ranks to head locals and sometimes even entire 
unions. The militant CIO, in particular, attracted Com-
munists and other radicals. CIO unions in several indus-
tries, including steel, farm equipment, automobiles and 
electrical equipment, welcomed the leftists into their ranks 
and utilized their services in building the union. During 
the thirties, the class warfare tactics of the Communist 
organizers proved effective, especially when dealing with 
conservative anti-union companies, which resorted to heavy-
handed methods to keep out unions. By the late forties, 
however, it was a different world. Most companies accepted 
unions and were willing to bargain collectively. Many unions 
themselves, such as the United Steelworkers of America, 
wished to preserve their gains and build on them. The 
militant tactics of unions perceived to be Communist-led 
seemed to threaten these gains. The radical unions, such as 
the United Electrical and Radio and Machine Workers of 
America and the United Farm Equipment Workers of America, 
also maintained ties to the Communist Party and supported 
Soviet foreign policy in their union newspapers. The CIO, 
fearing that the radicals would try to takeover the whole 
union movement, determined to rid itself of all members and 
unions it considered Marxist. 12 
Before and during the war, there were periodic out-
bursts of red-baiting as union dissidents accused their ad-
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versaries of being Communists when resisting union efforts 
to expel them. In 1944 and 1945, such dissidents in Chicago 
were often represented by William J. Grace, an attorney and 
head of The Citizens USA Committee, a right-wing extremist 
organization. Rival unions also made such charges. A far 
more serious challenge to labor radicals arose when a feud 
developed between the United Auto Workers and the Farm 
Equipment Workers. As early as 1939, the United Auto Workers 
protested the employment of an extreme left-winger by the 
Farm Equipment Workers union. In 1940, the CIO tried to 
merge the two, but the Farm Equipment Workers balked at a 
demand by the rival to fire two leftist organizers. The two 
unions made agreements from time to time about organizing 
plants, but they always broke down and the Auto Workers 
resorted to recurrent raids on Farm Equipment locals seeking 
to convince the members to defect to the United Auto Workers. 
Some leaders of farm equipment locals joined the rival union 
and tried to take their locals with them, but without 
success. Early in 1945, the CIO again tried to merge the two 
unions, but the Farm Equipment Workers demurred and were 
upheld by their members. The United Auto Workers then raided 
Farm Equipment locals, claiming that the union was doomed and 
that the Auto Workers were rescuing the members. The latter, 
however, did not wish to be rescued and fights broke out. 13 
Between 1945 and 1953, the Auto Workers made several 
rounds of raids on the Farm Equipment Workers locals, most 
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of them unsuccessful. In 1947, the Farm Equipment Workers 
reversed its anti-merger position in order to strengthen 
forces within the United Auto Workers who opposed Walter 
Reuther, a firm anti-Communist who had won control of the 
union, but still faced a hostile Executive Board. Reuther, 
however, opposed the merger and took it to the membership, 
who rejected it. Then after he strengthened his control of 
his union in 1948, Reuther again reversed his position and 
sought a merger. In 1949, the CIO expelled the Farm Equip-
ment Workers union when it refused a CIO order to merge with 
the United Auto Workers union. The Farm Equipment Workers 
then merged with the United Electrical Workers union, which 
was expelled from the CIO on grounds of Communist domination. 
Several other unions and union leaders were also expelled in 
1949 and 1950. All were given the right of appeal to a set 
of special panels, all of which were really kangaroo courts, 
whose decisions were preordained. The accused could then 
appeal to the CIO Executive Board, but those who did, lost 
that appeal, too. The CIO then launched rival unions to raid 
those it had expelled. 14 
The feud between the Farm Equipment Workers and the 
United Auto Workers strongly influenced postwar strikes in 
the farm equipment industry, especially at International 
Harvester. Both organized new plants, but the feud preven-
ted them from presenting a united front. Even when they 
tried to engage in joint negotiations with John Deere, the 
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company refused. Farm equipment companies played off both 
unions against each other. While one was on strike, the 
other generally was working. Each union tried to outdo the 
other in securing gains for its members. Both unions lost 
maintenance of membership for which they had fought hard 
during the war, but the Farm Equipment Workers generally 
gained more than the United Auto Workers in the early post-
war years. 15 
However, in 1950, International Harvester decided to 
rid itself of the hated Farm Equipment union, which it con-
sidered Communist-dominated. In August of that year, the 
company entered into a contract with the Farm Equipment 
union, but then withdrew it, citing wildcat strikes when the 
United Auto Workers went on strike. The Farm Equipment Wor-
kers promptly walked out in response to what they considered 
a brazen double-cross. They continued on strike until mid-
September and won a wage hike and a two-year contract, but 
the United Auto Workers stayed out until November and scored 
even greater gains, including a five-year contract. The 
company sought to weaken the Farm Equipment Workers union in 
favor of the United Auto Workers. Leaders of the Farm 
Equipment union sought to win a better deal for their mem-
bers in 1952. However, the strike, which broke out in Au-
gust, came at a very bad time. The House Un-American Acti-
vities Committee was investigating Communist involvement in 
unions, including the Farm Equipment Workers and its parent, 
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the United Electrical Workers, which had sought to prevent 
the strike. With fears of Communism sweeping the nation, 
many members began to doubt their leadership and returned to 
work. By early September, 800 went back. The company then 
launched an all-out effort to break the strike, sending 
supervisory personnel to talk to strikers in their homes. 
By early October, 2000 were back on the job. The United 
Electrical Workers finally persuaded the Farm Equipment 
Workers to give up the strike in November. The settlement 
was a deathblow to the union. Not only did it bring conces-
sions, which amounted to a substantial wage cut, but it 
required members to sign special stipulations for dues 
checkoff. Only 50 percent signed, eventually crippling the 
union financially. stewards handling grievances no longer 
were paid, thus crippling the union's grievance procedure. 
The union leader, Gerald Fielde, soon lost heart and disap-
peared from the union's activities altogether. 16 
Between 1952 and 1955, all Farm Equipment locals de-
fected to the United Auto Workers, and the Farm Equipment 
union disappeared. If International Harvester expected that 
this would end labor militance, it was soon disappointed. 
The Auto Workers pressured the company on grievances (a ma-
jor reason for company hatred for the Farm Equipment Wor-
kers) and finally staged a bitter strike in 1958, which led 
to a long-term agreement on grievance procedures. The 1959 
settlement brought the company a measure of labor peace, but 
one which was costly. 
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Its terms, which included abolition 
of mandatory overtime, ultimately made the company less com-
petitive and led to the long strike and corporate reorgani-
zation of the eighties. In retrospect, the Farm Equipment 
Workers were probably not much more militant than their ri-
val. Though the union staged more strikes, they were usual-
ly of short duration. The Auto Workers had fewer strikes, 
but longer ones. While the Farm Equipment Workers union was 
much more militant and uncompromising in its rhetoric, in 
practice, the union compromised like any other union. In-
deed, both unions were militant primarily because of the po-
licies of the companies they had to deal with, especially 
International Harvester. 17 
Other long-term labor disputes were also resolved at 
the end of the war. Montgomery Ward was returned to its 
owners in October, 1945. The Hummer plant in Springfield 
was returned in July. As soon as the company regained con-
trol, it discontinued maintenance of membership and dues 
checkoff provisions of the War Labor Board-imposed union 
contract. The union protested and threatened a strike, but 
soon withdrew demands for retention of these provisions in 
a new contract. The company also rejected some other provi-
sions of the old contract, but retained the Army-imposed pay 
increases. In the fall, the union did stage a demonstration 
strike, but with only spotty results, though the company did 
increase wages. Accounts differed as to the effectiveness 
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of the walkout, though some other unions did refuse to cross 
picket lines, thus hindering the company in shipment of mer-
chandise. In general, though, Sewell Avery beat the union. 
The end of the Army takeover left the union in the same po-
sition as it was earlier, though its members profited from 
Army-imposed pay raises. Still, the whole affair of company 
defiance of the War Labor Board hurt its prestige since 
Sewell Avery received the same kind of public abuse thrown 
at John L. Lewis for his defiance of the War Labor Board and 
its predecessor. 18 
Though Sewell Avery won his battle with the union, he 
did not do so well against his competitors in business, and 
for this he himself was to blame. Sewell Avery, like many 
other businessmen, feared a postwar depression, but while 
others soon realized that the economy was expanding rather 
than contracting, Sewell Avery continued his policy of cau-
tion. While Sears made plans for postwar expansion of re-
tail stores, Montgomery Ward hung on to its cash. The com-
pany did open some catalog outlets in communities lacking 
Ward stores, but other improvements were restricted and 
stores grew dowdy. Sales declined and many executives left 
rather than put up with Avery's dictatorial policies. Not 
until Avery resigned in 1955 did the company, under new 
leadership, start spending its huge cash horde. In 1957, 
the store built its first new store since 1941 to replace a 
burned out downtown store in Portsmouth, Ohio. Further new 
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stores were built in suburban shopping centers. 19 
President Truman also ended the federal takeover and 
operation of the Toledo, Peoria and Western Railroad in the 
fall of 1945, despite union protests over its return to its 
owner, George P. McNear. McNear, himself, refused to deal 
with the brotherhoods and insisted on returning to the work 
rules and pay scales he had imposed in December, 1941, thus 
prompting the 1942 strike and federal takeover. He also 
pledged to rehire some of his old employees, except for 24 
men who had engaged in violence during the 1942 strike, 17 
of whom had been cleared of convictions on appeal. All 
thirteen unions responded with a strike on October 1, 1945. 
McNear made no effort to operate trains at first, but then 
changed his mind in response to protests by shippers. A 
group of shippers met with both sides, but no agreement was 
reached. McNear proposed arbitration by a three man panel, 
but the unions wanted arbitration under the Railway Labor 
Act, which McNear would not accept since he felt the ar-
bi trators would be biased in favor of the unions. In 
January, 1946, McNear resumed some service using strikebrea-
kers. Violence soon broke out and McNear posted armed guards 
on trains. This brought more violence as guards shot at 
pickets and strikers fought with train crews. Other rail-
roads embargoed the line and refused to allow its trains into 
their yards if guards were on the trains. One switching road 
also complained that the crews McNear was using were unsafe. 
one engineer was partially blind. 
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The guards th ems elves 
threatened and shot at strikers. Some had criminal records. 
on February 6, guards on a train near Gridley shot and killed 
two pickets and wounded three others. The guards were tried 
for man-slaughter, but were acquitted. Governor Green and 
the Illinois Commerce Commission then tried to settle the 
dispute, but failed.m 
Meanwhile, shippers along the line grew dissatisfied 
with the situation and raised funds for litigation to force 
a settlement. In February, fourteen shippers filed suit in 
federal court seeking to force both sides to end the suspen-
sion of operations and asking the court to appoint a recei-
ver to operate the line. A few days later, the federal dis-
trict court in Peoria appointed a receiver to operate the 
line, but the company appealed and the receivership was 
suspended and then revoked in September by the appeals court, 
which also ordered the district court to issue an injunction 
against the unions. In December, the district court issued 
the injunction and ordered the company to operate the entire 
line. McNear appeared to have won his battle though the 
strike remained unsettled. However, late in the evening of 
March 10, 1947, McNear was taking a walk near his home when 
he was shot and killed by an assassin. The murder was never 
solved, but it was generally attributed to the strike. The 
death of McNear removed any impediment to settling the 
dispute. The trustees who took over the road soon reached 
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an agreement under which all employees were recalled to work 
under pay scales and work rules in use during the federal 
operation of the line. Rail service resumed on April 21. 21 
McNear was right in his oppostion to outdated work 
rules. However, his methods of resolving his disputes with 
labor made no friends for him or his company or the industry 
as a whole. There were several nationwide rail strikes in 
the postwar years. During the Truman years, several were 
settled by seizure of the railroads and arbitration of the 
disputes. The brotherhoods gained some wage increases, but 
were unable to force the railroads to accept additional un-
needed crewmen. Not until the late fifties, sixties and 
seventies, however, did the railroads begin to make progress 
in eliminating unneeded crewmen. Even as of this writing, 
the matter is still unresolved. 22 
The postwar years saw John L. Lewis forced to back 
down during a strike. In April, 1946, Lewis led the bitumi-
nous miners out on strike in a dispute over a variety of is-
sues, including wages and a health and welfare fund. The 
walkout led the government to seize the mines. On May 29, 
Secretary of the Interior J. A. Krug signed an agreement with 
Lewis giving the miners much of what he wanted. However, on 
October 21, Lewis demanded that the pact be reopened. Krug 
sent underlings to confer with union leaders at first. Then, 
on November 13, he met with Lewis and advised him that the 
government would not negotiate, but that the owners would. 
Lewis was angry. 
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He had signed an agreement with the 
government, not the owners, but Krug insisted on presenting 
a plan for negotiating between the union and the owners. 
Attorney General Tom Clark also presented an opinion uphold-
ing Krug's view that the agreement prevailed as long as the 
government held the mines. Lewis, however, said that it 
would terminate on November 20. The government then prepared 
to fight. It froze bituminous coal in transit and storage 
and ordered railroads to cut use of coal. On November 18, 
the Attorney General secured an injunction against the union 
and its officers ordering Lewis and his staff to cease 
termination of the agreement. However, when the union took 
no action, the miners struck on November 20. Public outcries 
prompted Lewis to look for a way out without surrendering to 
the government. He found none. On December 3, he and his 
union were found in contempt of court, and later they were 
fined. Lewis soon called off the strike. He later appealed 
to the Supreme Court, but lost. There were further strikes 
in the late forties with varying degrees of success, but in 
the fifties, the owners themselves changed policies, seeking 
labor peace in the interests of production in a changing 
market. 23 
One major change in the postwar world was the relaxa-
tion of competition between the American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) and its offspring, the CIC. By the late forties, there 
were recurrent discussions of reunification. The old issue 
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of craft versus industrial unionism was dead since many AFL 
affiliates were industrial unions. Still, reunion was 
delayed until William Green, head of the AFL, and Phil 
Murray, head of the CIO, were both dead since neither was 
willing to defer to the other in leadership of a merged 
union. Reunification came in 1955. 24 
Postwar changes in transportation greatly intensified 
existing trends as government lavished vast sums of money on 
new highways, airports and waterway improvements, all of 
which served to shift traffic away from railways. The na-
tion had always financed some highways and canals, but in 
the twentieth century, such programs took on added importance 
as a means of offering competition to the railroads. In 
1916, in response to demands by motorists for good roads, 
Congress established the first federal highway program. By 
the twenties, every state was eagerly building new roads with 
matching federal funds. The roads were soon crowded with 
automobiles, trucks and buses, all of which cut into railroad 
freight and passenger traffic and destroyed the electric 
interurban railways built in the first years of the century. 
In the postwar era, highway spending was greatly expanded 
with new superhighways, turnpikes, expressways and finally 
the Interstate System as well as state and local roads. 
Chicago alone built several expressways, starting with the 
Edens, completed in 1951, and the Eisenhower, finished in 
1956. Automobile usage also increased so that many families 
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came to own two or more cars. Automobiles, trucks and buses 
crowded the new highways in ever increasing numbers. The 
railways themselves established some bus systems to serve 
outlying areas and eliminate branch line trains. Later, the 
Pennsylvania Railroad assisted in the formation of the 
Greyhound network, and other railroads, including the Santa 
Fe and the Burlington, formed the National Trailways System. 
After World War II, they generally sold off these bus lines, 
which then expanded further. By 1962, buses exceeded 
railways in passenger-miles. Truck traffic also grew rapidly 
as more cargo shifted to the highway. Trucks dominated 
certain types of traffic, especially the more profitable 
cargoes. Truck production boomed in the postwar years and 
improvements increased the size and speed of over the road 
trucks. 25 
Air transport grew tenfold during the decade of the 
forties. New four-engined 50-passenger airliners replaced 
two-engined 21-passenger planes. Many states, including 
Illinois, embarked on a program of building airports. The 
number of airports in the state grew from 54 in 1941 to 162 
in 1950. Chicago built O'Hare Airport and Meigs Field. 
Private companies bought planes, and some, like LeTourneau, 
a Peoria firm, built airstrips at their plants. 26 
Railroads at first were optimistic about postwar 
prospects for passenger as well as freight traffic, both of 
which continued at a very high level well into the postwar 
years. 
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Homebound troops and traveling civilians crowded 
trains in the first few months of peace, and travel restric-
tions continued well into the postwar years. Due to the 
crush of freight and passenger traffic, the Office of De-
fense Transportation was not abolished until 1949. Many 
lines, encouraged by the heavy traffic, ordered new stream-
liners, anticipating that trains with modern equipment would 
do well in carrying large numbers of people over moderate 
distances. Late in the war, federal anti-trust litigation 
resulted in the breakup of the Pullman Company into a car-
building firm, which remained independent, and a sleeping 
car operator, which was sold to a group of railroads. The 
new firm ordered new sleepers. Many railroads ordered the 
new vista-dome car, which was introduced in 1945. However, 
delivery of the new cars was delayed by shortages of parts 
caused by strikes and materials shortages. Meanwhile, the 
airlines secured new planes while autobuilders rolled new 
cars off the assembly lines. Though the new trains that were 
built made money at first, it was already too late to stem 
the loss of riders to competing modes. Many potential 
passengers recalled overcrowded conditions on wartime trains 
and swore off rail travel. The automobile, the bus and the 
airliner steadily siphoned off more travelers so that by the 
late fifties, the railroads were running up huge passenger 
deficits, which they subsidized with freight profits. Even 
these were inadequate by 1958 due to heavy truck and barge 
competition. 
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Some responded with cuts in the quality of 
service. This only encouraged more riders to desert the 
rails. The carriers responded by dropping trains at an ever-
increasing rate until the advent of Amtrak saved about half 
of what was left of passenger service. Although Amtrak has 
reversed the decline, its chronic lack of adequate funding, 
coupled with the high popularity and heavy government support 
for competing modes of travel has limited its ability to 
expand its share of the intercity travel market. 27 
Rail freight traffic did far better than passenger 
service in the postwar years, but even that declined steadi-
ly despite significant improvements such as piggyback ser-
vice, unit trains and other technological innovations. As 
of this writing, the railroads, which carried over two-thirds 
of the nation's freight ton-miles in 1945, now handle a 
little over a third. The rest goes by truck, barge, air or 
pipeline. Railroads have been handicapped by excessive 
government regulation, obsolete work rules and by the need 
to build and maintain rail rights of way, while most compe-
ting modes use government-built rights of way at very little 
cost to themselves. Though much of the regulation has been 
abandoned and some changes have been made in work rules, 
this last disadvantage continues. One result of the loss of 
traffic has been mergers and abandonment of redundant and 
little-used trackage. Shortly after the war, the Gulf, Mo-
bile and Ohio merged with the Alton Railroad to form a com-
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petitor to the Illinois Central. However, in 1972, the lat-
ter merged with its rival and has since sold off or abandoned 
much of its track. Recently, the railroad's parent company 
spun off what was left of the Illinois Central itself. Even 
so, Chicago remains a major railroad center and Illinois a 
railroad crossroads with connections between carriers serving 
all parts of the nation, a function it also fulfills for 
highway, air and water carriers. 28 
Dieselization of railway operations was completed in 
the forties and fifties, eliminating not only steam, but some 
electrification. The Gulf, Mobile and Ohio was one of the 
first to retire its steamers in 1949. Other carriers soon 
followed suit, and by 1960, the process, which had started 
before the war, was complete except for a few short lines and 
industrial operations. Even the Illinois Terminal system, 
which was the subject of much controversy for its wartime 
attempt to abandon part of its line, eliminated its electric 
operation in favor of diesels in the mid-fifties. It also 
ended all passenger service at the same time. The line 
through Bloomington and part of the line into Danville, which 
the company had tried to abandon during the war, were finally 
abandoned in the fifties, mainly because of difficulties in 
operating freights over these routes. 29 
Early in 1945, Chicago Mayor Kelly and Governor Green 
agreed on a plan for public ownership of the city's transit 
lines. In the spring of that year, the General Assembly 
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authorized the organization of a transit district to be ad-
ministered by a seven-man board, four appointed by the mayor 
and three by the governor, and created a municipal corpora-
tion, the Chicago Transit Authority, with power to buy and 
operate transit systems in the Chicago area. In June, Chi-
cago voters approved the plans for an exclusive franchise 
for the authority. In 1947, the new transit authority took 
control of the city's streetcar and elevated lines. Later, 
it bought the Chicago Motor Coach bus lines, thereby gaining 
control over all of the city's transit lines. 30 
The Chicago Transit Authority was one of the fruits 
of the postwar cooperation between Mayor Kelly and Governor 
Green. However, while both men profitted from the alliance, 
it was not enough to save their political careers. In Chi-
cago, several factors combined to force Mayor Kelly to re-
tire from office in 1947 rather than run for reelection. 
scandals plagued the public school system throughout the 
Kelly years, largely because he and his allies on the school 
board insisted on appointing political allies to positions 
in the schools. In 1945 and 1946, the situation finally 
reached a crisis when the National Education Association 
issued a report critical of the administration of the school 
system and the North Central Association threatened to with-
draw its accreditation of the school system. The controver-
sy forced Kelly to appoint an investigating committee of 
Chicago educators and abide by its recommendations. School 
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superintendent William H. Johnson and several school board 
members resigned and were replaced from a list of candidates 
submitted by the investigating committee. 31 
Another crisis which damaged Kelly's political con-
trol of the city was racial. Although other municipal ser-
vices were used as sources of patronage, Mayor Kelly always 
protected the Chicago Housing Authority from political in-
terference. This aroused a good deal of hostility from al-
dermen who were angered by its refusal to make political 
appointments. After the war, they found another reason to 
hate the agency. In 1945, with a serious housing shortage 
developing, the Housing Authority began utilizing Quonset 
huts, trailers, converted military barracks and prefabrica-
ted units to house returning veterans until they could find 
suitable homes. Much of the housing was located on vacant 
sites in outlying areas, usually in white neighborhoods. 
Initially, the Housing Authority adhered to a policy of 
segregation, but with blacks constituting 20 percent of 
veterans in need of housing, the agency began selecting 
tenants on the basis of need. Eleven of twenty-one housing 
sites were integrated without incident, but riots broke out 
at Airport Homes and other projects in 1946. Mayor Kelly 
and the Housing Authority backed down in the case of Airport 
Homes, but other veteran housing units remained integrated. 
The last of the temporary projects was not discontinued until 
the mid-fifties. The Housing Authority also met resistence 
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over its efforts to plant public housing in white neighbor-
hoods. Meanwhile, riots broke out as blacks moved into white 
neighborhoods. In the fall of 1945, white students staged 
strikes to protest the presence of blacks in their schools, 
but soon gave in under pressure from the Kelly administra-
tion. Still, racial tensions, especially in housing, 
combined with scandals in the school board and other city 
services and dissension in the Democratic Party in Chicago 
to make Kelly's reelection uncertain. 32 
In 1946, Jacob. M. Arvey replaced Kelly as party 
chief. Soon after the fall elections in which the Republi-
cans made several gains, Arvey surveyed the mayor's pros-
pects for reelection. The results indicated that Kelly would 
have a difficult time winning reelection. Kelly finally 
agreed to withdraw and the machine slated Martin H. Kennelly, 
a businessman and reformer, who won two terms in city Hall, 
before losing to Richard J. Daley in the Democratic primary 
of 1955. 33 
After the Republican victories of 1946, Governor Green 
looked certain to win reelection in 1948. Early in the year, 
with President Truman running as an underdog for a second 
term, the Democratic slatemakers met to choose candidates in 
what they thought would be a losing election. Because of 
the party's poor prospects for victory, they decided to 
choose reform liberal candidates for governor and senator. 
Accordingly, they put up ex-Alderman Paul Douglas for senator 
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and Adlai E. Stevenson for governor. Douglas was originally 
slated for governor, but the machine soon realized that if 
he won, he would be difficult to control. The Senate was a 
safer place for a reformer. He would do little damage there 
and senators had few jobs to hand out anyway. Stevenson was 
a political unknown and seemed unlikely to win. Even if he 
did win, with his lack of experience, the Cook County 
organization felt it would be safe with Stevenson in Spring-
field. 34 
However, the campaign and election proved to be a 
surprise. Truman, Douglas and Stevenson were all strong 
campaigners in Illinois. Stevenson concentrated on state 
issues, which were ready-made, including a mine disaster and 
corruption in the Green Administration and the downstate 
party. on the eve of the election, a new scandal broke in 
Peoria involving collusion between criminals and office-
holders. Douglas, meanwhile, vigorously attacked both the 
extreme left and the extreme right, being opposed both by 
the incumbent Senator c. Wayland Brooks, and the Progressives 
allied with former Vice-President Henry Wallace. Truman 
himself denounced the Republicans in Congress for failure to 
pass a bill to provide storage for surplus corn. Inadequate 
storage, often a problem for Illinois farmers, threatened to 
force the dumping of surplus corn on the market at deflated 
prices. The results were victory for the Democrats. Truman 
squeezed by with a smaller margin than Roosevelt ever 
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received, but both Douglas and Stevenson won by substantial 
• 35 
margins. 
In office, Stevenson proved to be a capable fairly 
effective reform governor, who worked with the Democratic 
organization in Cook county, but did not always follow its 
wishes. The party responded by running him for president in 
1952 in a race he could not win. After the 1952 election, 
the Democrats in Cook County generally reverted to a policy 
of cooperation with the Republicans. With few exceptions, 
the Democratic machine mounted no serious effort to capture 
the statehouse and often exerted little effort in the senate 
races, especially against Republican Senator Everett Dirk-
sen, who got along well with Mayor Daley. In 1960, the ma-
chine slated County Judge Otto Kerner to oppose an incumbent 
Republican governor with an eight-year-record of corruption. 
Kerner won, but made no effort to build up his own machine 
or challenge Daley for control of the party. After Kerner 
left to become a federal judge, the machine went back to 
slating weak little-known candidates, who would not threaten 
the machine, and then gave them little support. The machine 
is primarily interested in the municipal and county elec-
tions, and concentrates on them to the exclusion of anything 
else except for unusual circumstances such as a presidential 
race in which a Democratic candidate such as John F. Kennedy 
could render some assistance to the city of Chicago. 36 
At the same time, the Republicans mounted no serious 
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challenge to the Democratic party in Cook County. Most of 
its mayoral candidates since 1939 have been traditional, old-
line Republican politicians who were not attractive can-
didates and who had little chance to win. Several times, 
the party nominated Democrats who left the party, such as 
Benjamin Adamowski, a maverick politician who usually feuded 
with the machine during his political career. None of the 
Republicans won. Indeed, Bernard Epton, the last one to come 
close to winning, did so only because of the unusual 
circumstances of the race, in which a black anti-machine 
Democrat, Harold Washington, mounted a successful challenge 
to the machine in a mayoral race. In the next mayoral elec-
tion, the Republican candidate finished well behind even a 
more traditional machine challenger to the incumbent Mayor 
Washington. 37 
This collusion between the two parties was a recogni-
tion of political realities. Chicago was ethnic, black, 
Catholic and Democratic, while the downstate was white, Pro-
testant, small-town, Republican and conservative. Downsta-
ters viewed Chicago as a city of sin and corruption. While 
the two areas of the state had conflicting interests, the 
two parties were able to satisfy their own interests and to 
some extent, those of their constituents. 38 
Another change in the postwar political arena was the 
decline of Colonel Robert Rutherford McCormick's influence 
within the Republican party. Though the Chicago Tribune 
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remained a powerful force, it grew steadily out of touch with 
the rank and file, especially the younger Republicans. The 
colonel, who had backed Thomas Dewey in 1940 and opposed him 
in 1944, came out for Ohio Senator Robert Taft in 1948, 
saying that Dewey could not be elected. McCormick and his 
paper were bitter over the results of the convention, which 
it charged was dominated by "America Lasters" and interna-
tional bankers. In November, the Tribune, urged voters to 
support Republicans, but did not mention Dewey. In 1952, 
McCormick again pushed Taft and refused to swallow General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was backed by Dewey. In August, 
he encouraged formation of a third party excluding Truman 
Democrats and "Me-too" Truman Republicans. Though the Colo-
nel approved of some of President Eisenhower's actions, his 
paper generally was cool toward the Administration. Though 
McCormick died on April 1, 1955, his paper reflected his 
influence for many years. Not until 1969, did the Tribune, 
under new leadership, move toward the political center. 39 
The end of the war also brought changes in society. 
Blacks made significant gains in employment during the war. 
However, many lost their jobs when war plants shut down and 
found it difficult to find new ones. In 1948, the Illinois 
Interracial Commission held hearings around the state and 
found continued discrimination by employers and employment 
agencies, especially against blacks, but also against Mexi-
cans, Japanese, Filipinos, Jews and Catholics. One firm 
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fired all Catholics after the war. Blacks were often limi-
ted to low-grade jobs. Newspaper ads specified racial and 
religious restrictions in employment. Even in unionized in-
dustries, blacks often suffered discrimination. Unions af-
filiated with the AFL were reluctant to accept blacks or 
organized them into all-black auxiliary locals. However, 
CIO unions were committed to a policy of nondiscrimination. 
This helped blacks secure employment and advancement in mass 
production industries such as meat packing and farm equip-
ment. Some companies were also committed to equal employment 
opportunities. International Harvester, which had long em-
ployed blacks, found that CIO unions were a useful ally in 
stopping walkouts by whites protesting promotion of blacks. 
The United Auto Workers fought for integration of union fa-
cilities even in Southern locals which favored segregation. 
It was not until the sixties, however, that blacks scored 
significant gains. The civil rights movement gained the 
support of the Democratic Administrations of Presidents John 
F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson in ending discrimination in 
employment, public accomodations, housing, education and 
other areas. 40 
As with blacks, women were laid off in large numbers 
after the war. Everywhere, proportionately more women were 
laid off than men. In some cases, housewives wanted to re-
turn home. Others, however, wished to continue working. 
Many of those laid off from high-paying industrial jobs faced 
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the prospect of accepting lower-paying jobs. In some cases, 
they had been trained to do specific tasks, which were not 
needed in factories producing civilian goods. Hence, they 
had to be retrained at a lower wage. Many were unwilling to 
accept lower-paying jobs or wished to go back to their old 
jobs when the plant reconverted. Because of dissatisfaction 
over pay scales, many chose not to accept the initial job 
offers in the postwar period. In some cases, companies that 
relied heavily on women workers, faced labor shortages. 
still, there were far more openings for men than for women. 
Also, the jobs available to women were generally in tradi-
tional women's occupations. A woman scanning help wanted 
ads in a Chicago newspaper in September, 1945 could find 
openings in stores and office work, but very few factory 
jobs. Eventually, most women were forced to return to white 
collar and service occupations open to them before the war. 
However, more women continued working than before the war. 
In 1940, only 26 percent of American women of working age 
were in the labor force. In 1970, 40 percent were in paid 
employment. More married women with families continued 
working after the war than before the war. The income from 
work has given women increased independence and status. It 
has also allowed them to escape undesirable marriages, thus 
leading to a rise in the divorce rate. Employment of women 
has also led to a decline in the birth rate since many women 
curtailed child-bearing in order to pursue careers or jobs. 41 
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One of the most significant changes brought by the 
war was in the migration of people to war jobs and military 
posts in Illinois. War boom communities like Seneca experi-
enced huge increases in population. Though many people re-
sented the newcomers, others eventually came to accept them. 
The Seneca shipyard attracted workers from all over the 
country, thus exposing Senecans to different points of view. 
Townspeople picked up new ideas, which they put into effect 
in the postwar world. In the summer of 1945, they started 
a new Community Club, which promoted civic improvements, in-
cluding a new bank, road improvements and new recreational 
facilities. The public library enjoyed increased circula-
tion. New schools were built and new civic groups started. 
Seneca, a sleepy rundown town in 1940, was an enterprising 
community in 1950. 42 
Another result of the migration of workers and ser-
vicemen were marriages between migrants and local women. 
Society pages of Chicago newspapers reported an increasing 
number of such marriages as the war went on. Young service-
men were lonely and many women were eager to marry. The 
marriage boom also brought a baby boom. The first six months 
of 1942 saw an increase of 6,621 births in the state. Many 
of these marriages proved unstable and divorces soared. By 
December, 1943, divorces in Sangamon County were 65 percent 
of marriages. By July, 1945, Chicago saw more divorces than 
marriages. In the fall of 1945, one Chicago judge installed 
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a nursery just off his courtroom where children played while 
their parents 9ot divorced. 43 
Reconversion brought substantial changes to Illinois. 
Freed of controls, the state's industries expanded to pro-
duce civilian goods to satisfy a burgeoning consumer market. 
Farmers enjoyed improved living standards fed by record crops 
which sold for record prices. As price controls and ration-
ing eased, labor unions sought wage increases, first to make 
up for reductions in take-home pay due to the elimination of 
overtime, but later to offset the rising cost of living. 
The end of controls combined with a burgeoning consumer 
market and strike-won increased wages to set off an infla-
tionary spiral which continued until supplies began to meet 
demand. Travel restrictions also were lifted, thus allowing 
the public to choose whatever means of conveyance it wanted 
to journey from one place to another. In growing numbers, 
it chose the automobile and the airplane and sometimes the 
bus, but not the train. As riders deserted the rails for 
other means of transportation, the railroads were forced by 
rapidly growing passenger deficits to abandon the business 
of carrying people and concentrate on freight, which was 
still profitable. Even then, they lost business to trucks 
and barges. Though railroads continued to be major players 
in the postwar transportation system, their role was con-
siderably diminished even in Illinois. 
The postwar era in Illinois was a period of prospe-
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rity and some uncertainty. Fears of depression haunted the 
immediate postwar period, while a perceived threat from 
communism led to the demise of several radical unions. some 
groups, especially organized labor, women and blacks, strug-
gled with varying degrees of success, to preserve and extend 
wartime gains. Politically, the postwar years in Illinois 
were a period of change and continuity. Although the major 
wartime political leaders were forced out of office in a wave 
of reform, the fifties brought a restoration of a working 
arrangement between the Chicago Democrats and downstate 
Republicans, which has continued with few interruptions to 
the present day. The political leadership of the postwar 
years also reflected the changed outlook of Illinoisans 
toward the role of government in society and the economy and 
the nation and their state in the rest of the world. Before 
the war, the New Deal was hotly debated. While Chicago 
Democrats strongly supported it, downstate Republicans 
denounced it and farmers were not sure of its merits, though 
they like the benefits they received from farm programs. In 
foreign affairs, the state was a bastion of isolationism. 
The war changed all this. As early as 1940, isolationism 
was becoming less popular among the electorate. The war 
destroyed it. The New Deal also gained acceptance, even 
among Republicans. The result was a substantial erosion of 
the power of Colonel McCormick as voters rejected his 
candidates in favor of more progressive leaders. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The war brought significant changes to Illinois. 
once committed to one party, Illinois became a swing state 
whose allegiance could no longer be taken for granted by 
either party. During the twenties, the Republicans domina-
ted politics in the state only to lose control to the Demo-
crats in the thirties. The forties brought a Republican re-
surgence which recaptured the statehouse for the Grand Old 
Party, but the Chicago Democratic machine strengthened its 
hold on municipal politics. During the thirties and for-
ties, Colonel Robert Rutherford McCormick, the archconserva-
tive owner and publisher of the Chicago Tribune and leader 
of the Illinois Republican Party, often cooperated with his 
friend, Chicago Mayor Edward J. Kelly, in the division of 
political power. While the Democrats focused on municipal 
and county races and exerted little effort toward winning 
state positions, Republicans concentrated on winning the 
statehouse while conceding Chicago to the Democrats. This 
arrangement benef itted Colonel McCormick, who secured the 
election of his proteges and also helped Mayor Kelly who 
gained weak Republican opposition in mayoral campaigns and 
also eliminated his most dangerous rivals within his own 
party by running them for state off ices in races which they 
could not win. The war brought further changes which 
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strengthened the power and prestige of Mayor Kelly, while 
eroding the influence of Colonel McCormick within his own 
party. Before the war, Illinois was a stronghold of isola-
tionism and many Illinoisans questioned the New Deal. After 
the war, this was no longer the case. Even Republicans 
accepted American involvement in world affairs and govern-
ment intervention in the economy. Though Colonel McCormick 
dominated slatemaking in his party, his candidates were in-
creasingly unsuccessful. As a result, Governor Dwight Green 
forged an alliance with Mayor Kelly in the General Assembly 
at least partly to escape the domination of the Colonel. The 
division of power between Democratic Chicago and the Repub-
lican downstate recognized political realities and benefit-
ted both parties as partisan rivalry gave way to a measure 
of bipartisan cooperation. 
A key element in the electoral success of the Chicago 
Democratic machine was the black community, which converted 
to the Democratic Party during the thirties, at least partly 
due to Mayor Kelly's policies. Kelly provided jobs for 
blacks and supported desegregation initiatives. The New Deal 
provided work relief projects. After 1939, a black sub-
machine arose in the black wards. The war brought increased 
job opportunities and status for blacks as labor shortages 
forced many industries to hire blacks for the first time. 
Though many blacks lost their jobs after the war, many others 
achieved lasting gains, especially in mass production 
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industries organized by affiliates of the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations. More importantly, the wartime 
gains helped set the stage for the civil rights movement of 
the postwar era. 
Women also gained increased employment opportunities 
during the war. Though most lost their high-paying jobs in 
war plants after the war, many stayed in the work place. 
There had been some employed outside the home before the war, 
but never in such numbers. After the war, many more women 
continued working albeit in poorly-paid occupations tradi-
tionally open to women. Moreover, as with blacks, war-time 
experiences ultimately led to the womens' liberation movement 
of the sixties and seventies. 
Labor itself benefitted a great deal from the war as 
the crush of business made industries reluctant to fire ex-
perienced personnel for union activity. Hence, many compa-
nies were forced by wartime conditions to accept unioniza-
tion. The war also brought a temporary measure of labor 
peace as both labor and management agreed to abide by deci-
sions of the War Labor Board in those disputes which they 
could not resolve themselves. Labor also agreed to a no-
strike pledge while management reluctantly accepted union 
security. Neither labor nor management was enthusiastic 
about wage stabilization. Labor wished to increase the wages 
of its membership, while management sought to attract and 
retain workers. However, they accepted wage stabilization 
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in exchange for price control as part of a general program 
for controlling inflation. Even with restrictions on income, 
most workers prospered during the war and improved their 
economic status. Ultimately, their earnings and their pent-
up demand for consumer products unobtainable during the war 
contributed to the postwar economic expansion. 
Illinois industry profitted from the defense buildup 
and the war emergency with the vastly increased volume of 
business. Not only did the war bring industry out of a De-
pression, but business activity in the postwar years conti-
nued at a higher level than before the war. Though small 
companies sometimes found it difficult to get contracts, 
almost every firm, large or small, made something for use by 
the armed forces of the United States and its allies. While 
many firms produced items similar to what they made in 
peacetime, others built tanks, artillery and small warships. 
Many manufacturers had to retool and adapt to stringent mi-
litary specifications. Businessmen also cooperated with each 
other and with government agencies in dealing with problems 
of priorities, shortages of materials and tools, plant 
protection and solicitation of business. Wartime conditions 
f creed Illinois industries to be more versatile and gave them 
experience which proved useful in the postwar period when 
many introduced new product lines and improved existing ones. 
The war increased the state's industrial base and the size 
of many individual firms. It also changed the character of 
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the state's industries. Machinery and heavy industry grew 
in proportion to food processing and other trades. 
Although the war did not bring any major technologi-
cal changes in agriculture, it greatly speeded up existing 
trends. Walter Wilcox, in his study of the effect of the 
war on agriculture, maintains that the war increased mechani-
zation and farm size and made farmers more market-minded. 
The thirties and forties saw great progress in mechanizing 
farms throughout the nation. The increase was greatest in 
the West, but also outstanding in the Midwest. During the 
war, shortages of farm equipment retarded mechanization for 
a time, but as manufacturers resumed partial production of 
farm implements late in the war, it proceeded at a faster 
pace. Mechanization relieved labor shortages and made it 
possible to farm more land. This was especially important 
as many farmers were forced into retirement by the shortage 
of farm workers. Their lands were sold to other farmers, who 
increased the size of their own farms. Thus mechanization 
and the shortage of farm labor increased the tendency toward 
fewer and larger farms. Such farmers were more inclined 
toward market-based agriculture than subsistance farming. 
While such trends were already underway in Illinois before 
the war, they were greatly excellerated by wartime condi-
tions. The war also speeded up the growth of the soybean 
industry as soybeans came to rival corn. Despite shortages 
of labor, equipment, feed, storage facilities and freight 
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cars for shipping their produce, Illinois farmers broke all-
time production records on many crops. Though price ceilings 
held down profits, most farmers improved their economic 
status during the war. The war brought Illinois agriculture 
out of a long Depression and into a period of prosperity that 
continued in the postwar years. 1 
As with agriculture, there were no major technologi-
cal changes in the nation's transportation system during the 
war, but it did have to carry a much heavier load with fewer 
workers and insufficient equipment to do the job. To handle 
this burden, carriers had to cease competitive practices and 
cooperate with each other and with shippers and government 
agencies to speed shipments and travelers to their destina-
tions. 
Due to its geographical location and its importance 
as a major transportation crossroads, Illinois and its car-
riers bore a major share of the burden of transporting the 
traveling public and the output of the nation's mills, mines 
and farms. At that time, the railroads dominated freight 
transportation and intercity common-carrier passenger travel, 
but even before the war, highway, water and air carriers were 
capturing much business previously handled by rail. The war 
retarded and even reversed this trend, but the shift resumed 
as the war ended. Indeed airline traffic grew rapidly in the 
final years of the war. Illinois embarked on a program of 
airport construction after the war and Governor Green 
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established a Department of Aeronautics. Illinois continues 
as a major transportation crossroads today, but in highway, 
air and water transport as well as railroads. 2 
Government at all levels played a major role in di-
recting the mobilization of the economy and society to bring 
the war to a successful conclusion. This vast expansion of 
government power was temporary, however, and even then it 
depended on a good deal of cooperation between different 
levels of government as well as business, labor and the ge-
neral public. Also, many programs such as the War Labor 
Board relied on voluntary compliance while local administra-
tion was handled by volunteers. There was no despotism. 
Though the nation accepted some temporary restrictions on 
its liberties, it remained a democracy. 3 
Much of the experience of Illinois in the Second World 
War was replicated in other parts of the nation. And yet 
there was much that was different. The boomtown conditions 
of Seneca, Wilmington and other communities were echoed in 
Willow Run, Michigan and other towns around the country. 
certainly, the inconvenience and deprivation produced by 
price control and rationing was universal. However, Illi-
nois, as a farm state, was not only a consumer, but a 
supplier of black markets, especially in meat. 
In agriculture, the growth of mechanization and farm 
size were a nationwide phenomenon as farmers sought to cope 
with severe labor shortages. However, the West relied much 
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more heavily on imported Mexican workers than did Illinois, 
which, like other Midwestern and Eastern states, utilized 
local labor, especially draft-exempt farm workers. Illinois 
also made extensive use of city-dwellers, especially school 
children, some troops from military posts, prisoners-of-war 
and imported workers from the West Indies. Illinois also 
differed in the nature of its crops. Illinois was a Corn 
Belt state, but soybeans became a significant crop. Even 
today, Decatur, Illinois remains the capital of the soybean 
industry. 4 
Gerald D. Nash, in The American West Transformed, 
described the tremendous impact of the war in changing the 
West from a supplier of raw materials for use by industrial 
consumers back East to an industrial center in its own right. 
Alan Clive, however, in his study of the home front in 
Michigan, found that the war did not bring Michigan out of 
its dependence on the auto industry. Illinois, did not 
undergo such a massive transformation as did the West, but 
it already had a much more diversified industrial base than 
did Michigan or other one-industry states. The war brought 
an increase in industries producing machinery, electrical 
equipment and other capital goods. Such industries came to 
represent a larger proportion of the state's industries as 
compared to food processing and other industries. The trend 
continues. Today, the Stockyards are virtually extinct, 
while Motorola, Sundstrand and other firms loom large in the 
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industrial economy of Illinois. Some political and business 
leaders expected that the aviation engine plants and the 
aircraft factory in Chicago would lead to the emergence of 
Chicago as a major aircraft manufacturing center in the 
postwar period. This did not transpire. The aircraft 
industry was already well established on the West Coast, some 
other states west of the Mississippi River and on the East 
Coast. During the war, the West gained additional aircraft 
plants financed by the federal government. With plenty of 
postwar capacity, the aircraft industry had no need for the 
Chicago engine plants, which were actually operated by 
automobile companies, or the Douglas Aircraft Company plant 
in Park Ridge, which was built of wood to conserve steel. 
Hence, the Chicago and Park Ridge plants closed after the war 
and converted to other uses as did ordnance plants and other 
war industries. 5 
In transportation, however, Illinois was unique. 
Unlike most states, which were served by only a few major 
transportation arteries or were simply points of origin or 
terminals, Illinois was the crossroads of the nation. Due 
to the state's geographical location, most east-west and much 
of the north-south traffic of any kind went through Illinois. 
Hence, Illinois played a much bigger role than any other 
state in the Union in transporting the nation's goods and 
travelers during the war, and felt the burdens of wartime 
traffic and restrictions to a much greater degree. 
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Illinois was also unique in its labor relations. The 
unions themselves were part of national movements, which 
found fertile ground for organizing new locals in the state's 
mills, mines and factories. During the war, labor and 
management throughout the nation generally cooperated with 
the National War Labor in its efforts to resolve industrial 
disputes. However, Illinois furnished significant dissenters 
such as Sewell Avery and George P. McNear, who defied the 
government in their refusal to deal with unions. John L. 
Lewis battled with the government, the companies and rival 
unions in the coal fields of Illinois. It was an Illinois 
company, International Harvester, which promoted company 
unions as a means of thwarting traditional trade unions. 
Even after, they were outlawed, the company continued the 
works councils under various guises and even turned to the 
AFL to keep out the CIO. Other Illinois firms tried similar 
tactics on a smaller scale even during the war. 
The introduction of blacks and women into occupations 
traditionally reserved for white males was also a nationwide 
development. In Detroit, Michigan, whites staged hate 
strikes to protest increased employment of blacks. Phila-
delphia transit workers struck to avoid employment of blacks 
on streetcars. White shipyard workers in Mobile, Alabama 
started a race riot to protest the upgrading of black 
workers. In Illinois, the record was mixed. In East Alton, 
community opposition prevented the integration of the Western 
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Cartridge plant. However, there were very few walkouts in 
war plants around the state over employment or upgrading of 
blacks and all that occurred were short-lived. 6 
Illinois also avoided the race riots that hit Detroit, 
Los Angeles, New York and other cities. In Chicago, Mayor 
Kelly's firm response in quelling any racial incidents kept 
them from developing into riots. Not until after the war, 
when Kelly's power was on the wane did Chicago experience the 
racial conflicts that afflicted other cities. 
The war affected local communities in different ways. 
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the Chica-
go industrial area gained somewhat in population, but the 
labor force was much bigger than in peacetime. Employment 
gained significantly, especially in manufacturing. Expan-
sion of industrial facilities was larger than in any other 
area of the country. The value of industrial production in 
1945 was almost three times the 1939 amount. 7 
Seneca, like other boomtowns, had a different expe-
rience. Seneca did gain a few lasting civic improvements, 
including new schools and sewer facilities. However, the 
biggest change was in the attitudes of local people. Migra-
tion of workers from other parts of the country to work in 
the shipyard exposed Senecans to different points of view. 
After the war, the community was much more energetic in sol-
ving local problems and its citizens were more open to the 
world around them. 8 
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Changes in attitudes were probably the most signifi-
cant result of the war. Illinois's ethnicity and its 
position in the center of the country influenced its support 
for isolationism in the thirties and early forties. Chicago 
had a very large German, Irish and Italian population, which 
was hostile toward intervention in the European war, espe-
cially on the side of the British. Also, the state's 
distance from the sea gave it a sense of security. Illinois 
felt safe from attack no matter what happened along the 
coast. Indeed, Illinois business and civic leaders pointed 
to the state's distance from the coast when lobbying for 
defense industries, arguing that war plants in Illinois would 
be more safe from attack than those on the coast. After 
Pearl Harbor, Illinois, like many other states, took action 
to guard against air attack. However, there was little 
danger of such attacks due to the limited range or enemy 
aircraft, and the defensive measures were discontinued by 
early 1944, thereby reinforcing a sense of security. 9 
However, Illinois became less isolationist during the 
war. By 1945, most Illinoisans accepted the need for some 
measure of international cooperation after the war. They 
also were of the role of their state in the nation and the 
world as a whole. Illinoisans were more outward-looking. 
Mayor Kelly and other officials flew from Chicago to Europe 
late in 1945 to promote trade and direct transatlantic 
service from Chicago. Illinois firms such as International 
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Harvester and John Deere sought new markets and plants 
overseas. 10 
The war brought a new consensus in foreign and 
domestic policy. In his study of the homefront during the 
Second World War, Richard Polenberg notes that the issues of 
American intervention in world affairs and government 
intervention in the economy were undecided in 1941. By 1945, 
even Republicans accepted them and merely quibbled about the 
dimensions of intervention in workd affairs and the extent 
of the welfare state. Although some New Deal programs were 
killed by the war, others survived intact to play a role in 
the war effort. Indeed, war agencies themselves reflected 
a New Deal format. While the war ended the relief aspect of 
the New Deal, it strengthened the role of government in the 
economy. Colonel McCormick continued to voice a conservative 
nationalist opposition to these developments, but even within 
his own party, he came to be seen as the voice of the past. 
The future lay with more progressive leaders of both par-
ties. 11 
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